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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
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Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.

HONORABLE THOMAS F. NEVILLE

JOAN M. FISHER

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
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Petition For Post-conviction Relief Or Writ
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Thomas F. Neville

AFSM

TCGATEGM

Affidavit In Support Of Petition

Thomas F. Neville

CERT

TCGATEGM

Certificate Of Mailing

Thomas F. Neville

RSPS

CCVASQME

State's Response To Petition And Motion
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Petn Response In Opposition To Request To
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Zane Jack Fields, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

9/22/2008

ORDR

DCELLISJ

Judge
Order on Motion That Costs of appeal be Waived Thomas F. Neville

JOAN R.1. FISHER
Idaho State Bar No. 2854
Capital Habeas Unit
Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & ldaho
201 N. Main

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ZANE JACK FIELDS,
Petitioner,

1
1
1
1

1

V

Case No.

SP 0

0/007~1D
&--

PETITION FOR POST-CON?'ICTION
RELIEF OR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS

)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
and

1
1
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff

1
1

V.

1

ZANE JACK FIELDS,
Defendant.

1
)

Case No. 16259
MOTIONS TO CORRECT ILLEGAL
SENTENCES, TO VACATE
SENTENCES OF DEATH AND FOR
NEW SENTENCING TRIAL

Petitioner, Zane Jack Fields, by and through his attorney, Joan M. Fisher of the Capital
Habeas Unit of the Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington and Idaho, files this Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief and/or Writ of Habeas Corpus and his Motion to Correct an Illegal
Sentence, to Vacate the Sentence of Death and For New Sentencing Trial. This petition is filed

PFXITIOIL
FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIE6 A\D/OR WRIT OF HABEASCORPUS;
MOTIONTO CORRECT
~I.LEGALSENTENCES,
V ~ C A T ESENTEWES
OF DEATH, AND FOR NEW SENTENCI~G
TRIAL
-1

pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 19- 27 19 and- 4901 et sey., Idaho Criminal Rulcs 35 and 57.
The relief requested must be granted to avoid a nlanifest injustice and violations of the United
States Constitution Amendments 5, 6, 8, and 14 and Idaho Constitution, Article I, Sections 1,2,
3, 5 , 6 , 7,8, 13, 18 and 21.
Overview of Grounds for Relief
On June 24, 2002, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion in Ring v. Arizorzn,

536 U.S. -, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (June 24, 2002), which clearly establishes that petitioner's death
sentence is unconstitutional. In Ring, the Court held that the fundamental constitutional principle
it had made clear three years earlier, in Jones v. United States, 1 19 S.Gt. 12 15, 1224 n.6 (1 999)
applies to capital cases like all others. That constitutional principle is this: "under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a
crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt." Ikid
The King decision has immediate, obvious and profound implications for this case. Most
obviously, it means that petitioner's death sentence is unconstitutional because he was not given a
jury trial on the statutory aggravating factors that made him eligible for a death sentence under
Idaho law--the very reason the Court in Ring held the death sentence imposed by the State of
Arizona in that case was unconstitutional. It also means that petitioner's death sentence is
unconstitutional because the procedures by which it was imposed disregarded the Jones principle
in a number of other ways, ways that were not immediately at issue in Ring itself. Ln addition,

P E r l rlON FOR POST-C'O~L
ICTION RELIEF AND/OR WRIT OI. HABEASCORPLS;
MOTIOY1 0 CORRLCT
ILI~EGAL
SENT~TC~S,
V A C ~ T SENTE~CLS
E
O F DEATH, A h D FOR Nh% ~ E N T E ~ c I N TRIAL
G
2

-

the concurring opinion of Justice Breyer in Rirzg reopens a related constitutional issue which is
presented by this case, an issue previously thought to be foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent:
whether the jury sentencing in capital cases, that the vast majority of death petialty states
afford, is required by the Eighth Amelidment. And the principles set forth and applied in Ring
and .ln~escall into question the coritinued validity of the Idaho Supreme Court's previous
decisions rejecting claims that jury trials on capital eligibility and sentence are required by
Idaho's constitution.
The decision in Rirtg is thus a truly extraordinary legal development which compels this
Court's reconsideration of the constitutionality of Petitioner's death sentence under both the
United States' and Idaho's constitutional protections. This petition is being filed so that this
Court can give this ease that reconsideration.
The specific grounds for relief it raises are as follows:

I. Custody Status of Petitioner
Petitioner is incarcerated on death row in solitary confinement at the Idaho Maximum
Security Lnstitute at Boise, Idaho.
11. Course of Proceedings
A. Judgment and Sentence
Judgment and sentence were imposed by then District Judge Gerald F. Sehroeder,
Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, County of Ada, Boise, Idaho on March 7, 199 1. Stute of

Idaha v. Zune Jack Fields, Ada County Case No. 16259.
B. Sentences for Which Relief Is Sought

PEFITION EOK POSI-COP~\.ICTIONRhil.IEF 4n(D/OR WRIT OF HABEASCORPUS;
MOTION TO CORRECT
ILI.ECAL SENTE~CES,
V A C A IE S E N T ~ POF
~C
DEATH,
~ S AND FOR NEW SENTENCI~GTRIAL3

-

The sentence ignposed for which relief is sought is a sentcnce of death for one count of
murder in the first degree.

C. Jury Verdict
The jury in Petitioner's case returned a verdict of guilty on one count of murder in the
first degree for murder in the perpetration of a robbery. Tlie infomation under which petitioner
was tried did not allege any aggravating circumstances making petitioner eligible for the death
penalty and no aggravating circumstances were submitted to the jusy.
D. Direct Appeal
Petitioner appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment and Conviction, the
imposition of sentence, and the denial of post-conviction relief. The conviction and sentence of
death were affirmed. State v. Fields, 908 P.2d 121 1, 127 Idaho 904 (19 9 9 , rehearing denied
May 17, 1995, eert. Ilerzied, 1 16 S .Ct. 3 19 (October 10, 1995).
On direct appeal Petitioner challenged Idaho's sentencing scheme for depriving him of a
jury detemination of specific intent to kill in connection with the felony murder aggravating
circumstance in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. State v. Fields, Nos. 19185 & 19809, Brief of Appellant at 57-58 (Idaho Supreme
Court, filed January 27, 1994). In rejecting this argument, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that it

"was not necessary for the jury to find specific intent to Kill in order to convict Fields of that
offense [first degree felony murder]." Fields, 908 P.2d at 1223.
E. Prior Post-Conviction Proceedings

PETITION
FOR POST-CONLICI
ION RELILTAND/OR WRIT OF H.IBEAS CORPUS;
MOTIONTO CORRLCT ILLEGAL S E R l ENCLS,
VACATES E %ENCES
~
OF DEA'IH, AVD FOR NER SENTENCI~~~G
T m h -~4

Following the denial of his appeal and affimiance of the denial of his initial
postca~lvictionpetition, Petitioner filed another petition for post-conviction relief, raising the
issue of jury finding of facts necessary for aggravating circumstances, which was denied by the
District Court and affirmed on appeal. Fields v. Stute, 17 P.3d 230, 135 Idaho 286 (2000). On
rehearing Petitioner raised the issue of jury determination of aggravating factors as requirements
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, Appre~zLltiv. New Jerseey,530 U.S. 466 (2000), and
Jones v. Ur1iti.d States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). The Idaho Supreme Court denied rehearing on
January 25,2001.

F. Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings
Petitioner sought federal habeas corpus relief, including a determination that he was
denied his right to have a jury determine the existence of aggravating circumstances. Fields v.
Kluuser, No. 95-0422-S-EJL, Amended Petition for Writ of I-iabeas Corpus, Claim 36 at 76-77
(D. Idaho, Oct. 1, 200 1). The petition is pending in the federal district court.
111, Due Diligence
Petitioner brings this post-conviction relief petition less than 42 days after the decision in

Ring

V.

Arizona. Although Petitioner raised on both direct appeal and federal habeas proceedings

the constitutionality of the Judge determining the aggravating circumstances and the sentence
(see brief on direct appeal, p. 124 et. seq.) he could not have prevailed earlier because of the
erroneous constitutional analysis applied by the Idaho Supreme Court until the United States
Supreme Court recognized that only a jury may make the factual findings which make a
defendant eligible for the death penalty. Petitioner's other claims herein, including the

PFTITION
FOR POST-CCJYLIC~IONRELIEF
AND/OR N R I T OF HABEASCORPUS;
M O r l O N T O CORRECT
ILLEGAL SENTENCES,
VACATE SENTEPICES
01. DEATH, AND FOR Nk U SE~TE\CIUG
TRIAL5

-

constitutional right to notice in the infomation of the aggavating circumstances, the right to a
preliminary hearing on the existence of such circumstances, and the violation of his right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment due to excessive delay could also not have been raised
earlier as they arise directly from the co~sstitutionalparameters of Kirzg v. Arizoiza.
V.

Grounds for Relief

A. Factual Background
Petitioner was charged with an information which contained no notice of any of the
statutory aggravating circulnstances ultimately found by the sentencing judge. Exhibit 1
(Lnfomation); Exhibit 2 (Findings of Judge). No preliminary hearing was held to determine
probable cause respecting any aggravating circumstances. At trial the jury was not required to
determine the Petitioner's mens rea as constitutionally required under Etzmund v. FIori~Iu,458
U.S. 782 (1982).
The jury which tried petitioner was not instructed on and did not determine any of the
statutory aggravating circumstances. In fact, the jury was explicitly instructed that it could not
consider punishment in its deliberations. Exhibit 3.

B. Claims
1. The death penalty statute under which petitioner was tried and sentenced (Idaho Code

5 19-25 15) denied petitioner his right under the United States and Idaho Constitutions to have the
aggravating circumstances which made him eligible for the death penalty determined only by a
jury. United States Constitution, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, Idaho Constitution
Article I, Sections I, 2, 7, 13, 18, Idaho Code 19- 1902; Ring v. Arizona, supra; Apprendi v. New

P E T I T I OFOR
~ POST-C'ORVICTION
RELIEFAND/OR WKlT 01. HABEAS CORPUS;
MOTIONTO CORWCr ILLEGAL SENILFVCLS,
VACATE SENTENC~X
OF DEATH, AND FOR N E W S L N T E N C ITRIAL
~G - 6

Jersey, 5330 U. S, 466 (2000); Sullzvurz tt.Lozcisianu, 508 U.S. 275 (1 993); 111 re Winslzip, 397

U.S. 358 (1972); Dutlcun v. l,oulsianu, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
2. The death penalty statute under which petitioner was tried and sentenced denied
petitioner his right to notice in the charging doculnent of the aggravating circumstances which
would make bin1 eligible to be sentenced to death. United States Constitutio~i,Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth h e n d m e n t s ; Idaho Constitution, Article 1, Sections 1, 8, and 13, ldaho Code 19-

102; Ring v. Arizotla, supra; Jones v. Ui;t~tedStates, 526 U.S. 227 ( 1999).
3. The death penalty statute under which petitioner was tried and sentenced to death
deprived petitioner of his right under Idaho law and the Idaho Constitution of a preliminary
exmiination on the existence of aggravating circumstances which would make petitioner eligible
for the death penalty, denial of which violates the due process clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States; Idaho Constitution Article I, Sections 1, 7, 13, 18; ldabo Code
19-1308; Hzcb v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S.343 (1980).
4. The death penalty statute under which petitioner was tried and sentenced denied
petitioner his right to have a jury determine his sentence. United States Constitution, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, Idaho Constitution, Article I, Sections 1, 6, 7 and 13, Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. at --, 122 S .Ct. at 2446 (Breyer J., colzcurring in the judgtnent); Furmun v. Ceorgzu,
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
5. A jury did not determine whether Petitioner acted with requisite mens rea as required
under E~ztnundv. Florida, 458 U.S. 477 (1981), in violation of Petitioner's rights under the Sixth,

PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RhL.IEF AND/OR WRIT 01. HABEAS
COKPUS;
MOTIONTO CORRECT
ILLEGALSENTENCES,
VACATESENTENCES OF DEATH, AND FOR NEW sENTEhClNG TRIAL
-7

Eighth, and Fourteenth Anlendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 1,
7, 13, and 18 of the Idaho Constitution.
6. The death penalty statute under which petitioner was tried and sentenced denied
petitioner his right to have the factual question whether all of the mitigating circumstances
outweighed each of the aggravating circumstances. United States Constitution, Fifth, Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments, Idaho Constitution, Article I, sections 1, 7, 13, and 18, Ring v. Arzzor~a,
supra; State v. Charhsneau, 1 16 Idaho 129, 773 P.2d 293 (1989).
7. The 11 years under which petitioner has been confined under a sentence of death
obtained through an unconstitutional process despite petitioner cosnplaining at the trial, direct
appeal and habeas stages of the unconstitutionality of the sentencing scheme used to secure his
death sentence has subjected petitioner to cruel and unusual punishment under both the federal
and Idaho state constitutions. United States Constitution, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments;
Idaho Constitution, Article I, sections 1, 6, 13, and 18; State v. Faiiz, 116 Idaho 82, 113, 774
P.2d 242, 283 (1989) (Bistline, J, corzcurrzng and dissenting); State v. Osborrz, 104 Idaho
809,82 I, 663 P.2d 1 1 l 1, 1 123 (1 983) Bistline, J., concurrirzg and dissenting.)
8. To execute petitioner despite the clear unconstitutionality of the procedures by which
his death sentence was imposed, despite the fact that he made timely objection to those
procedures, and despite the fact that most or all other similarly situated and tried capital
defendants in Idaho will not be put to death without being afforded those constitutional

Y E T I ~ I O NFOR POST-CONVIC~
ION RELIWAhD/OR WRll OE HABEAS CORPUS;
MOTIONTO C O R ~ C ?ILLEGAL S~~TO-CKS,
VACATE SENTENCES
01; D E ~ T H AND
,
FOR N6W ShFtTESCING TRIU 8

-

protections, would constitute a gross and unjustifiable denial of the equal protection of ihe law
guaranteed by the Fourteenth h e n d m e n t to the Constitution of the United States and Article I,
Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution and the arbitrary imposition of death in violation of the
Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the Uslited States and Article I, Section 6 or the Idaho
Constitution. firnturt v. C;eoug~u,408 U . S . 238 (1972);DougEus v. Cui@vtzzu, 372 U.S. 353,

357 ( I 963); S ~ l z ~ v.
t h Beaneft, 365 U.S. 708,7 13-14 (1 961).
This Petition and Motions are based on the files and records of the State o f h l z o v. Zane
Jack Fields, Ada County Case No. 16259, and the prior post-conviction proceedings held
thereon, judicial notice of which is requested, the Verification of Petitioner herein below and the
Affidavit of Counsel filed in Support hereof.
Wherelbre, Petitioner seeks from this Court:
1. An order vacating petitioner's sentences of death and setting the same for re-

sentencing with instructions that death may not be imposed; and
2. Any and all other relief which the court deems necessary in the interests of justice.
DATED this 1" day of August, 2002.
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STATE OF IDAHO

)
:ss

County of Ada

1

Zane Jack Fields, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and says as follows:
That he is the Petitioner in the above-entitled action; that he has read the above and
foregoing Petition For Post-Conviction Relief andor Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to
Concct Illegal Sentence, Vacate Sentence of Death and for New Sentencing Trial, that he knows
the contents thereof and that thc facts stated herein are true and to the best of his knowledge and
belief.

Petitioner

9

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this b d a y of August, 2002.

State of Idaho, residing at
, therein.
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GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Room 103 Courthouse
Boise, ID 83702-5954
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NO

FILED
LM.-

PM

AUG

4

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
1

THE STATE OF IDAICO,
Plaintiff ,

1
1
1

-vs-

I N F O R M A T I O N

)

1
1
1

ZANE JACK FIELDS,
Defendant.

GREG H. BOWER,
County

of

Ada,

State

Prosecuting Attorney
of

Idaho, who

in

in

the

and

Court

of

the

now

into

County of Ada, and states that Zane Jack

Fields is/are accused by this
MURDER

the

name and by the

authority of the State, prosecutes in its behalf, comes
District

for

Information of

the

crime(s) of:

IN THE FIRST DEGREE, FELONY, I.C. 18-4001, 02, 03(d) which

crime(s) was committed as follows:
That the defendant, ZANE JACK FIELDS, on or
of

February, 1988,

INFORMATION,

in

the

about

11th

day

County of Ada, State of Idaho, did,

Filed Aug. 4 , 1 9 8 9

00016

w i l l f u l l y , u n l a w f u l l y , and w i t h
Catherine

malice

kill

Mary

V a n d e r f o r d , a human b e i n g , by s t a b b i n g h e r i n t h e n e c k ,

c h e s t , and b a c k from which s h e d i e d on
murder

aforethought,

was

committed

in

the

F e b r u a r y 11,

perpretation

1988,

which

of a r o b b e r y a n d / o r

burglary.
A 1 1 of which i s c o n t r a r y t o t h e form,

the

force

and

effect

of

s t a t u t e i n s u c h c a s e and a g a i n s t t h e p e a c e and d i g n i t y of t h e

S t a t e of I d a h o .

/

Ada Cou t y P r o s e c u t i n g A t t o r n e y

INFORMATION,

-

EXHIBIT #2
FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN
CONSIDERING THE DEATH
PENALTY UNDER SECTION
19-2515, IDAHO CODE

MAR 0 7 1991

DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT GF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

3

IDAHO,
11 THE STATE OFPlaintiff,

J
)
)
)
)
)
)

vs .
ZANE JACK FIELDS,
Defendant.

Case No. 16259
FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN
CONSIDERING DEATH PENALTY
UNDER SECTION 19-2515,
IDAHO CODE.

I

I

I

The above-named defendant having been found guilty by a jury
of the criminal offense of Murder in the First Degree which under
!

law authorizes imposition of the death penalty; and the court

1

having ordered a presentence investigation of the defendant and
thereafter held a sentencing hearing for the purpose of hearing
16

17

/
/

all relevant evidence and argument of counsel in aggravation and
mitigation of the offense.
NOW THEREFORE the court makes the following findings:

1

19

I

';

1.

Conviction.

The defendant while represented by counsel

was found guilty of the offense of Murder in the First Degree by
jury verdict.

22

I

2.

Presentence Report.

A presentence report was prepared by

23 . , order of the court and a copy delivered to the defendant or his
!

24

counsel at least seven (7) days prior to the sentencing hearing
pursuant to section 19-2515, Idaho Code, and the Idaho Criminal
Filed Mar. 7, 1991

00019

I
i

Rules.

The defendant objected to portions of the presentence

report, and the court has ruled on those objections in a separate
memorandum.

The court has excised those portions of the report to

which an objection was sustained,
3,

Sentencing Hearing.

A sentencing hearing was held on

January 14, 1991, pursuant to notice to counsel for the defendant;
and that at the hearing, in the presence of the defendant, the
court heard the arguments of counsel, Evidence was not submitted
by either the prosecutor or the defendant, but each had previously
submitted sentencing memoranda.

4.

Facts Found in Mitigation.

The mitigating factors that

appear to the court are as follows:
The defendant was abandoned by his father when he was two
years old.
Apparently he was oppressed by a dominant female figure early
in life which has contributed to the aggressive attitude he has
displayed toward women.
There is some indication that he suffered childhood
convulsions and that he reacted poorly under stress.
The defendant has relative low intelligence.

As a teenager

he was evaluated in the area of borderline retardation. However,
he has completed a GED program.
The defendant has been a drug and alcohol abuser for many
years, commencing at an early age.
I

FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN CONSIDERING DEATH PENALTY

As a teenager he indicated

that he used "all kinds of alcohol" and "as much as possible,

The :

use of alcohol and drugs has impaired his ability to conform his
I

conduct to legal and social standards.

I

i

As an inmate in the penal system he has been able to conform
his conduct
time.

;

institutional standards for substantial periods

A Department of Corrections report dated June 6, 1981,

indicates that he volunteered to help and seemed willing to work.
I

A

progress report dated September 1, 1981, indicates that he was

"manageable within the protective custody unit at the ISMF, having

1

I

I

0

received no disciplinary reports and generally receiving above

I

average on his work evaluations." A report November 11, 1984,
indicates that he completed a high school course in the
penitentiary.

On January 20, 1986, he was evaluated as a good

worker and on August 6, 1986, he was noted to be polite to staff,

i

friendly with other inmates and generally to follow the rules.
5.

i

Statutory Aggravating Circumstance Considered But Not

Found Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.

Idaho Code

§

19-2515(q)(5).

The

state seeks a determination that the aggravating circumstance set
forth in Idaho Code

§

19-2515(g)(5) exists, asserting that, "The

murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting
exceptional depravity."

In ordinary language it might appear that

this killing falls within those words.

The victim was a 69 year

old woman who was stabbed numerous times and left to die by a
large, young man.

However,'to find this aggravating circumstance

FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN CONSIDERING DEATH PENALTY

the court must find that the killing was accompanied by additional

1

acts which set the crime apart. from the norm of capital felonies

11 -

"the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily

tortuous to the victim."
5
6
7

8

(/

/I

,

Clearly this crime was conscienceless

and pitiless to the victim.

I

However, the court cannot find beyond

'

1

a reasonable doubt that it was more tortuous than other killings.

1 The killing was not accomplished with surgical precision. It was
(1 cruel, as virtually all murders are, but the victim was not

I
i
1
I

I

I

tortured or put to pain beyond the infliction of the wounds, one

9

I

of which was fatal.

10

Aggravating Circumstances Found Beyond a
I i ReasonableStatutory
Doubt.
6.

a.

Idaho Code 5 19-2515(q) ( 6 1 .

The state seeks a determination

that the aggravating circumstance set forth in Idaho Code 5 19-

I

i

I
j

1

2515(g)(6) exists in that, "By the murder, or circupstances

/I

I

surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter
disregard for human life."

This element requires a showing of

acts or circumstances "which exhibit the highest, the utmost,

11I I

callous disregard for human life, i.e. the cold-blooded, pitiless

/I

reasonable doubt.

II

multiple times.

slayer." This aggravating circumstance has been proved beyond a
The defendant stabbed a 69 year old woman

iI

She posed no physical threat to him.

He left her

I / to die. He stabbed her to complete a small value property crime
11

11
/

or to avoid detection for that crime.

I
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In any use of language, he

I

1

1:

CI3
0

a
s
~ - r

1

displayed utter disregard for h m a n life which was callous, cold-

2

blooded, pitiless.

3

1

.

b.

The state seeks a determination

that the aggravating circumstances set forth in Idaho Code

§

19-

2515(g)(7) has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt in that the
6

/

murder was committed in the perpetration of a robbery and/or

l

burglary and was accompanied by an intent to cause death.

I

1

The

jury found the defendant guilty of felony murder, that is, murder
committed in the perpetration of a robbery and/or a burglary.

In

this case the court gave a more restrictive instruction on the
element of intent than may be necessary for felony murder,
instructing the jury on the elements of malice aforethought.
l3
j4

17

I/
I/
I/

21
22

23
24

Implied malice

involves conduct with a wanton disregard for human life.
statutory aggravating circumstance under I.C.

§

To be a

19-2515(g)(7) the

court must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was
/I with
a specific intent to cause death, not the wanton disregard
for human life of implied malice.

18

20

Express malice involves an intention to kill.

I/
/I
I/
ll

11
11

The element of a killing with a

specific intent to cause death has been established beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The state relies upon the number and savagery of the wounds
as evidence of an intention to kill.
that intention, but by itself is also
disregard far human life.
FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN CONSIDERING DEATH PENALTY

It is powerful evidence of
consistent with a wanton

However, additional facts support the

Ii

finding that the wounds were inflicted with an intention to kill.
ii

2

1

If the defendant had merely sought escape when confronted by Mrs.

3

Vanderford, he could have overpowered her easily without the
of a lethal wound. The only reason to use a knife was
ll toinfliction
silence her forever. As Scott Bianchi testified, echoing the

I

i
II

defendant's words, he, the defendant, needed "to finish the job. "

i

I! significantly against the finding that he intended to kill her.
The fact that she was still alive when he left does not weigh

8

1

9

I

kill her

/ c.

12

-

We intended to "finish the job"

-

I
I

to

Idaho Code

19-2515(q)(8).

The state seeks a determination

conduct in the commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a
propensity to commit murder which will constitute a continuing

iI

III

i

1I
1

I

!

threat to society."

19

I

A 1974 report by Ira Nadler a psychiatrist at State Hospital
South has a chilling forecast of this case, noting of Zane Fields

II

20
21
22

'1

that, "He also denies any actual rape of people and denies ever

i1 I

having used a knife in order to commit assault on a lady."

lj

report continues to state the following: "He does not show any

1!

The

II

23
24

I1 'i
I

appropriate concern about the acts he has committed and does not
look at all upset about the accusation of having raped a three
FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN CONSIDERING DEATH PENALTY

CI

rr;E
i 00

I

/11

0

I
I

2515(g)(8) exists in that, "The defendant, by prior conduct or

18

w

/

and he did.

that the aggravating circumstance set forth in Idaho Code 5 19-

13

:

The number and extent of the wounds would have left no reasonable
doubt as to the outcome.

10

I

year old."

Dr. Nadler diagnosed him as antisocial personality,

borderline mental retardation.
The clinical record from State Hospital South in 1975 notes
another instance of inappropriate sexual behavior

that required

his removal from the facility for the safety of other patients.
The presentence report dated December 12, 1976, for his first
adult felony notes the following:
"The subject's commitment to the Youth
Training Center in St. Anthony, Idaho, began
in 1972. This commitment occurred when the
subject violated curfew and made threatening
gestures with a knife toward a girl. During
that same year, the subject was granted an
extended leave to Idaho Falls. June 14, 1973,
Zane was returned to the Youth Training Center
after being charged with assaulting a woman in
an Idaho Falls laundromat. According to YTC
records, this charge was subsequently dropped.
In June of 1974, another incident involving
attempted rape reportedly occurred in a park
in the area.
The presentence investigator noted in the 1976 report that,
"The subject's behavioral problems were not altered significantly
by either hospitalization or commitment to the Youth Training
Center.

Zane's performance under probation as a juvenile was

poor. ''
Clinical records from State Hospital South in Blackfoot from
January, 1975, reveal the following comments from Richard Grow,
Ed. D., Psychologist 111:
"Zane has not internalized the values and norms of our
FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN CONSIDERING DEATH PENALTY

,

I

I

!
society. He is impulsive and has a low frustration
tolerance. He is prone to be suspicious of others and
tends to blame others for his mistakes. He seems unable
to learn from experience and, thus, modify his behavior.
Finally, I deeply fear that Zane is incapable of
significant loyalty and tends to perceive people as
objects. His views of sexuality are distorted, and he
has felt downtrodden by some important female sexual
figure in the past.

i

I

1

I

I

1
I

I

I

1
While he is not actively psychotic, there are hints of a
I
thought disorder which will increase in proportions in time.

I

In a psychiatric sense, there is nothing about Zane that
should excuse him from criminal responsibility for his
behavior. In my judgment this is not the last that the
criminal justice system will hear from this individual,
and he will be a habitual offender of a progressive
nature.

II
I
I

i

I f 3 3

/

I

I

In 1978 Fred Kirn, a psychologist at the Idaho Security
Medical Facility, reported as follows:

"In summary unless Mr.

Fields changes, his present thought patterns and decreases his
14

alcoholic consumption there is a strong likelihood that he will

15

continue to act out criminally, violently and ~ e x u a l l y . ~ ~

17
18

As an adult Mr. Fields failed on probation, committing

11

forgery while on bond for delivery of marijuana.

1

Mr. Fields developed a plan to become a private detective, but

/

I

By August, 1982,

I
II

according to the progress report of August 5, 1982, had made

!

little progress towards rehabilitation.

1

The 120 day jurisdiction evaluation dated September 21, 1983,

i 1I

noted that Mr. Fields was free of disciplinary violations, but the

I

22

23
24

l
/1

social workers rated him as a poor candidate for successful
completion of probation.
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The concerns were accurate.

On April

1
I
I

1

0

10, 1984, he was declared a probation violator.
In general the defendant has not been a discipline problem in
the penitentiary, but he has consistently violated laws when
released.
record:

The following is a s m a r y o f the defendant's criminal

1) a 1976 conviction for grand larceny, resulting in a

five year commitment with a 120 day retained jurisdiction; 2) a
1977 conviction from Bonneville County for unlawful possession of
controlled substance, resulting in a suspended sentence and
probation;

3 ) a 1977 probation violation in Bonneville County,
63

resulting in revocation of probation and commitment to the Idaho

C

State Correctional Institution for the indeterminate three year
period that was previously suspended;

4) a 1980 misdemeanor

CI

conviction in Bonneville County for petit theft, resulting in a
$60.00 fine, plus a jail sentence;

5) two felony convictions in

Go
'

j

Bonneville County in 1980 for forgery and delivery of a controlled I
I

substance resulting in indeterminate five year sentences to the
Idaho State Correctional Institution. Additionally, at that time
there was a probation violation;

6) a 1984 felony conviction for

second degree burglary, accompanied by a probation violation for
the burglary, resulting in concurrent sentences to the Idaho State
Correctional Institution for terms not to exceed five years;

7) a

1986 felony conviction in Bannock County for grand larceny,
resulting in a jail sentence;

8) a 1987 conviction in Ada County

(Boise) for pedestrian under the influence, resulting in a fine
FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN CONSIDERING DEATH PENALTY

W

and costs;

1988 felony conviction in Ada County for
I

aggravated assault, resulting in a sentence of five years to the

2

Idaho State Correctional Institution and at the same time a
misdemeanor conviction for petit theft, resulting in a 127 day
5

jail sentence.

6

occurred subsequent to the murder in this case.

The aggravated assault and the petit theft

In addition to the adult criminal record, the defendant's

7

8

juvenile record began in 1968 with a finding under the Youth

9

Rehabilitation Act that he committed burglary.

/I

lo
11

In 1969 he was

I

found to have committed shoplifting, "car prowl," and auto theft.
In 1972 he committed assault.

iI O

In 1973 he was charged with assault /

12

with intent to commit rape.

13

assault with intent to commit rape occurred. As a juvenile he was

14

placed on probation, was ordered to undergo psychological

15

counselling, was committed to the Youth Training Center, to a

16

Harbor House and to the Idaho Youth Ranch.

17

Hospital South in Blackfoot on two occasions.

' w
t.r

In 1974 another incident involving

00

1

18

I

He also was in State

Sworn testimony from pre-trial proceedings in this case

I

l9

!

indicates that he is volatile and threatening.

I

1

I

20

:

21

: beyond a reasonable doubt that in free society the defendant has

I

A dichotomy exists in this case.

The record establishes

t

,

i
1

I

I

22

exhibited a propensity to commit crimes which will constitute a
continuing threat to society.

24

He views people as objects.

fascinated with weapons, particularly knives.
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He is

In commission of

1

'

li

'

the murder at hand he killed when his property crime was detected.

1

I

!1

In free society he would constitute a continuing threat to kill

1

I

3

when others interfere with his desires, as occurred in this case.
I

On the other hand much of the defendant's institutional

4

record is discipline free.

,

An argument can be made that

6

institutionalization would take away the continuing threat,

7

Obviously if one is isolated from the opportunity to commit

I

acts he will not commit harmful acts. However, the court
I/ harmful
is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that if frustration or

El
9

l2
13
14

I/

if the opportunity arose.

The fact that, hypothetically the

can be prevented from committing acts
isolation does /
/I1 defendant
not mean he does not constitute a continuing threat to society to 1
// commit murder if the occasion arises.
1
by

will be a continuing threat to society has been proved beyond a

16

I/
I

t

18

7.

Additional Fact in Aggravation.

I

Eleven days after

19

murdering Mrs. Vanderford the defendant committed a petit theft at

20

Shopko in Boise, Idaho. When an attempt to apprehend him occurred

21

he drew a handgun on store personnel, resulting in a conviction

22

following jury trial for aggravated assault and petit theft.

23

murder and the aggravated assault occurred within approximately

24

two months of his release from the penitentiary.

25
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26

I

!

reasonable doubt.

I

' I

0

i 00

The aggravating factor of a propensity to commit murder which

15

17

I

aggravation confronted the defendant in confinement he would kill

10

l1

1

The

The fact that he i

W

1

committing another theft, carrying a weapon and threatening use of

I1
5

g

la
11

12
l3

15

The number of witnesses present eliminated the

of killing to avoid detection.
I1 practicality
This is a factor that would logically seem to fall within the
consideration of I.G. S 19-2515(g)(8) as an aggravating

6

8

the weapon.

I

1I1

1

circumstance, but the reference to "prior c o n d u ~ tprecludes
~~
its

1

consideration under that statutory provision, since it occurred
subsequent to the murder.

I wC3
/

Therefore, the court sets it forth

11 separately as a factor considered in understanding the defendant.
/ / Imposition of the death penalty upon this circumstance would not

1

i

be proper.

8. Weighing the Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in
/I Determining
the Penalty. The court is required to weigh a11

I

mitigating factors against each aggravating circumstance.

16

The aggravating circumstance in I.C. 2515(g)(6) that, !!By the

17

murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant

18

exhibited utter disregard for human life" outweighs all mitigating /

I

I

19

/I

circumstances. One may have sympathy for the circumstances of the /

20

ii1 ,

defendant's life, but the cumulative effect of all mitigating
i

I '

21

il
I

22
23

24

25

I

factors pales in the face of the aggravating circumstance of utter
I

I ' disregard for Mrs. Vanderford's life. The mitigating factors do

11
I

1

I

I111

l

not outweigh the aggravating circumstance and do not make
imposition of death unjust.
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1I
I

i

I
I

Siniilarly the mitigating factors do not outweigh or balance

1

I

1

the aggravating circumstance in I.C. D 19-2515(g)(7) that in the
cnmission of felony murder the defendant had a specific intent to
,

I
I
I

I

kill.

The cumulative mitigating circumstances are insubstantial

I

in comparison to the magnitude of the act of intending to kill in I

5
6

II , the commission of a felony. Again, the mitigating factors do not
I

I/

7

,I

of death unjust.

8

I

12

The cumulative effect of the mitigating circumstances does

j
/I
II

13

threat to society so as to make imposition of death unjust.

There

have been some sad events in the defendant's life and a limited
number of positive factors.

The limited positive traits shown by

14

:I

the defendant are insubstantial in comparison to the danger he

15

I

poses to others.

I/
16

The mitigating factors do not outweigh the

aggravating circumstance and do not make imposition of death

1 /
I

17

unjust.
9.

The Factor of Guilt.

A jury has found the defendant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

That finding was based in

significant part on inmate testimony implicating the defendant.
Before considering imposition of a death penalty the court feels a
legal and moral obligation to test whether there is sufficient
certainty in the evidence to dictate that a person die when inmate
testimony constitutes a substantial part of the evidence leading
FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN CONSIDERING DEATH PENALTY

I

I

not outweigh the propensity to commit murder as a continuing

10
11

outweigh the aggravating circumstance and do not make imposition

O
10
)-L

,

00
U1

to the conviction.

If the court harbors doubts about imposing a

death penalty based on the inmate testimony, apart from any other
weighing process, individual conscience would dictate against the
imposition of death.

The only barrier that might stand between

the defendant and the ultimate criminal penalty is if the quality
of evidence were such that the death penalty would
in light of that evidence.

be too final

There is no such barrier.

It is the court's conclusion

of conscience shield the defendant.

-

that the appropriate penalty is death.

'
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FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN CONSIDERING DEATH PEXALTY

No doubts

District Judge

/

EXHIBIT #3
JURY INSTRUCTION N0.23
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INSTRUCTION NO.

%3 -

It .is not within your province to concern yourselves with
the question of penalty or punishment.

That feature of the case

is solely for the Court. Therefore, I instruct you not to

concern yourselves with it at all. Your duty as jurors is solely
to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused and upon that
question and that question alone you, as jurors, are to vote and
return your verdict.
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JOAN r\%. FISHER
ldsbo State Bar 2854
Capital Habeas Unit
Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho
201 N. Main
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-01 80

IN THE DLSTIUCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ZANE JACK FIELDS,
Petitioner,

)
)

)
)
V

1

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)

and

)

SP OT 0 2 0 0 7 1 1 D

Case No.
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF'
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF OR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS

1
1

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff

)

)
v.

1
1
1

ZANE JACK FIELDS,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO

Case No. 16259
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO CORRECT ILLEGAL
SENTENCE, TO VACATE
SENTENCE OF DEATH AND FOR
NEW SENTENCING TIUAL

)
: SS.

County of Latah

1

I, Joan M. Fisher, counsel for the Petitioner, a person over eighteen years of age and
competent to testify, and mindful of the penalties of perjury, and in compliance with Idaho Code
$19-27 19(5)(a) say and declare as follows:
AFFLDAF IT tN SUPPORT OF PETITIOIh FOR POST-CONVICTION RELEI&OR \* RIT OE HABEAS COKPUS,
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPOR1 OF MOTION TO CORKECT ILLEGAL SEnlTEhCE, TO VACATE SENTEhCE OF DLATII, iLniD FOR YE% SLN 1 ENCING TIUAL

1

1.

I an1 and have been the courl-appointed counsel for Petitioner sirzce 1996 and as such am
fully fmiliar with the facts and circumstances surrounding Petitioner's conviction a11d
sentence which are challenged herein.

2.

That I an fmiliar with the record of the case and law surrounding the issues raised
herein.

3.

The doeumcnts attached to the Petition are true and correct copies of the original
documents filed in the underlying conviction, &ate of I~iahovs. Zuiw Jack Fields. Ada
County Case No. 16259.

4.

The facts raised in the Petition for Post-conviction Relief, and Motion to Correct Illegal
Sentence and For New Sentencing are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
DATED this

of August, 2002.

efore me this

I

day of August, 2002.

AEFWAVIT IN SI'PPORT OF PhTI FlOh FOR POST-COh'I'IC 11Oh RELEIE OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,
AFFIDAVIT Lni SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CORRECT lLLEGAL SEN rENCE, TO VACATE SENTENCE OF DEATH, AFiD FOR NLU SENTENCING TMAL
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2

GREG H. BOWER
Ada Cotmty Prosecuting Attorney
Roger Bourne
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar #2127
200 Mr. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Case No. SPOT0200711D
ZANE JACK FIELDS,

)

Petitioner,
)

VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,
)

Respondent.

STATE'S RESPONSE TO
PETITION FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF, MOTION
TO CORRECT ILLEGAL
SENTENCES, TO VACATE
SENTENCES OF DEATH AND
FOR NEW SENTENCING TRIAL
AND STATE'S MOTION TO
DISMISS

COMES NOW, Roger Bourne, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for
the County of Ada, State of Idaho, and makes the State's Response to the
above-described motion for new sentencing.
This defendant should not be resentenced. The U.S. Supreme Court
opinion in R i n v.
~ Arizona does not apply retroactively for the reasons set out
below. Additionally, even if the Ring holding were to be applied, the jury that
found FIELDS guilty of First Degree Murder also found the statutory
aggravating circumstance that Judge Schroeder relied on in sentencing the
defendant t o death. Both issues will be discussed below.
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF, MOTION TO CORRECT
ILLEGAL SENTENCES, TO VACATE SENTENCES OF DEATH AND FOR NEW SENTENCING
AND STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS (FTELDSiSPOT020071 ID), Page 1
8
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parts, or appendages may not by themselves constitute deadly weapons under
the aggravated assault and aggravated battery statutes.))
In his dissent from the Ring decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated
his belief that many death row inmates would challenge their convictions
based on the

decision. He stated:

'? believe many of these challenges will ultimately be
unsuccessful, either because the prisoners will be unable to
satisfy the standards of harmless error or plain error review, or
because, having completed their direct appeals, they will be
barred from taking advantage of today's holding on federal
collateral review. See 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(b)(2)(A), 2254(d)(1);
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 103 L.Ed.2d 334, 109 S. Ct. 1060
(1989).
The Teague case clearly holds that new rules announced by the
Supreme Court do not apply retroactively to defendants whose conviction is
final in state court and who is only collaterally attacking the conviction in
federal court. Fields' conviction in state court was final in 1995. State v.
Fields, 127 Idaho 904 (1995). The denial of Fields'successive petition for post
conviction relief was affirmed in Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286 (S. Ct. 2000).
The Ring holding is a new rule that does not apply to Fields.
I.C. 5 19-2719(5)(c)also expressly prohibits successive post-conviction
petitions seeking the retroactive application of new rules of law. Fields'
successive post-conviction petition must be dismissed.
J u r v Found The Statutory Aggravator
The defendant was convicted of First Degree Murder for the killing of
Mary Catherine Vanderford by stabbing her in the neck, chest and back from
which she died, on February 11, 1988. It was charged that the murder was
done willfully, unlawfully, and with malice aforethought, and was committed
in the perpetration of a robbery andlor burglary.
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF, MOTION TO CORRECT
ILLEGAL SENTENCES, TO VACATE SENTENCES OF DEATH AND FOR NEW SENTENCING TRIAL
AND STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS (FLELDSlSPOTO2WI ID), Page 3
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The jury was instructed on the elements of the crime of murder.
Instruction #13, which is attached to this response, was given to the jury.
Instruction #13 told the jury that the crime of murder required the jury to
find a n unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. The jury
was given the definition of malice as follows in Jury Instruction #13, which is
attached:
The crime of murder is the unlawful killing of a human being
with malice aforethought. Malice is express where the evidence
manifests or shows a n unlawful and deliberate intent to take
away the life of a human being without just cause or excuse.
Malice is implied if the evidence shows no considerable
provocation for the killing. Malice is also implied where
the evidence or circumstances surrounding the killing shows
the presence of a n abandoned and malignant heart, which
means a condition of heart and mind which has no regard
for social or moral obligation.
Thus, malice is implied when the evidence shows that a
killing resulted for any act andfor acts involving a high degree of
probability that death would result, when such act andlor acts
have been committed for a base, anti-social purpose, and with a
wanton disregard for human life.
The jury was instructed that to find the defendant guilty of murder,
they must find that the defendant either had the specific intent to cause
death or that the defendant's conduct showed a wanton disregard for human
life. The jury found the defendant; guilty of First Degree Murder for the
killing of Catherine Vanderford during the commission of a robbery or
burglary and was done with malice. That combination satisfied Idaho Code
§19-2515(g)(7). That being that the murder was committed during the
perpetration of an enumerated felony and was done with a n intent to kill.

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF, MOTION TO CORRECT
ILLEGAL SENTENCES, TO VACATE SENTENCES OF DEATH AND FOR NEW SENTENCING TRIAL
AND STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS (FELDS/SPOM20071ID), Page 4
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Idaho Code 8 19-2515(~)(7)
"The murder was one defined a s murder of the first degree by
section 18-4003, Idaho Code, subsections (b), (c), (d), (e), or

(0,

and it was accompanied with the specific intent to cause the
death of a human being."
Idaho Code $18-4003(d) was then a s follows:
"Any murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to
perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping or
mayhem is murder of the first degree."
As Judge, now Justice, Schroeder stated in his Findings of the Court in
Considering Death Penalty under Section 19-2515, Idaho Code, the jury was
thoroughly instructed on the element of intent to kill a s a n element of
murder. Justice Schroeder stated the following:
b. Idaho Code Section 19-2515(g)(7). The State seeks a
determination that the aggravating circumstances set forth
in I.C. § 19-2515(~)(7)has been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt in that the murder was committed in the perpetration
of a robbery and/or burglary and was accompanied by an
intent to cause death. The jury found the defendant guilty of
felony murder, that is, murder committed in the perpetration
of a robbery and/or burglary. In this case, the court gave
a more restrictive instruction on the element of intent that may
be necessary for felony murder, instructing the jury on the
elements of malice aforethought. Express malice involves
an intention to kill. Implied malice involves conduct with a
wanton disregard for human life.
To be a statutory aggravating circumstance under I.C. $192515(~)(7),the court must find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the killing was with a specific intent to cause death, not the
wanton disregard for human life of implied malice. The element
of a killing with a specific ntent to cause death has been
established beyond a reasonable doubt.
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF, MOTION TO CORRECT
ILLEGAL SENTENCES, TO VACATE SENTENCES OF DEATH AND FOR NEW SENTENCIN
AND STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS fFLELDSiSPOT020071ID), Page 5
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The State relies upon the number and savagery of the
wounds as evidence of an intention to kill. It is powerful
evidence of that intention, but by itself is also consistent
with the wanton disregard for human life. However, additional
facts support the finding that the wounds were inflicted with
an. intention to kill. If the defendant had merely sought escape
when confronted by Mrs. Vanderford, he could have overpowered
her easily without the infliction of a lethal wound. The only
reason he used a knife was to silence her forever. As Scott
Beianchi testified, echoing the defendant's words, he, the
defendant, needed '%ofinish the job." The fact that she was
still alive when he left is not weighed significantly against the
finding that he intended to kill her. The number and extent of
the wounds would have left no reasonable doubt as to the
outcome. I-Ie intended to "finish the job" - to kill her - and he did.
Judge Schroeder left no doubt that in his view the jury found that the
murder was done with malice and occurred during the perpetration of a
robbery or burglary. Express malice is the specific intent to kill. Implied
malice is the intent t o kill as shown by a wanton disregard for human life.
While the jury wasn't given a specific interrogatory as to which type of malice
they found, the evidence certainly supports a specific intent to kill. In other
words, Judge Schroeder relied upon the same evidence that the jury found as
supporting the aggravating circumstance. That is all that R i n v.
~ Arizona
requires.
Justice Scalia stated the following in his concurrence in the Ring case:
While I am, as always, pleased to travel in Justice Breyer's
company, the unfortunate fact is that today's judgment has
nothing to do with jury sentencing. What today's decision
says is that the jury must find the existence of the fact that
an aggravating factor existed. Those states that leave the
ultimate life-or-death decision to the judge may continue
to do s e b y requiring a prior jury finding of aggravating .
factor in the sentencing phase, or more simply, by placing
the aggravating-factor determination (where it logically
belongs anyway) in the guilt phase.
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF, MOTION TO CORRECT
ILLEGAL SENTENCES, TO VACATE SENTENCES OF DEATH AND FOR NEW SENTENCING
AND STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS (FlELDSlSPOTO20071ID), Page 6
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Harmless Error
The defendant Ring had been charged with and convicted of shooting
the driver of an armored car and then stealing the money from the car. The
State evidently argued that the agpavating factor of murder for pecuniary
gain was implicit in the jury's guilty verdict and as such was a jury finding of
a statutory aggravating circumstance. The State apparently argued that
sentencing by the court with those facts was harmless error. The Supreme
Court made this notation in footnote 7.
We do not reach the State's assertion that any error was
harmless because a pecuniary gain finding was implicit
in the jury's guilty verdict. See Neder v. United States,
227 US 1, 144 L. Ed 2d 35, 119 Sp. Ct. 1827 (1999)
(This court ordinarily leaves it to lower courts to pass on
the harmlessness of error in the first instance).
The petitioner has argued that it was error for Judge Schroeder to
make the finding beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of a statutory
aggravating factor supporting the death penalty for the petitioner. The
State's view is that the jury did find the statutory aggravator as described by
Judge Schroeder. However, at most, this is error subject to a harmless error
analysis.
In the Neder case, supra, the facts were that the District Court had
failed to properly instruct the jury on "the materiality" element of the crime of
tax evasion. The government did not dispute that the District Court erred in
deciding the materiality element itself rather than submitting the issue to the
jury. The court stated the following at p. 1833:
We have recognized that "most constitutional errors can
be harmless." Fulminante, supra, at 306, 111 Sup. Ct.
1246." If the defendant had counsel and was tried by an
impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF, MOTION TO CORRECT
ILLEGAL SENTENCES, TO VACATE SENTENCES OF DEATH AND FOR NEW SENTENCING
A,W STATE'S NOTION TO DISMISS (mLDSlSPOT020071ID), Page 7

any other constitutional errors that may have occurred
are subject to harmless error analysis." Rase v. Clark,
487 US 570,579, 106 Sup. Ct. 3101,922 L.Ed 2d 460 (1986).
Indeed, we have found an error to be "structural," and thus
subject to automatic reversal, only in an "very limited class
of cases."
The Supreme Court went on to list certain structural defects that were
subject to automatic reversal. The list was as follows, a complete denial of
counsel; biased trial judge; racial discrimination in selection of grand jury;
denial of self-representation at trial; denial of public trial; defective
reasonable doubt instruction.
The Supreme Court then went on to state the following about the jury
instruction in Neder at p. 1833:
The error at issue here-a jury instruction that omits
an element of the offense-differs markedly from
the constitutional violations we have found to defy
harmless error review. Those cases, we have explained,
contain a "defect affecting the frame work within
which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in
the trial process itself."
Fulminante, supra, at 3 10, 111 Sup. Ct. 1246. Such errors "infect
the entire trial process," Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 US 619, 630,
113 Sup. Ct. 1710, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353 (19931, and "necessarily
render a trial fundamentally unfair," Rose, 478 US, at 577, 106
Sup. Ct. 3 101. Put another way, these errors deprive defendants
of "basic protections" without which "a criminal trial cannot
reliable serve its function as a vehicle for determination of
guilt or innocence.. .and no criminal punishment may be
regarded as fundamentally fair." Id., at 577-578, 106 Sup.
Ct. 3101.
The Court went on to hold that this omission in a jury instruction was
subject to a harmless error analysis and was in fact harmless error because
the evidence of the existence of materiality was overwhelming.

00~~~~~000124

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF, MOTION TO
ILLEGAL SENTENCES, TO VACATE SENTENCES OF DEATH AM) FOR NEW SENTENCING TRIAL
AND STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS (mLDSlSPC)T020r)71 lDi, Page 8

CONCLUSION
The Riag holding is not retroactive. Nonetheless, the facts supported a
finding of express malice. As Judge Schroeder pointed out, the evidence left
no reasonable doubt of t h e intended outcome. At most, the sentencing
procedure was harmless error.
For the reasons stated above, The Defendant's Motion for R e s e n t e ~ ~ c i n g
and Post-Conviction Relief should be denied. The State moves for dismissal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

\a

9day of August, 2002.

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

By:

Roger Bourne
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to be me t h i s L g day o

02.

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF, MOTION TO CORRECT
ILLEGAL SENTENCES, TO VACATE SENTENCES OF DEATH AND FOR NEW SENTENCING TRIAL
AND STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS (FlELDSiSPOTO20071ID), Page 9
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CERTIFICATE OF SERmCE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this =day

of August, 2002, I served a

true and correct copy of the furegoing ANSWER TO PETITION FOR POSTCTION BELIEF to Joan M. Fisher, Capital Habeas Unit, Federal
Defenders of Eastern Washington and Idaho, 201

N.Main, Moscow ID 83843,

the following person(s) by depositing in t

x
_
-

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF, MOTION TO CORRECT
ILLEGAL SENTENCES, TO VACATE SENTENCES OF DEATH AND FOR NEW SENTENCING TRLAL
AND STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS (FEELDSISPOT020071ID), Page 10
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CAPITAL HABEAS UNIT
Federal Defenders of
Eastern Washington and Idaho
Joan M. Fisher, ID Bar ff2854
201 North Main
Moscow ID 83843
Telephone: 208-883-081 0
Facsimile: 208-883-1472

IN THE DISTNCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDlCIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ZANE JACK FIELDS,
Petitioner,

)
)
)

1
)

VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

1
)
)
)

CASE NO. SP OT 0200711D

NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE
OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTING
MEMOMNDUM, AND
=QUEST FOR HEARING

PLEASE T A m NOTICE that in this action, Mr. Zane Fields, Petitioner, intends to
exercise his statutory and constitutional rights by filing an opposition to Respondent's State's
Response to Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, Motion To Correct Illegal Sentences of Death
and For New Sentencinp 'Trial and State's Motion to Dismiss, which was filed on or about
August 30,2002, and a copy of which undersigned counsel first received today, September 5,
2002. Additionally, Petitioner requests oral argument on the matters at issue. This Notice of

1
is brought
NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE OPPOSITlON AND SUPPORTING
MEMORANDUM, AND REQUEST FOR HEARING - 1

pursuant to the Idaho Code $3 19-2719(5) [Special Appellate and Postconviction Proceedings in
Capital Gases], 19-4907(a) [Applicability of civil statutes and rules of procedure], Idaho
Criminal Rule 57(b) [post conviction proceedings governed by Rules of Civil Procedwe] and
Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure [Motion for S u m m w Judgment and
Proceedings thereon]. It is also brought p u r s w t to Mr. Fields's right to due process as
guarateed by the Idaho Constitution art. 1, $13, and the United States Constitution, amend. XIV.
It is, as well, brought pursuant to Mr. Fields's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment right against
cruel and unusual punishment which mandates that greater safeguards be applied to capital than
non-capital guilt-imocence and sentencing proceedings. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280,305 (1976) ("because death is qualitatively different from imprisoment, "there is
a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case"), and Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625,638

(1 980)("To insure that the death penalty is indeed imposed on the basis of 'reason rather than
caprice or emotion,' we have invalidated procedural rules that tended to diminish the reliability
of the sentencing determination. The same reasoning must apply to rules that diminish the
reliability of the guilt determination.").
//
//
//
//
//

NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE OPPOSlTION AND SUPPORTING
MEMORANDUM, AND REQUEST FOR HEARING - 2

DATED this j$-

9
day of September, 2002.
NSPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

Attorney for Petitioner

NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTING
MEMORANDUM, AND REQUEST FOR HEARING - 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

3c.

I hereby certify that on t h e L day of September, 2002,I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing docwent by
se$ to:

Roger Bourne
Ada GomQ Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street, Room 3 191
Boise, Idaho 83702

NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTING
MEMORANDUM, AND REQUEST FOR HEARING - 4

h

CAPITAL HABEAS UNIT
Federdl Defenders of
Eastern Washington and Idaho
Joan M. Fisher, ID Bar itt2854
201 North Main
Moscow ID 83843
Telephone: 208-883-08 10
Facsimile: 208-883 -1472

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

VS.

1
1
1

ZANE JACK FIELDS,

)
)

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

)
)

/4w0
CASE NO. 16259
NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE
OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTING
MEMOMNDUM, AND
=QUEST FOR HEARING

PLEASE TAI(E NOTICE that in this action, Mr. Zane Fields, Defendant, intends to
exercise his statutory and constitutional rights by filing an opposition to Plaintiffs State's
Response to Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, Motion To Correct Illegal Sentences of Death
and For New Sentencing Trial and State's Motion to Dismiss to the extent that that pleading is
l
To Vacate Sentences
considered a response to Mr. Fields's Motions To Correct I l l e ~ a Sentences,
of Death and For New Sentencing Trial in the above captioned case. Notably, Plaintiff filed its
State's Response in Case No. SP OT 020071 lD, not in the above-captioned case. Plaintiff filed

NOTICE O F INTENT TO FILE OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTING
MEMORANDUM, AND REQUEST FOR HEARING - 1

its

on or about August 30,2002, and undersigned counsel first received a copy

today, September 5,2002. Additionally, Defendant requests oral argment on the matters at
issue. This
Wearing is brought pursuant to the Idaho Code $5 19-2719(5) [Special Appellate and
Postconviction Proceedings in Capital Gases], 19-4907(a) [Applicability of civil statutes and
rules of procedure], Idaho Criminal Rule 57(b) [post conviction proceedings governed by Rules
of Civil Procedure] and Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure [Motion for Sunlmary
Judgment and Proceedings thereon]. It is also brought pursuant to Mr. Fields's right to due
process as guaranteed by the Idaho Constitution art. 1, tj 13, and the United States Constitution,
amend. XIV. It is, as well, brought pursuant to Mr. Fields's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
right against cruel and unusual punishment which mandates that greater safeguards be applied to
capital than non-capital guilt-innocence and sentencing proceedings. See, s,Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,305 (1976) ("because death is qualitatively different from
imprisonment, "there is a conesponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination
that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case"), and Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S.
625,638 (1980)("To insure that the death penalty is indeed imposed on the basis of 'reason
rather than caprice or emotion,' we have invalidated procedural rules that tended to diminish the
reliability of the sentencing determination. The same reasoning must apply to rules that diminish
the reliability of the guilt determination.").

NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTING
MEMORANDUM, AND REQUEST FOR HEARING 2

-

DATED this

kkY
of September, 2002.
ESPECTFULLYT SUBMITTED,
I

Attorney for Defendmt

NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTING
MEMORANDUM, AND REQUEST FOR HEARING - 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN THE DISTMCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ZANE FIELDS,
Petitioner,

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
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Case Nos. SPOT02-00711D
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO REQUEST TO
SUMMARILY DISMISS OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR
S U M m R Y DISMISSAL

Petitioner Zane Jack Fields responds in opposition to Respondent's Response to Petition
for Post Conviction Relief, Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, to Vacate Sentence of Death and
State's Motion to Dismiss ("State's Response"), and in support of Petitioner's claim for
sentencing relief under Ring v. Arizo~a.Respondent contends that Fields should not be resentenced because Ring is not retroactive, Idaho Code section 19-2719(5)(c) prohibits retroactive
application of a new rule of law, the jury found the statutory aggravating circumstance in Fields'
case, and even if the jury failed to find the statutory aggravating circumstance, the error is
harmless. For the reasons set forth below Respondent's motion should be denied and Petitioner's
petition should be granted.
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1.

PETITIONER WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO T N A L BY JURY ON
STATUTORY AGGUVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Xing v. Arizona clearly establishes that petitioner's death sentence is unconstitutional.

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. -, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (June 24,2002). In Ring, the Supreme C o r n of
the United States held that "[cjapital defendants, no less than non-capital defendants ... are
entitled to a jury d e t e ~ n a t i o nof my fact on whch the legislature conditions an increase in their
maimurn punishment." 122 S. Ct. at 2432. In Ring, the Court held that the fundmental
constitutional principle it had made clear t h e e years earlier, in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S.
227, 243 n.6 (1999), applies to capital cases. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2438-43. That constitutional
principle is this: "under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury
tsial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the
maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt." Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6, quoted in, Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2438-39.
The i m e d i a t e effect of Ring v. Arizona, szdpra, has been "to invalidate the death penalty
scheme in Idaho." State v. Fetterly, - Idaho -, 52 P.3d 874, 875 (Idaho August 6, 2002)
(rehearing denied Aug. 22, 2002). As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in Fetteulj~,Ring
requires a jury to rnake "the factual findings of the aggravating factors necessary to the
imposition of a death sentence." Id.
Ring and Fetterly constitute a dramatic and unprecedented reversal of constitutional
precedent, by the Supreme Court of the United States, and by the Idaho Supreme Court. Relying
on now-overruled U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly
rejected the federal constitutional argument that Ring accepted, and that Ring now requires this
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court to accept. The line of Idaho Supreme Court decisions ovemled by Ring and Fetterly
traces back to State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900,904,674 P.2d 396,400 (1983), and State v. Creech,
105 Idaho 362, 372-373,670 P.2d 463,474 (1983). That line of case law was most thoroughly
s u m a ~ z e in
d an oft-cited passage in State v. Charboneuu, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989):
[The Appellant] asserts that the imposition of the death penalty with no pafiicipation by
the jury in the sentencing process violates the sixth, eighth, and fourleenth miendments to
the Gonstitudon of the United States. He also contends that the sentence was
unconstitutional because he was denied a jury determination of the aggravating
clrcmstances enumerated in I.C. $ 19-2515(g).
In 1983 this Court held "that here is no federal constitutional requirenient of jury
parlicipation in the sentencing process and that the decision to have jury participation in
the sentencing process, as contrasted with judicial discretion sentencing, is within the
policy determination of the individual states." State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 373, 670
P.2d 463,474 (1983) cert. den. 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S.Ct. 1327,79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1984).
See also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900,902,674 P.2d 396,398 (1983) eert. den. 468 U.S.
1220, 104 S.Ct. 3591, 82 L.Ed.2d 887 (1984); State v. Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766, 710 P.2d
1202 (1985) cert. den. 479 U.S. 870, 107 S.Ct 239,93 L.Ed.2d 164 (1986). In 1984 the
United States Supreme Court upheld death sentencing by trial judges. Spaziano v.
Horidu, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S.Ct. 3154,82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984).
This Court has also held "that Art. 1, 5 7, of the Idaho Constitution does not require the
participation of a jury in the sentencing process in a capital case." Sivak, 105 Idaho at
904,674 P.2d at 400. See also State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 774 P.2d 252 (1989).

To accept [Appellant's] argument that the jury must be involved in determining whether
aggravating circumstances exist, we would have to conclude that the aggravating
circumstances listed in I.C. 5 19-2515(g) are elements of first degree murder. We are
unable to reach that conclusion. The circumstances listed in the statute are clearly
circumstances to be considered in sentencing and not elements of first degree
murder. It is not unconstitutional for a judge, instead of a jury, to determine whether any
of the aggravating circumstances listed in the statute exist.
Our opinion in this aspect of the case is not changed by the decision of the Ninth Circuit
in Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 10 11 (9th Cir. 1988). In Adamson the Ninth Circuit held
Arizona's death penalty sentencing statutes to be in violation of the sixth amendment.
During reargument of this case to determine what impact Adamson might have on our
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opinion here, the solicitor general -For the state of Idaho acknowledged that there is no
signif cant difference beween the h z o n a death penalty sentencing statutes and those of
Idaho. Nevertheless, we are not convinced that Adanzson cowectly states the requirements
of the sixth mendment on this issue.
Charboneau, 774 P.2d at 3 15-17 (emphasis added); see also State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772,79596,948 P.2d 127, 150-51 (19971, cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1 126 (1998); State v. Pizzuto, 1 19 Idaho
742,769,810 P.2d 680,707 (1991) cert. denied, 503 U.S. 908 (1992); State v. Card, 121 Idallo
425, 430, 825 P.2d 1081, 1086 (1991) cert. denied, 506 U.S. 91 5 (1992); State v. Paz, 118 Idaho
542, 552-53, 798 P.2d 1, 11-12 (19901, cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259 (19911, overruled an other
~
v. C a d , supra; State v. Fain, 119 Idaho 670, 675, 809 P.2d 1149, 1154 (1 991)
grounds b - State

cert. denied, 504 U.S. 987 (1992); State v. Lanvord, 116 Idaho 860, 868, 781 P.2d 197, 205
(19891, cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1032 (1990).
Ring and Fetterly hold that the Idaho Supreme Court's reasoning was incorrect at every
step. Aggravating circumstances necessary to impose a death sentence are elements of the
offense, for constitutional purposes; Adamsozz v. Ricketts was right on this point, and the
Supreme Court decision that effectively overruled it,' kl/alton v. Arizona, 487 U.S. 639, 648
(1990), was wrong. The dissenting Justices of the Idaho Supreme Court who have repeatedly
and passionately argued that the ldaho statute is unconstitutional on this ground, have turned out
to be right. See State v. Lanword, 1 16 Idaho 860, 880-84, 78 1 P.2d 197 (1989) (Huntley, J.,
dissenting); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 784, 810 P.2d 680, 722 (1991) (Bistline, J.,

'

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Adurnson has never actually been overruled. See
Adamson v. Lewis, 955 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc). However, the court has assumed that
the en banc decision on this point is superseded by the seemingly irreconcilable Supreme Court
authority of Wulton. See id. at 6 19.
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dissenting), cert. devzierl: 503 U.S. 908 (1992); Sitate v. Charboneazd, 1 16 Idaho 129, 169, 774
P.2d 299,339 (1 989) (Bistline, I., dissenting), cerr. clrenied 493 U.S. 922 (1989) and 493 U.S.

923 (1989); State r). Creech, 105 Idaho 362,375404,670 P.2d 463,476-505 (1983) (Huntley
and Bistline, JJ., dissenting), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984); State v. Szvak, 105 Idaho 900,
908- 09,674 P.2d 396,404-05 (1983) (Bistline, J., dissenting), cerf. denied, 468 U.S. 1220
(1984). "It is high time to comply with our Idaho Constitution and put the awesome decision of
life or death back in the hands of twelve tried and true jurors." State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795,
814, 820 P.2d 665, 684 (1991) (Bistlinc, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 987 (1992).
It is therefore clear that defendant Zane Fields' death sentence was imposed in a
hdamentally unconstitutional proceeding, a proceeding in which he was denied a right that our
state constitution says must be "inviolate." Idaho Constitution Article I, $ 7. That denial plainly
made a difference in his case for his death sentence was based on a judge-made determination
that the "the killing was with a specific intent to cause death, not the wanton disregard of human
life for implied malice," Findings of the Court in Considering the Death Penalty ("Findings"j,
Clerk's Record ("CR") at 168, while the jury was instructed that it could convict Fields of felony
murder based on finding either express or implied malice. Jury Instruction # 13. Thus, it is
apparent that the body that was constitutionally required to make the findings that made Mr.
Fields eligible for a death sentence did not make the finding of specific intent that Judge
Schroeder did in his sentencing findings. Yet, Zane Fields stands condemned by the decision of a
judge alone, a decision that a judge had no power to make -- an argument that the Idaho Supreme
Court and the Supreme Court of the United States rejected, but which both courts have now
acknowledged was correct all along.
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Fortunately, that death sentence has not been carried out, and this grave constitutional
error is not inevocable. The interests of this state in the review of its own state judgments,
protection of its citizens and application of its Constitution require this court to answer the
critical questions now raised by Ring and grant Petitioner the relief masrdated by Ritig and the
Idaho and United States Constitutions.

A.

STATUTORY AGGK4VATING CIRCUMSTANCES
ELEMENTS
OF THE CRIME OF CAPITAL MIJWER WHICH MUST BE FOUND BY
A JURY BEYOND A =ASONABLE DOUBT FOLLOWING PRETRIAL
NOTICE AND APPROPMATE JURY INSTRUCTIONS.

There is no question in Idaho that a defendant has a right to a jury trial on all the elements
of the offense. State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 594, 600, 873 P.2d 848, 854 (Idaho 1994). "The rule in
Idaho has always been that a criminal defendant cannot be convicted of a crime unless the
factfinder finds the defendant guilty of committing every fact necessary to constitute the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (citing State v. Hofman, 123 Idaho 638, 693, 851 P.2d 934, 939
(Idaho 1993); State v. Seymour, 7 Idaho 257,260, 61 P. 1033, 1034 (Idaho 1900)).
The question that had not been answered correctly in Wuiton, and which was
fundamentally misunderstood by the Idaho Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court,
was whether the statutory aggravating "circumstances" which rendered a person death-eligible
were elements of a greater offense of "capital murder" as opposed to mere sentencing factors of
first degree murder. The answer, we now know, is that the aggravating circumstances are
elements of a greater death eligible crime, of which first degree murder is a lesser included
offense. See Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. at 2443 (under Arizona's sentencing structure, [which is
essentially identical to Idaho's], "aggravating factors operate as 'the hnctional equivalent of an
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element of a greater offense"', quoting Apprendi). We now know that "those facts setting the
outer limits of a sentence, and of the judicial power to impose it, are elements of the crime for the
purposes of the constitutional analysis," Harris v. Utzited States, - U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 2409
(2002), and that aggravatsng circmstances necessarily constitute elements of a "greater offense."
As Justice Thomas clearly stated, " m e n a fact exposes a defendant to greater p u n i s h e n t than

what is otherwise legally presc~bed,that fact is "by definition [an] 'elernen[tIr of a separate legal
offense." I-luuris v. United Stutes, 122 S. Ct. at 2426 (Thomas, J, dissenting) (quoting Apprendi
v. NewJemey, 530 U.S. at 483 n.lO).

There is no question that Idaho Code 5 19-25 15 sets out facts which if found to be true
beyond a reasonable doubt expose the defendant to a greater punishment, namely death, than he
could otherwise be exposed. I. C. $9 18-4004, 19-2515(c). As in Arizona, those facts are
elements of the crime and must be found by a jury.
Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to die under a statutory scheme which required
the finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt before
he could be sentenced to death. The statutory aggravating circumstances were elements of the
greater offense of "capital" murder and thus required a jury verdict. Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. at
2443. Because no jury made the findings of aggravating circumstances, Petitioner was only
convicted by a jury of the lesser included offense of first degree murder, and his death sentence
must be vacated under Ring v. Arizona and State v. Fetterly, 52 P.3d at 875.2

2

It is this verdict of the lesser included offense that Petitioner's Rule 35 Motion to
Correct the Sentence is based. Having been convicted of murder in the first degree by jury
verdict, the maximum penalty for which is life imprisonment, the matter before the court is not a
"capital case" and thus, not governed by Idaho Code fi 19-2719. Thus a Rule 35 Motion to
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B.

THE MGHT TO TRIAL BY JUrtU IS NOT A NEW RULE BUT IS AN
ANCIENT, FUNDMENTAL RIGHT.

Ring's requirement that juries, not judges, find the elements of the charge is derived from
ancient principles of law:
The principle that the jury were the judges of fact and the judges the deciders of law was
stated as an established principle as early as 1628 by Coke. See 1 E. Coke, Institutes of
the Laws of England 155b (1628) ("ad questionem facti non respondent judices; ad
questionem juris non respondent juratores "). See ulso Langbein, The English Criminal
Trial Jury on the Eve of the French Revolution, in The Trial Jury in England, France,
Germany 1700-1900, [(A. Schioppa ed. 1987)j at 34, n. 60.

Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. at 247.
Walton v. Arizona, 487 U.S. 639 (1990), did not contravene those principles but simply
misread the Arizona statute to which it was applying them. Tlie United States Supreme Court
enfeebled the institution of the jury through its ruling in Wulton v. Arizona, as did the Idaho
Supreme Court in its original rejection of right to a jury trial on the aggravating circumstances in

Creech and Sivak.
Before the United States Supreme Court's incorrect rejection of the jury trial issue in

FYalton, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Adamson v. Ricketts found otherwise, correctly
emphasizing the historical, longstanding basis for finding aggravating circumstances to be
elements of the offense in Arizona's nearly identical capital statute:
The historic roots of the right to jury trial provide an essential backdrop to this
discussion. The Framers of the Bill of Rights included the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of a right to jury trial as an essential protection against government
oppression. "Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal

correct the illegal sentences (of death) imposed can and must be heard and granted. Any
argument that the motion to correct illegal sentence cannot be heard in this capital case violates
equal protection and suspends the writ, as set forth in section IV, in@.
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G o v e m ~ e n t in
s other respects, found expression in the criminal law in this
insistence upon community pmicipation in the delemination of guilt or
innocence." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,156,823 S.Ct. 1444, 1451,20
L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). The cornerstone of this protection is the right to have the
jury detemine the existence of the facts necessary to detemine guilt or imocence
of a given crime. Only by maintaining the integ~tyof the factfinding fulction
does the jury "stand behveen the accused and a potentially arbitrary or abusive
G o v e m e n t that is in command of the criminal sanction." United States v.
h4arlin Linen Szrpplt. Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1355, 5 1 L.Ed.2d 642
(1977).
The Court has recognized that the defendant's right to a jury trial and the
concomitant facf~ndingresponsibilities of the jury merit greater protection as the
potential punishment increases. See, e.g., Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160-61, 88 S.Ct.
at 1453 (jury trial not constitutionally mandated for petty offenses; seriousness of
punishent determines when right attaches). As we have previously stated, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the death penalty is qualitatively different
from all other punishments and that heightened scrutiny of death sentencing
decisions is required. Thus, when the death penalty is implicated courts must be
particularly careful to prevent the infringement of Sixth Amendment rights.
To avoid the dangers of government oppression recognized in Duncan and
reaffirmed in later cases, there must be strict separation of determinations of guilt
or innocence (factfinding) and determinations of the appropriate punishment
(sentencing). To otherwise blur the distinctions between those concepts would
result in the ultimate tyranny feared by the Founders and condemned by Duncan:
the unchecked power of the government to execute at will.

Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F. 2d at 1023. The Court noted W h e r the attributes of the legal
landscape in effect at the time of petitioner's conviction and sentence:
The Constitution requires that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt all
elements of the offense with which the defendant is charged. In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358,361, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1071, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Yet the parameters
of what constitutes an "elementw--soas to fall within the jury's factfinding
responsibility--remain elusive. A line of due process cases considering such
contours has failed to produce concrete guidelines. Cf:McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 241 1,2417, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (Court
has "never attempted to define precisely the constitutional limits [ofl the extent to
which due process forbids the reallocation or reduction of burdens of proof in
criminal cases, and do[esj not do so today...."); see also Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
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U.S. 684,95 S.Ct. 1881,44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,90
S.Ct. 1068,25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1969). We find, however, that a framework for
analysis emerges from these cases. Thus, in assessing A d a s o n ' s claim, we
examine (1) the legislative history of Arizona's death penalty statutes; (2) the
actual role played by aggravating circmstmces under Arizona's revised statute $
13- 703; and (3) the application of AfcMillan v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme
Court's most recent pronouncement on the distinction bet-ween elements and
sentencing factors, to this case.

Ring expressly rejected Walton's enoneous conclusion, contrary to Adamson, that

statutory aggravating factors were not elements of the greater offense of "capital" murder. By
returning the right to jury trial, notice of elements of the offense charged, and due process to their
ancient moorings, it is now clear that petitioner's claim of entitlement to jury involvement in the
finding of aggravating circumstances is correct, and that his sentence violated his right to notice,
a jury trial and appropriate instructions on all the elements of the offense required under the
United States Constitution Amendments 5, 6 and 14 and the Idaho Constitution, articles I,

$5 7,

8, and 13.
The Supreme Court's retraction of the Walton ruling in Ring restores a right to jury trial
that is neither trivial nor transitory but "the most transcendent privilege which any subject can
enjoy." Blackstone's Commentaries, quoted in Lewis Powell, Jury Trial ofCrimes, 23
Washington & Lee L. Rev. 1, 3 n.7 (1966). See also, e.g., United States v. Battiste, 24 Fed Cas.
1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass.) (No. 14,545), 2 S m e r 240 (1835) (Justice Story): "I hold it the
most sacred constitutional right of every party accused of a crime, that the jury should respond as
to the facts, and the court as to the law." 2 S m e r 240,243 (1835). Petitioner should not be
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denied the jury rights restored in Ring simply because the state and federal supreme courts
temporarily overlooked the point before finally getting it right.

C.

UNDER THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION THE FUGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
IS INVIOLATE AND PETITIONER WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO
JURY DETEMINATION OF THE 5 19-2515 ELEMENTS OF THE
OFFENSE.

Under R ~ n gv. Arizona, Hamis v h i t e d States, Appm~div. New Jersey and Jones v.
United S t a m , petitioner has a right to a jury trial on the factual elemenls under Idaho law that are
necessary to increase the maximm sentence for first degree murder to death, i.e., facts necessary
to prove the elements of the greater crime of "capital" murder. Petitioner's jury never convicted

him of com~ittinga statutory aggravating circumstance under

5 19-2515, a necessary element

for death eligibility. Therefore, petitioner has only been convicted of the lesser included offense
of first degree murder. The Supreme Court of the United States corrected the mistake announced
in R7aEto~zv. Arizona and recognized that aggravating circumstances are facts that must be found
by a jury. With that clarification in the law, the longstanding, "sacred," fundamental right under
the Idaho Constitution to the sight to trial by jury mandates the vacation of petitioner's death
sentence.
The Idaho Constitution sanctifies and defends the right to trial by jury as one of the
Eundannental protections inherent in the state constitution. The right is protected in not one but
hvo explicit sections of the state constitution. See Idaho Const. art. I, 5 7; id. art V , 5 1. The first
reference to the venerated sight in the constitution provides that: "[tlhe right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate." Idaho Const. art. I, 7. The second reference to the right states that any "fact
at issue shall be tried by order of court before a jury." Idaho Const. art. V, 5 1.
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Numerous Idaho cases recount that the right to trial by jury established by these state
constitutional provisions secured "that right as it existed at the time of the adoption of the
constitution." Johnson v. Nichels, 48 Idaho 654, -, 284 P. 840, 842 (Idaho 1930); Clzristensen
v. NolIing;rwarth, 6 Idaho 87, -, 53 P. 2 11 , 212 (Idaho 1898). See, e.g., State v. Puatt, 125

Idaho 594, 599, 873 P.2d 848, 853 (Idaho 1994), State v. Benniort, 1I2 Idaho 32, 37, 730 P.2d
952, 957 (Idaho 1986); State v. Szvak, 105 Idaho 900,903,674 P.2d 396,399 (Idaho 1983);
Cornish v. Smzith, 97 Idaho 89,92,540 P.2d 274,277 (Idaho 1975); State 1). Nadlman, 63 Idaho
153, -, 118 P.2d 58,61 (Idaho 1941); Stale v. Miles, 43 Idaho 46, -, 248 P. 442,442-43 (Ida110
1926); Bra& v. Place, 41 Idaho 747, -, 242 P. 3 14 (Idaho 1925); People ex ref. Brown v.
Burnhum, 35 Idaho 522, -, 207 P. 589,590 (Idaho 1922); Shields v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 476, -,
79 P. 391, 393 (Idaho 1904).
Justices Huntley and Bistline summarized the historical fact that Idaho juries by their
verdicts chose whether or not death would be imposed from territorial times until passage of
Idaho Code Ij 19-2515 in 1977. State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362,375-77 670 P.2d 463,476-78
(Wuntley, J., dissenting); id. at 386-404,487-505 (Bistline, J., dissenting). Justices Huntley and
Bistline dissented vigorously in Sivak and Creech because the Legislature's removal of the jury
participation in sentencing proceedings through the enactment of $19-2515 in 1977 violated the
constitutional mandate that the right to jury trial "remain inviolate." The United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Ring makes clear that I.C. 5 19-2515 is unconstitutional in requiring that the
trial judge make the factual findings regarding the existence of aggravating circumstances. See
State v. Fetterly, 52 P.3d at 875. As set forth supra, in Ring and Harris the Supreme Court
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conclusively established that statutory aggravating circumstances are elements of the crime, and
corrected the error of WaEton in holding to the c o n b - a ~ .
Once that legal principle is accepted, the right to jury detemination of the elements that

mdce a defendmt eligible for the death penalty is a simple matter of long established state and
federal constitutional law. "The rule in Idaho has always been that a criminal defendant cannot
be convicted of a crime unless the factfinder finds the defendant guilty of comitting every fact
necessary to constihtte the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Pratt, 873 P.2d at 854 (emphasis
added) (citing State v. Hoflmatz, 123 Idaho 638, 693, 851 P.2d 934,939 (Idaho 1993); Stale v.
Seymour, 7 Idaho 257, -, 61 P. 1033, 1034 (Idaho 1900)). The factfinder in a criminal case in
Idaho must be a jury: "Article I, 5 7 guarantees a jury h5al whenever the possible sanction
includes imprisoment." Bennion, 112 Idaho at 44, 730 P.2d at 964.
In Idaho, the "right to a jury trial is a fundamental right, and must be guarded jealously."
Bennio~z,730 P.2d at 957 (citing f i r m e r v. LooJbourrow, 75 Idaho 88,94,267 P.2d 113, 116
(1954)). The Idaho Supreme Court has characterized the right to trial by jury as the "most
precious constitutional right." David Steed and Assocs., Inc. v. Young, 115 Idaho 247,250, 766
P.2d 71 7,720 (Idaho 1988). Writing for the court of appeals, then Chief Judge, now Justice,
Walters stated that "[blecause trial by jury is one of the fundamental guaranties of the rights and
liberties of the people, every reasonable presumption should be indulged against its waiver."
State v. ?$?heeler, 114 Idaho 97, 101, 753 P.2d 833, 837 (Id. Ct. App. 1988). In State v. Paz, the
Idaho Supreme Court- stated that the "right to a fair and impartial jury is one of the most sacred
and important guarantees of the Constitution." State v. Paz, 118 Idaho, 542, 55 1, 798 P.2d 1, 10
(Idaho 1990).
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR S U M U Y DISMISSAL - 13

The right to trial by jury under the Idaho Constitution "is the right which is guaranteed to
the h ~ e r i c a npeople by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which
was in force in Idaho Territory when our state came into e~istence."~
Nadman, 118 P.2d at 61-

62. See also Rex v. Poole, Gases Tcmpore Hadwicke 23,27 (17341, quoted in Spnrfv. United
States, 156 U.S. 5 1,94 (1 895):

[Ilt is of the greatest consequence to the law of England, and to the subject, that these
powers of the judge and the jucy are kept distinct; that the judge deternines the law, and
the jury the fact; and, if ever they come to be confounded, it will prove the confusion and
destruction of the law of England.
Id. As an ancient, fundamental component of criminal law in our society, the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial on all the elements of the offense - including the statutory aggravating
circumstances, which enhance the jury verdict from potential life sentence to potential death
sentence - existed at the time of adoption of the State Constitution.
Significantly, in meeler then Chief Judge Walters quoted a U.S. Supreme Court case
that required a judge who was evaluating a defendant's purported waiver of the right to jury trial
to exercise "caution increasing in degree as the offenses dealt with increase in gravity." Putton v.
United States, 28 1 U.S. 276, 3 12-13 (1930), quoted with aupproval in, FUzeeler, 1 14 Idaho at 101,
753 P.2d at 837. The gravity of the offense in this capital case is of the highest order of
magnitude, and the deprivation of the fundamental right to a trial by jury on every element of the
offense must not be countenanced.

3

The state constitution was drafted August 6, 1889, adopted by the people in
November of 1889, Sivak, 674 P.2d at 399, and approved by Congress on July 3, 1890. Pratt,
873 P.2d at 599.
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There is no question that under Idaho's Constitution, petitioner had an "inviolate,"
fundmental right to jury fa~tfindingon statutory aggravating circmstmces before a sentence of
death could be imposed.

If,

PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF RING.
A.

EQUITY W Q U I m S APPLICATION OF RING TO PETITIONER'S
CASE.

Assuiing ilrguendo the State's characterization of Ring as announcing a new rule, rather
than the restoration of an ancient rule, Ring is a new development in support of an old claim.
Under Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 636 (Idaho 2000) (Sivak fi), the Idaho Supreme
Court has rejected the notion that a previously raised claim is waived when supported by new
evidence. "We must be vigilant against imposing a rule of law that will work injustice in the
name of judicial efficiency." lil. at 642, 8 P.3d at 647. Here, the same sort of injustice would
arise fkom rejection of any assumed "new" rule under Ring, as the Idaho Supreme Court has
already acknowledged that Idaho's

5 19-2515 capital sentencing proceedings without a jury are

unconstitutional under Ring. State v. Fetterly, 52 P.3d at 875 (vacating death sentence under
Ring and remanding for re-sentencing). Equitable principles alone demand that petitioner's

death sentence be vacated, as lie raised the very point addressed in Ring in his direct appeal case
years ago.
The State seeks the inequitable result, indeed, miscarriage of justice, that would deny
retroactive application of the "new" rule in Ring and allow execution of petitioner - despite the
fact that petitioner had been denied a jury on the question of whether aggravating factors existed.
The State relies on Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 41 7, 825 P.2d 1073 (Idaho 1991), which in turn
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cited C;rf$lh v. k'entucb, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), for its contention that "new" rules should not be
applied to cases that are "already final." The State's position is flawed for several reasons.

B.

N N G ANNOUNCES A SUBSTANTIVE RULE OF LAW NOT
CONTEMPLATED BY SECTION 19-2719(5).

Ring" recognition that aggravating circumstances are elements of a greater, capital
offense that must be found by a jury is a substantive rule, and even "new" substantive rules of
criminal law are retroactive. See BousZey v. United States, 523 U.S. 6 14, 620-2 1 (1995)
(inconsistent with the doctrinal underpinnings of habeas review to preclude a petitioner from
relying on a decision announcing applicable substantive criminal law after petitioner's conviction
and sentence were final). In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
"the availability of collateral relief from a federal crin~inalconviction based upon an intervening
change in substantive law." 417 U.S. 333,334 (1974) (emphasis added). Concluding that a
subsequent, substantive change in the law that established that petitioner's conviction and
punishent were invalid would "inherently result in a complete miscarriage of justice," the Court
held that collateral relief would be required. Davis, 417 U.S. at 346-47. See United States v.
Sood, 969 F.2d 774,775-76 (9thCir. 1992); United States v. MeClelland, 941 F.2d 999, 1000-01

(9thCir. 1991).
The rule gleaned from Ring under the Jones jurisprudence must be read to refine the
definition of an element of a capital offense, which is unquestionably a substantive decision
governed by Davis. 417 U.S. at 346-47 (holding that a defendant may assert in a collateral
proceeding a claim based on an intervening substantive change in the interpretation of a federal
criminal statute).
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The essence of criminal law is the definition of elements of the offense. .lorzes clarified
tbat rnaximun~-punishma-increasingfacts are elements. ifpprendi applied to that definition the
well-established rule that elements must be found by a jury, and Ring confimed and extends
that rule to the capital arena. The "newtrrule, if indeed there is any, in this sequence was Jones,
and it is one of criminal law, not procedure. A11 the other procedural benefits tbat inure as a
result of the definition of the offense of capital murder, i.e., jury decision, unanimity, notice by
indictment or infornlation follow as a result of the detemination that the stamtow aggavating
factor is an element of the substmtive offense under long-established law.
As the right to a jury detemination of the existence of an element of the offense is clearly
a matter of substantive criminal law, Ring must be applied to vacate petitioner's sentence.

C.

THE REQUIREMENT OF A JURY TRIAL ON FACTS WHICH
INCREASE THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE IS "IMPLICIT IN THE
CONCEPT OF ORDERED LIBERTY."

Even ifthe right to a jury trial on all of the elements of an offense were a procedural,
rather than substantive, right, (which it is not), petitioner is entitled to its benefit. As set forth in
pxior sections, the right to a jury trial on all elements of an offense is an ancient rule, not a new
one. As a rule that preceded petitioner's conviction and sentence by centuries, it is clearly
applicable to petitioner.
Moreover, even if one accepts the State's mis-characterization of Ring as a "new" rule of
criminal procedure, under retroactivity principles announced by the Idaho Supreme Court, Ring
must clearly be given retrospective effect. The State relies on state retroactivity cases that only
state the general rule, that new decisions will not apply retroactively to cases that are already
final on direct appeal. State's Response at 2-3. See FettevZy v. State, 121 Idaho 4 17,418-19, 825
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P.2d 1073, 1074-75 (1991) (citing GriJ'f;ttt v, Kerztucb, 479 U.S. 3 14 (1987)); Stuart v. State,
128 Idaho 436, 914 P.2d 933 (1996) (citing Fetterly), and Butler v. State, 129 Idaho 899,901,

935 P.2d 162, 164 (1997) (citing fitterly).
Both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Supreme C o w of the United States recognize an
exceptton to the general rule md allow retroactive application for a new rule that is "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty," Matter ofGaflord,127 Idaho 472,476,903 P.2d 61, 65 (Idaho
1995). See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). The State entirely ignores this exception.
Instead, the State incorrectly asserts that the "Teague case clearly holds that new rules
announced by the Supreme Court do not apply retroactively to defendants whose conviction is
final in state court and who is only collaterally attacking the conviction in federal court." State's
Response at 3. The State ignores the two exceptions to Teague's general rule of nonretroactivity, the first, for primary conduct which is beyond the power of the State criminal lawmaking authority to pr~scribe,~
and a second for rules that are "implicit in ordered liberty," i.c.,
watershed rules of criminal procedure. Teague, 489 U.S. at 3 11. M i l e the Idaho Supreme
Court has not explicitly discussed the Teague exceptions, (both of which petitioner contends
apply to his case), the state supreme court's recognition of the "implicit in ordered liberty
exception" in Gaffovd is controlling and mandates retroactive application of Ring in this ease.

4

Petitioner's Ring claim fits Teague's first exception because recognition of the
aggravating circumstances as elements places imposition of the punishment of death beyond the
power of the state, absent a constitutional finding of those elements. This differentiates Ring
from Appveizdi, whch did not involve a qualitatively different form of punishment, death as
opposed to imprisonment, that was unavailable in the absence of the aggravation findings.
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In kfatter ofCaflord, the Idaho Supreme Court mnounced that a "new rule will be
applied on collateral review if it requires the obsewance of procedures "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."' Gaford, 127 Idaho 472,476,903 P.2d 61,65 (Idaho 1995) (quoting the second
exception in T e a p e v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) and citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302
(1989)). In Guflord the state supreme court stated that a new rule under Foucha v. Louisiana,

504 U.S. 71 (1992), which required the release of an insanity acquitee who had regained his
sanity or was no longer dangerous, was grounded in due process, was formulated to protect a
fundamental liberty interest, and must he applied retroactivelq, to cases on collateral review
because it required the observance of procedures that are "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty." GaSford, 903 P.2d at 65 (emphasis added).5
The right to "trial by jury in criminal cases is hdannental to the American scheme of
justice." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). Caflord's due process notion of
fundamental rights being "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" derives from the Supreme
Court's decision in Palko v. Cosznecticut, 302 U.S. 3 19 (1937). Palko used that description to
describe a subset of rights set forth in the Bill of Rights which were applicable against the States

5

The cases relied upon by the State to preclude retroactivity in this case, Fetterly,
121 Idaho at 41 8-19, Stuart 1). Stute, 128 Idaho 436, 914 P.2d 933 (1996), and Butler v. State,
129 Idaho 899, 901,935 P.2d 162, 164 (1997), are irrelevant, because they do not implicate the
CafSord exception for rules that are implicit in ordered liberty. At issue in Fetterly, Butler, and
Stuart, respectively, were the retroactivity of State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho129, 774 P.2d 299
(1989) (prescribing the method of weighing mitigating and aggravating evidence); State v.
Townsem!, 124 Idaho 88 1, 865 P.2d 972 (1993) (concluding that parts of the human body are not
a deadly weapon); and State v. Tribe, 123 Idaho 721, 852 P.2d 87 (1993) (requiring submission
of lesser included offense of second degree torture murder). None of these cases involve a
fundamental riglit that is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," in contrast to the
fundamental right in this case, trial by jury on all elements of the offense.
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thougtr the Foweenth h e n d m e n t . Id. at 324-25 (setting analflical frmework for whether
Double Jeopardy Clause was binding on the States). In dictum in Palko, the Supreme Court
stated that the right to trial by jury was "not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty,"
and that its abolition would not "violate a "principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fmdmental." Id. at 325 (quoting Sizj~derv.
Massachuselts, 29 1 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). Thirty-one years later the Supreme Court specifically
rejected the dictum in Pulko that the right to trial by jury was not implicit in ordered liberty.
Duncur-z v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 155. In explicitly rejecting Palko's dictum and in holding that
"the right to jury trial in serious criminal cases is a fmdmental right" that "must be recognized
by the States as part of their obligation to extend due process of law to all persons within their
jurisdiction," id. at 154, the Supreme Court necessarily found that the right to trial by jury in
criminal cases is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."

In the most basic sense, Ring remedies a ""tructural defect[ in the constitution of the
trial mechanism."' Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,281 (1993). In Sullivan, Justice Scalia
writing for the Court recognized not only that the right to trial by jury is "'fkndanlental to the
American scheme of justice,"' id. at 277 (quoting Durzcan v. Louisia~za,391 U.S. at 149), but
also that its "most important element" is "the right to have the jury, rather than the judge, reach
the requisite finding of 'guilty."' Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277 (citing Sparfv. United States, 156
U.S. 5 1, 105-06 (1 895)).
In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) - which, of course, was the taproot of Gideon
v. FFainwright, the model case for retroactive application of constitutional change - the Supreme

Court held that a denial of the right to counsel could be vindicated in postconviction proceedings
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because the Sixth A m e n h e r ~required
t
a lawyer's participation in a criminal trial to "complete
the court." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 468. A judgment rendered by an incomplete court was
subject to collateral attack. Id. What was a mere imaginative metaphor in Johrrson is literally
true of a capital sentencing proceeding in which the jury has not participated in the life-or-death
factfinding role that t h e Sixth h e n h e n t reserves to a jury under Appvendi and Ring: the
constitutionally requisite tribunal was simply not there for the critical finding of aggravating
circumstmces; and such a rahcal defect necessarily "cast[s] serious doubt on the veracity or
integrity ofthe . . . trial proceeding," Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922, 929 (Ha. 1980).
"[Tlhe jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundmental
decision about the exercise of official power - a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life
and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power . . .
found expression . . . in this insistence upon community participation in the determination of
guilt or innocence." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 156. These same principles require jury
participation in the determination of guilt or innocence of the factual accusations "necessary for
imposition of the death penalty." Ring, 122 U.S. at 2443. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494-495.
The right to a jury determination of factual accusations of this sort has long been the central
bastion of the Anglo-American legal system's defenses against injustice and oppres~ion.~
As

6

See Blackstone's Commentaries, 55 349-350 (Lewis ed. 1897):

[Tlhe founders of the English law have with excellent forecast contrived . . . that the truth
of every accusation . . . should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of
twelve of his equals and neighbors. . . . So that the liberties of England cannot but subsist,
so long as this pallalZiunz remains sacred and inviolate; not only from all open attacks,
(which none will be so hardy as to make) but also from all secret machinations, which
may sap and undermine it. . . .
PETITIONER'S RXSPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 21

fosmer Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote: "jury trial has been a principal element in maintaining
individual freedom m o n g English speaking peoples for the longest span in the history of man."

Powell, Jury E l a l ofCvime.s, 23 Washington & Lee L. Rev. 1, 11 (1966).
Justice Powell also quotes de Tocqueville as observing:
that: the jury ""paces the real direction of society in the hands of the governed. . . .
and not in . . . the government. . . He who punishes the criminal . . . is the real
master of society. All the sovereigns who have chosen to govern by their own
authority, and to direct society, instead of obeying its direction, have destroyed or
enfeebled the institution of the jury."

Id. at 5 (quoting 1 Alexis de Toequeville, Democracy in h e r i c a 282 (Henry Reeve trans.,

Section 19-2719 and the UPCPA must be interpreted consistently with the Idaho
Supreme Court's retroactivity decision in Gafford or it is a violation of equal protection, due
process and an improper suspension of the writ of habeas corpus under the Idaho and United
States Constitutions, as argued in Section IV infra. In Duncan, the Supreme Court of the United
States found the right to jury trial to be a fundamental right, one which necessarily is "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty," given the Supreme Court's express rejection in Duncart of
Palko's dictum that the jury trial right was not implicit in ordered liberty. The right to jury trial

Id. See also Rex v. Poole, Cases Teinpore Hardwicke 23,27 (1734), quoted in Sparfv. United
States, 156 U.S. 51,94 (1895):
[I]t is of the greatest consequence to the law of England, and to the subject, that these
powers of the judge and the jury are kept distinct; that the judge determines the law, and
the jury the fact; and, if ever they come to be confounded, it will prove the confusion and
destruction of the law of England.

Id.
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is implicit in ordered liberty and fundamental under both the Idaho and United States
Constitutions. The right to jury trial on aggravating circumstances in capital cares m o u n c e d in
Ring is a h d a m e n t a l right, implicit in ordered litrerly, and entitled to retroactive application

under Gasford.

111.

THE DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL ON THE
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MADE HIM ELIGIBLE: FOR THE DEATH
PENALTY IS A STRUCTUUL ERROR NOT SUBJECT TO HARMLESS
E m O R ANALYSIS, AND EW3N IF R A M L E S S ERROR ANALYSIS IS
ATTEMPTED THE ERROR IS NOT a M L E S S .
The State argues that the denial of a jury trial on statutory aggravating circumstances is

harmless error. State's Response at 7-8. The deprivation of a jury trial on the existence of
statutory aggravating circumstances is a structural error not amenable to harmless error analysis.
As the Ring error in this case is structural, harmless error analysis cannot be undertaken. It is

impossible to determine rel-rospectively what structure and what record would have existed had

Ring been in effect at the time of petitioner's trial. In any event, the Ring error is not harmless
under the facts of petitioner's case.

A.

Idaho Law Provides for a Separate Trial to Determine Statutory
Aggravating Circumstances.

Idaho law under which petitioner was tried and sentenced, establishes a bifurcated
proceeding. I.C. $5 18-4004, 19-2515 The jury finds only whether a defendant has committed a
first degree murder. The judge finds both whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable
doubt at least one statutory aggravating circumstance rendering the defendant death eligible and
then "whether the mitigating circumstances which may be presented outweigh the gravity of any
aggravating circumstance found and make the imposition of death unjust." Idaho Code 5 19-
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2515(c) (1977, m. 1984).~See Hofman v. Arave, 236 F.3d at 543-544 (explaining how the "...

judge must hold a separate sentencing proceeding.") (emphasis in original). The judge makes the
deternitlation of the existence of statutory aggravating circumstances after a separate trial in
which he considers both the evidence adduced at trial and a separate body of evidence, including,
inter alia, evidence ruled inadmissable at trial and a presentence report. I.C. 8 19-25 15(e).
Hearsay evidence is atlmissible at the trial in which the aggravating circmstances are
determined. See State v. Osborn, 63 1 P.2d 187, 193-5 (Idaho 1981) (intent of statute is to place

as much relevant information as possible before sentencing judge). The judge also hears all
evidence presented in mitigation before he determines whether the statutory aggravating
circumstances have been proved. I.C. $19-2515(e).

Idaho law requires a preliminary hearing and probable cause determination for felony
offenses. I.C. tj 19-804. In petitioner's case the preliminary hearing did not consider or
determine the existence of probable cause for any statutory aggravating circumstance. See

generally Preliminary Hearing Transcript. The Information did not allege or mention any
statutory aggravating circumstance. CR 17-1 8 (Information).
The jury in petitioner's case returned a verdict of guilty on one count of murder in the
first degree for murder in the perpetration of a robbery andlor a burglary. Contrary to the
constitutional requirement that all elements of the offense be determined by a jury, no statutory

7

The statute now reads: Where the court finds a statutory aggravating circumstance
the court shall sentence the defendant to death unless the court finds that mitigating
circumstances which may be presented are sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would
be unjust. I.C. tj 19-2515(c) (1977, am. 1984, am. 1995).
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aggravating circwstmces were submitted for jury detemination. In fact, the jury was explicitly
insmcted that it could not consider punisbent in its deliberations. Jury Insmction No. 23.
Judgment and sentence of death for conviction of felony murder were imposed by then
District Judge Gerald f. Schroeder, Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, County of Ada, Boise,
Idaho on March 7 , 1991. The findiilgs in aggravation which made Mr. Fields eligible f i r a death
sentence necessarily rested on the conclusion the jury did not reach: that Mr. Fields acted with
express rather than implied malice. CR 168 ('19-251 5 Findings).

The trial judge in petitioner's case found three statutory aggravating circmstances.
These were: (1) by the murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant
exhibited utter disregard for human life [$19-25 15(g) (611; (2)the murder was one defined as
murder of the first degree by I.C. tj 18-4003, subsection (d), cornrnission of a murder in the
perpetration of a robbery and/or burglary, accompanied with the specific intent to cause the death
of a human being [§ 19-2515(g)(7)]; (3) the defendant, by prior conduct or conduct in the
comn~issionof the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit murder, which will
probably constitute a continuing threat to society [tj 19-2515(g) (811. CR 170-74 (Findings of the
Court in Considering the Death Penalty, filed March 7, 1991).
Judge Schroeder made these findings at the conclusion of a hearing in which he
considered not only the evidence at trial but an entirely different range of evidence, including:
the presentence report, testimony by a number of additional witnesses in sentencing and post trial
hearings, and arguments of counsel. See gerzerally Tr Trial vol. VIII; Presentence Report.
Petitioner never conceded either guilt on the underlying charges or the existence of any statutory
aggravating circumstance.
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Mr. Fields timely appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, which affimed his conviction
and sentence on ESebruw 16, 1995, State v. Fields, 127 Idaho 904,908 P.2d 1211 (Idaho 1995).

B.

The Denial of A Jury Trial Is Structural Error Which Cannot Be Harmless.

The denial of the right to a jury trial is structural error which cannot be bartnless.
iMeCurk v. Signberg, 163 F.3d 470 (8' Cir. 1998); People v. Collins, 27 P.3d 726 (Cal. 200 1).

In Harmon v. i.14arshall, 69 F.3d 963, 965 (9thCir. 1995) the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that when the jury was not instructed on any elements for two of the crimes in a multicount indictment the error could not be harmless. "We find it difficult to imagine a more
fundamental or structural defect than allowing the jury to deliberate on and convict Harmon of an
offense. fur which it had no definition." Id. at 966. The court stated fixther ""[]here is no way
we can determine the extent to which Harmon's convictions were actually affected by the failure
to instruct, because we simply cannot tell how the jury reached its decision."' Id.
The Supreme Court recognizes that the right to a jury trial is fundamental and violation of
that right cannot be harmless. " m e n that right [to jury trial in serious criminal cases] is
altogether denied, the State cannot contend that the deprivation was harmless because the
evidence established the defendant's guilt; the error in such a case is that the wrong entity judged
the defendant guilty." Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986). See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508

8

The State's citation to Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (holding that jury
instruction omitting element of offense can be harmless error), is not apposite. See State's
Response at 7-8. Neder analogizes the omission of an element of the offense to cases involving
improper instructions on a single element and finds that such an omission is subject to harmless
error. This case, by contrast, involves not just the omission of one element of instructions on an
aggravating circumstance but the denial of the entire trial at which any of the statutory
aggravating circumstances were found and the lack of any instructions on any element of the
statutory aggravating circumstances.
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U.S. at 38 1. The structural error precludes appellate hmlessness findings precisely because:
"[a] reviewing court can only engage in pure speculation -- its view of what a reasonable jury
would have done. And when it does that, "the wrong entity judgels] the deftendant guilty. '" Id.
(quoting Rose v. Clark). The Idaho stalutory sentencing scheme's "[dlenial of the right to a jury
verdict of guilt b e y o d a reasonable doubt" is smctwal error, "the jury guarantee being a 'basic
protectiotn]' whose precise effects are measurable, but without which a criminal trial cannot
reliably serve its function." See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281. "'The deprivation of that /jurytrial]

right, with consequences that are necessarily uzquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably
qualifies as 'strucwal error."' Id.
The statute under which petitioner received his death sentence provides fbr a separate
trial to establish the statutory aggravating circumstances, to consider mitigation, to weigh
mitigation against any statutory aggravating circumstance, and to determine the justness of a
death penalty in light of mitigating and aggravating (statutory and non-statutory) circumstances.

I.C. 5 19-2515(c). Petitioner was entitled at a minimum to a jury trial on the existence of the
statutory aggravating circumstances and was completely deprived of that right. This deprivation
is not subject to harmless error analysis.

C.

Harrnless Error Analysis Cannot Be Meanin@ully Conducted In this Case.

Even if h m l e s s error analysis could be applied, the error here may not be deemed
harmless. H m l e s s error analysis involves reviewing the record and then determining whether
or not the error affected the jury's determination of guilt. Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991)
(error can be said to be harmless when it is unimportant in relation to everything else the jury
considered on the issue, as shown by the record). This test cannot be meaningfully performed
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here because it is impossible to retrospectively determine how petitioner" trial would have been
conducted and how his lawyers would have tried the case had Ring been in effect. No one can
do more than guess as to what procedure Idaho would have employed if the jury had to find the
statutory aggravating circmstances and how petitioner would have defended against the
aggravating circmstances if the trier of fact were the jury and not the judge.
Hwrnless error analysis depends on being able to assess the impact of an error on a
kno~vnrecord. %%en, the very nature of the proceeding itself is a matter of pure speculation,
then harmless enor analysis becomes a memingless endeavor. Coleman v. McCurmick, 874
F.2d. 1280 (9thCir. 1989), illustrates this point. In Coleman the defendant was resentenced to
death after his death sentence, imposed pursuant to a mandatory death sentencing scheme, was
overturned. The resentencing proceeding allowed the court to consider evidence from the
defendant's guilt phase trial. The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, found that this resentencing
violated the defendant's right to due process and that h m l e s s error did not apply because of "the
reviewing court's inability to determine whether such violations were in fact h m l e s s beyond a
reasonable doubt." 874 F.2d at 1289. The court reasoned that since Coleman's trial counsel had
no notice of the consequences of the trial record on the death decision, it would be purely
speculative to determine what tactical decisions he would have made had he had such notice. Id.
Similarly, because petitioner and his counsel had no notice that the jury would play any
role in the finding of the statutory aggravating circumstances which must be found before he
could be eligible to die, their tactical decisions could not have been influenced by such
knowledge. Thus, decisions on such vital topics such as whether petitoner should testify were
made absent this knowledge. Coleman observes that "[Tlhis decision, whether or not to testify in
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one's o w defense, can only be made rationally if the consequences of such a cort-rseof action are
known. Elere they were not." Coleman, 847 F.2d at 1287. This statement applies in full to
petitioner. Changing the identity of the fact finder on the initial question of death e1igibili.t): has a
pervasive but u h o w a b l e impact on virtually every aspect of strategy on both the guilt issues
and the aggravating circumstances questions.

Cliaited Slates v. Jordan, 29 1 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9" Cir. 2002) makes much the same point
in the context of an Apprendi error. The Jordan court found that not charging or including in the
elements the question of drug quantity was not harmless error when the defendant received a life
sentence for a drug offense involving more than 50 grams of methamphetamine.
M e n quantity is neither alleged in the indictment nor proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt, there are too many unlaowns to say with any confidence, let alone
beyond reasonable doubt, that the error was harmless. What evidence might have been
proffered by Jordan, in a defensive effort to minimize quantity, if the indictment had
properly charged the quantity involved in the offense, is entirely speculative. We hold
that the governrnent cannot meet its burden under the harmless error standard when drug
quantity is neither charged in the indictment nor proved to a jury beyond reasonable
doubt, if the sentence received is greater than the combined maximum sentences for the
indeterminate quantity offenses charged.

Id. at 1096-97.
Here, the petitioner was charged under an Information w-hich did not mention the
statutory aggravating circumstances. CR 17-18. The jury was never instructed on any of the
statutory aggravating circumstances, and counsel had no notice that any of those aggravating
circumstances were for the jury's consideration. The error in petitioner's case is more pervasive
than in Jordan and its impact even more speculative. The result involves the difference not just
between number of years in prison but between life and death. And the issues which were never
alleged in the Information or placed before the jury are far more complex than merely
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determining how m a y grams of a controlled substance a defendant possessed. Just as hamless
error could not be found in Jordan, it cannot be found here.

D.

Even If Harmless Error Analysis Is Performed, the Error Is Not Harmless.

Even if harmless error malysis is perfomed, the error is not harmless under the facts of
this case where Fields contested guilt and did not concede the existence of any aggravating
factor.
Harmless error cannot be found by cobbling together the jury's verdicts on guilt issues.
The Idaho Supreme Court does not accept the notion that a jury finding on a guilt issue equates
with a finding of an aggravating circumstance.
In State v. Sivak, 674 P.2d 396 (1983), the jury acquitted the defendant of premeditated
murder but convicted him of first degree felony murder. The judge, however, sentenced Sivak to
death aft-er finding, inter aha, that the murder was planned and calculated. On appeal, Sivak
complained about this inconsistency but the Idaho Supreme court rejected his argument, noting
that no inconsistency existed because the judge's finding was based on evidence which the jury
didn't hear. "Thus, the findings of the jury and the findings of the trial judge are not
inconsistent; rather they are based on different ranges of information." Sivak, 674 P.2d at 403.
Sivak's recognition that the statutory aggravating circumstances involve a different
inquiry and different evidence than the guilt phase findings flows inexorably fiom the statute
itself. If Idaho had intended that a jury's determination that a defendant killed a person with
specific intent in the course of a robbery constituted a finding that the ( f ) (7) statutory
aggravating circumstance, now codified as I.C. tj 19-2515 (h)(7), had been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, there would be no reason to require a separate proceeding based on different
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 30
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particula, it c m o t be said that the jury would have found the I.C. $19-2515 (g)(7), now (h)(7),
circuslance.
This is true because (1) we do not h o w whether the composition of the jury would have
been the same and whether their verdicts would hatre been affected by their howledge that the
death penalty was at issue, (2) what instmctions the jury would have received, (3) what evidence
Fields would have presented had he k n o w the statutory aggravating circustmces were at stake,
(4) whether Fields would have testified, and ( 5 ) what arguments his lawyers would have made.
1.

The Jury Did Not Know the Death Penalty Was At Stake.

The decision about whether to find a person eligible for death is qualitatively different
than the decision to find him guilty of murder. It has long been recognized that the jury's
knowledge of the consequences of the decision in a death penalty case may impact on its verdict.

Caliltvell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) (stressing importance of jurors appreciating the
consequence of their decision in a death penalty case); see also Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 3 8 , 50
(1980) (Constitution will not allow exclusion ofjurors who "frankly concede that the prospects
of the death penalty may affect what their honest judgement of the facts will be or what they may
deem to be a reasonable doubt"). Here the guilt verdict was rendered by a jury assured and
instructed that sentencing was solely the responsibility of the judge. The jury was specifically
instructed:

It is not within your province to concern yourselves with the question ofpenaljy
orpunishment. That feature of the case is solely for the Court. Therefore, I
instruct you not to concern yourselves with it at all. Your duty as jurors is solely
are not even arguably implied by the jury's guilt phase verdicts. Notably, the State only argues,
albeit incorrectly, that the jury's findings "satisfied Idaho Code $ 19-2515 (g)(7)." State's
Response at 4.
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to determine h e guilt or innocence of the accused m d upon that question, and that
question alone you, as jurors, are to vote and return your verdict.
No. 16259, Jury Instructions filed May 16, 1990, Instruction 23 (4IhJud. Dist. Ct.,

State V .

County of Ada) (emphasis added). It thus cannot be presmed that the composition of the jury
would have been the same. Even more critically, the jurors' diminished, indeed absent, sense of
responsibility for making a death eligibility detemination precludes deducing the verdicts on the
statutory aggravating circustances from the guilt verdicts.
2.

Both the Instructions the Jurors Did Receive and Those They Did Not
Prevent a Finding of Harmless Error.

Both the instructions the jurors did receive on the guilt issues and the unknown
instructions for the aggravating circumstance^'^ prevent a finding of harmless error. The jurors
were instructed that they would not make any decision concerning the sentencing or penalty. Id.
The instruction was affirmatively and drastically misleading if the jury's task included finding
the statutory aggravating circumstances.
We also do not 1-ow how the jurors would have been instructed on the (g) (7)
circmstance to be established. The (g) (7) aggravating circumstance, which requires a finding
that the murder be a first degree felony murder and be "accompanied with the specific intent to
cause the death of a human being" has also never been precisely defined. Indeed, the Idaho
courts have warned against instructing jurors on "specific intent." State v. Enno, 807 P.2d 610,
621 (Idaho 1991) ("We note that the distinction between general intent and specific intent is a
difficult distinction and has been abandoned in the Model Penal Code. The jury need not be

10

Presumably the jury would have had to receive instructions on the elements of the
statutory aggravating circumstances.
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instructed in the esoteric distinctions between general and specific intent"). Here, for a jury to
find the (g) (7) aggravating circmstance, an instruction and a decision by the jury on the
"esoteric" concept of specific intent was required,
It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that a jusy which had acquitted Mr. Fields of
premeditated and deliberate murder, ~vouldnot have found the specific intent required for the
(g)(7) circumstance, particulasly if the jnsy knew that its verdict would determine whether Mr
Fields was eligible to be sentenced to death.

IV.

THE STATE'S PROCEDURAL DEFENSES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A.

Idaho Code Section 19-2519(5) Violates Petitioner's Rights to Due Process
and Equal Protection Guaranteed under the United States and Idaho
Constitutions.

The State's argument that Fields' Ring claim cannot be raised in a successive proceeding
under 1. C. $19-2719, because it is not within the exception of I.C. 5 19-2719(5) is without
merit."
Section 19-2719 treats capitally sentenced inmates who attempt to challenge their
convictions differently from other criminally convicted petitioners who are subject only to the
UPCPA. Under the UPCPA, "post-conviction relief is not barred where new evidence is
discovered, or -~vherelater case law suggests a conviction is unlawful." Aragon v. State, 114
Idaho 758, 766 n.12, 760 P.2d, 1174, 1182 n. 12 (Idaho 1988) (citing I.C.5 19-4901) (emphasis
added). Under the UPCPA, I.C. $ 19-4908, a claim can only be waived ifthe waiver is bzowing,

11

Although the State makes no arguments opposing petitioner's motion to conect
illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 35, the differing treatment of Rule 35 movants based on
whether they are capital or non-capital cases is unconstitutional for all of the reasons set forth in
section IV of this brief.
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voluntary and intelligent. h4cKznrzey v. State, 133 Iddlo 695, 700-01,922 P.2d 144, 149-50
(Idaho 1999). Under iWcKinney, section 19-2719 "supersedes the W C P A to the extent that their
provisions conflict." Id. at 700, 922 P.2d at 149. In allowing non-capital, convicted i m a t e s a
collateral challenge to their conviction based upon new law or claims that were not waived
knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently, the UPCPA offers non-capital i m a t e s f a broader
protection and ability to correct an illegal, unconstitutional sentence than Idaho offers to inmates
under a sentence of death.
To the extent Idaho Code section19-2719(5) is construed to preclude review of
petitioner's claims, the statute is unconstitutional. It violates equal protection and due process
under the 14thAmendment of the United States Constitution, and Article 1, §§ 2 and 13 of the
Idaho Constitution, in that there is no rational basis, Romer v. Evans, 5 17 U.S. 620, 63 1-36
(1995); City of Cleburtre v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446-51 (1985); Zubel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61-63 (1982); U.S.D.A. v. Morerzo, 413 U.S. 528, 535 (1973); SterlingH
Nelson h Sons, Izzc. v. Bender, 95 Idaho 8 13, 8 15-16, 520 P.2d 860, 861-62 (Idaho 1974), for the
disparate treatment of non-capital prisoners who do not need to demonstrate the "heightened
burden" for postconviction relief which capital petitioners must meet, e.g., Paz v. State, 123
Idaho 758,760, 852 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Idaho 1993), or meet the limitations imposed by I.C. 5 192719(5). See, e.g., Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 648-49, 8 P.3d 636, 643-44 (Idaho 2000);
Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793,796-97, 10 P.3d 742, 745-46 (Idaho 1995).
Moreover, the differing treatment of capita1 and non-capital petitioners in the context of
the right which petitioner seeks to vindicate in this case, the fundamental right to a trial by jury,
entitles petitioner to strict scrutiny of the discriminatory classification. See Newlan v. State, 96

-
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Idaho 7 11, 714, 535 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Idaho 1975) (st-rict scrutiny when statute" classification
infringes upon a firndmental right); State v. Breed>111 Idaho 497, 500, 725 P.2d 202, 205
(Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (strict scmtiny of statutory schemes that infringe upon a "'fundamental
right' such as voting, procrerslion, or constitutional safeguards for persons accused of crimes").
See gerzerafly Nowak, Rotunda & Young, Constimtional Law, 5 14.41 at 785 (3rded. 1986)

("'When the g o v e m e n t takes actions that burden the rights of a classification of persons in tsmis
of their treatment in a criminal justice system it is proper to review these laws under the strict
scrutiny standard for equal protection"). As the right to trial by jury is a fundamental right,l2 this
court must review regulations that purport to regulate the right with strict scrutiny. Van
Valkenburgh v. Cztzzensfor Term Limits,135 Idaho 121, 126, 15 P.3d 1129, 1134 (Idaho 2000)
(if a fundamental right is at issue, appropriate standard of review of law infringing on that right is
strict scmtiny).
As Idaho's differing treatment of postconviction petitioners fails under a rational basis
analysis, it clearly fails under strict scrutiny. "A law which infringes on a h d a m e n t a l riglit will

12

"[G]onstitutional safeguards for persons accused of crimes are fundamental rights
under the state constitution." Idaho Schools for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho
573, 58 1, 850 P.2d 724, 732 (Idaho 1993) (dictum). A right is fundamental under the Idaho
Constitution if it is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or expressed as a positive right in
the constitution. Van Valkenburgh v. Citizensfor Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 126, 15 P.3d
1129, 1134 (Idaho 2000). Citing the Idaho Constitution's protection of the right of suffiage in
two places, the state supreme court concluded that the right of suffrage is a fundamental right.
Id. The right to trial by jury is likewise explicitly protected in two places in the Idaho
Constitution. Idaho Const. Art. I, $7, id. Art. V, $1. Consistent with the supreme court's dictum
regarding the fundamental nature of constitutional protections for persons accused of crime,
together with the explicit recognition of the right to trial by jury in two places in the Idaho
Constitution, it is unassailable that the right to trial by jury is a fundamental right under Idaho
law.
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be upheld only where the State can demons&ate the law is necessary to promote a compelling
state interest." Id. The state's interest in expeditious handling of capital cases, the puspose of the
offending provision, X.C. 5 19-2719, is not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify the
violation of petitioner's fundmental right to trial by jury.
B.

Section 19-2'719 Unconstitutionally Suspends the Right to Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus.

Section 19-2719 also unlawfully suspends the writ of habeas corpus under Article 1, 5 5
of the Idaho Constitution and Article I, 5 9, clause 2 of the federal constitution, by precluding
petitioner Erom raising valid claims under Ring that invalidate his sentence. Although the
legislature has regulated the use of habeas corpus by statute, "the writ is not a statutory remedy,
but rather a remedy recognized and protected by the Idaho Constitution." Mahuflej~v. Sfate, 87
Idaho 228, 231,392 P.2d 279,280 (Idaho 1964). The legislature "is without power to abridge
this remedy secured by the Constitution," id., though by statute the legislature "may add to the
efficacy of the \vrit," and the statute "should be construed so as to promote the effectiveness of
the proceeding." Id. Idaho Code sectioii 19-2719(5)(c)'s purported refusal to allow retroactive
consideration of Ring violates petitioner's right to challenge his conviction through habeas
corpus under the state ~onstitution.'~Id. Const. art. 1, 5 5.

l3

Idaho Code section 19-2719(5)(c)'s purported refusal to allow retroactive
consideration of Ring additionally violates not only equal protection and due process under the
state and federal constitutions, Cleburne, supra, Nowak et al., supra, but also petitioner's
fundamental right to a trial by jury, Idaho Const. Art. I, fj 7, id. Art. \I, fj 1, U.S. Const. amend.
VI and notice of every element of the offense in the charging papers, Idaho Const. Art. I, 5 8,
U.S. Const. amend. V. See State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560,564-67, 861 P.2d 1225, 1229-32 (Id.
Ct. App. 1993) (Walters, J.).
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The legislature's regulation of the writ of habeas corpus in I.C. $5 19-4901 et seq. and
19-2719 may not operate to suspend the writ. As the ldaho Supreme Court stated so aptly in
Mahafl~y,the legislature's regulation of habeas corpus must pvesewe it:

the limitations upon the remedy afforded by habeas corpus should beflexible and readily
available to prevertt mangest irzjustice, for, as Mr. Justice Black has expressed it, the
principles judicially established for the delimitation of habeas corpus action "must be
construed and applied so as to presewe - not destroy - cotzstztutional sa_fpuvds of
human ZiJe and l i h e r ~ . '[Citation omitted]
Mahcffley, 87 ldaho at 23 1,392 P.2d at 280 (emphasis added).

Idaho Code section 19-2719 (5)(c) does not allow habeas corpus actions that seek
vindication of fundmental rights through the retroactive application of judicial decisions and
accordingly precludes relief for a Ring violation of petitioner's right to a jury trial, notice and due
process. If the legislature's elimination of that aspect of state habeas corpus were constitutional,
it would leave petitioner with rights to a jury trial, notice of charges and due process under Ring,
but no remedy. Mahaffey makes clear, however, that the withdrawal of a habeas corpus remedy
for the denial of fundamental rights violates Article I, section 5 of the Idaho Constitution.
In the instant case, however, we must face the unique fact that ifwe deny petitioner's
application he will be in the unfortunate and medieval position of possessing a right for
which there exists no remedy. Urzless we wish to destroy petitioner's constitutionally
guaranteed right to be secure from cruel and unusual punishment, we must hold that the
writ ofhabeas corpus may issue in this type of situation.
Mahafley, 87 Idaho at 231-32, 392 P.2d at 281 (emphasis added).

Refusal by the Idaho state courts to enforce the state constitutional and statutory rights
asserted by Petitioner violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
petitioner's rights to due process of law and violates his liberty interest in the enforcement of
rights created and recognized by state law. See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980).
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h sum, constming Idaho Code section 19-2719 and the WCPA to preclude consideration
of the merits of petitioner's claims would violate both the Idatlo Constitution, Article I,

7 , 8, 13 asld 18, and Article V,

$5 2, 5 ,

5 1, and the United States Constitution, Article I 9 9 el. 2, the

Fifth and Sixth h e n d m e n l s , and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourleenth Amendment.

VI.

CONCLUSION
The ruling in Ring has reduced Idaho's death penalty scheme to constitutional rubble.

Anempring to retrospectively determine under what framework Fields's case would have been
tried, and what decisions his lawyers would have made had Ring been the law, is an exercise in
guesswork. What Ring does make unmistakably clear is that petitioner was tried under a
fundamentally flawed statute, that the impact of the error cannot be deemed harmless, and that
his sentence of death must be vacated.
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DATED this

3X/day of November, 2002.
2

Attorneys for Appellant
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Idaho State Bar No. 2854
Capital Habeas Unit
Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho
201 N. Main
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-0180
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BRUCE D. LIVINGSTON
Missouri Bar No. 34444
Capital Habeas Unit
Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho
201 N. Main
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-0180
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY O F ADA
ZANE JACK FIELDS,
Petitioner,

)
)
)

v

1

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

1

Case No. SP OT 020071ID

)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff

i
)
)

v.

1

ZANE JACK FIELDS,
Defendant.

)

Case No. 16259
MOTION FOR LIMITED ADMISSION

)

The undersigned local counsel, Joan Fisher, petitions the Court for admission of the
undersigned applying counsel, Bruce D. Livingston, pursuant to Idaho Bar Commission Rule
222, to allow him to appearpro hue vice for petitioner in these proceedings without payment of
any fee.

MOTION FOR LIMITED ADMISSION

-

1

--

Applying counsel, Bruce Livingston, cerlifies that he is an active member, in good
sanding, of the bar of the Srate of Missouri, that he mainwins the regular practice of law at the
above-noted address as a Federal Defender exclusively representing indigent clients, and that he
is a resident of the State of Idaho but is not licensed to practice law in the state courts of Idaho.
Mr. Livingston certifies that he has never previously been admitted under ICBR or appeared as
counsel in the Idaho state courts.
Both undersigned counsel certify that a copy of this motion has been served on all other
parties to this matter and that a copy of the motion has been provided to the Idaho State Bar.
Local counsel, Joan Fisher, certifies that the above information is true to the best of her
knowledge, after reasonable investigation. Local counsel acknowledges that her attendance shall
be required at all court proceedings in which applying counsel appears, unless specifically
excused by the trial judge.
Applying counsel also petitions the court for a waiver of the $200 fee for a limited
appeaxance. Petitioner is an indigent death row inmate who has previously been granted injbrmu

pauperis status by the Idaho state courts and the United States District Court for the District of
Idaho. Applying counsel, Bruce D. Livingston, generates no fees as a result of his representation
of petitioner and is an attorney employed by the Capital Habeas Unit of the Federal Defenders of
Eastern Washington & Idaho, which was appointed to represent petitioner in federal court. The
Federal Defenders will not seek payment for their representation of petitioner in state court.
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Dated t h i s d day of November, 2002.

Local Course1

Applying Counsel
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Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 W. Front Street, Room 3 191
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ZANE JACK FIELDS,
Petitioner,

1

Case No. SP OT 0200711D

)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

1
)

1
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff

1
)

1
1
ZANE JACK FIELDS,
Defendant.

Case Na. 16259

)
)

1
)

ORDER GRANTING LIMITED
APPEARANCE AND WAIVING FEE

The motion for limited appearance of Bruce D. Livingston in these proceedings is
granted. The request to gmnt the limited appearance with waiver of the fee is also granted. The
court will not authorize the payment of any attorney fees or travel expenses to Mr. Livingston or
his employer, the Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho.

Idaho District Court Judge
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GREG H. BOWER

M -------

Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
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Roger Bourne
Idaho State Bar #2127
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 Vlr. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICTAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ZANE JACK FIELDS
Petitioner,
VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

1
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

1
AND
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)

CASE NO.
HCR16259/SPOT0200711D
STATE'S RESPONSE TO
PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO STATE'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISMISSAL

1
Plaintiff,
vs.
ZANE JACK FIELDS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW, Roger Bourne, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and makes the State's response to the Petitioner's
Memorandum in Opposition to the State's earlier response and motion for summary
dismissal of Fields' petition requesting that he be resentenced based upon the holding
in Ring V. Arizona.
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISMISSAL (FIELDS/HCR16259/SPOT0200nlD), Page 1
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The State has earlier responded to Fields' petition by filing a response dated
August 30, 2002, In that response, the State has urged the Court to find that United
States Supreme Court decision in

does not apply retroactively to

petitioner Fields. The State brought to the Court's attention several Idaho decisions
together with Idaho Code $19-2719(5)(c),which preclude the filing of a successive post
conviction pleading that attempts to seek the retroactive application of a new rule of
law. The State also moved this Court for summary dismissal of Fields' petition.
Since that time, Fields has filed a response, which argues that the Ring decision
should be applied retroactively to him for several reasons set out in the response.
Today's State's response is in direct contradiction of Fields' arguments and sets out
recent case law showing conclusively that the Ring decision cannot be applied
retroactively by this Court.
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT IN RING V. ARIZONA DID NOT U K E THE
HOLDING RETROACTIVE AND THE HOLDING CANNOT BE RETROACTIVELY'
APPLIED OTHERWISE BY THIS COURT
In 1991, when defendant Fields was sentenced to death by Judge Schroeder, the
law of the land was clear. A judge, without participation by the jury, could
constitutionally find statutory aggravating circumstances after a guilty verdict or plea
to first-degree murder and sentence the defendant to death. There was no question
about it. Fields' judgment and denial of post-conviction relief became final in Fields v.
State, 127 Idaho 904 (1995).
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In the years before Fields was sentenced, and in the years since, the Idaho
Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of judge sentencing in first
depee murder cases.

A prominent case among the several eases is State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129
(1989). The United State Supreme Court also upheld judge sentencing in Walton v.

Arizona, 48'7 U.S. 639 (1990).
It wasn't until years later when the United State Supreme Court decided
Apprendi v. New Jersev, 530 US 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) that there
began to be doubt concerning the continued vitality of judge sentencing. The court in
Apprendi held that, "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." The Apprendi court vacated the sentence
of a person convicted in New Jersey whose sentence was enhanced because the
sentencing judge found that the crime was committed in violation of New Jersey's hate
crime statutes. The hate crime statutes increased the maximum potential available
sentence for the offender. Apprendi's jury had not been asked to find that Apprendi's
crime was committed for hate bias reasons.
At the time of the Apprendi decision, it was apparent that Apprendi and Walton
were in conflict. Walton could not stand for the proposition that a judge could make
factual findings that increase the maximum potential sentence in death penalty cases
in the face of the Apprendi decision. The issue had to be decided and Ring v. Arizona is
the application of the Apprendi rule to death penalty litigation.
Fields now argues that the Ring decision should be retroactive to his death
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sentence, which was final years earlier. There is no legal basis for a retroacf ve
application. To begin with, only the Suprerne Court can make the holding retroactive
and they did not.
The only reference to retroactivity is in Justice OTonnor's dissent, which the
Chief Justice joins. They point out that each prisoner on death row in the states affected
by the Rinff holding, will likely challenge his or her death sentence. Justice O'Connor
said the following:

"I believe many of these challenges will ultimately be unsuccessful, either
because the vrisoners will be unable to satisfv the standards of harmless error
or plain error review or because, having completed their direct appeals, they
will be barred from taking advantage of today's holding on federal collateral
review." See 28 U.S.C. section 2244 (b)(2)(A),2254(d)(1);Teame v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288,109 S.Ct. 1060,103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1383); Rina 122 Sup. Ct. at page 2149
and 2450.
1

J

The Supreme Court did not say that the decision was retroactive and Justice
O'Conner recognized that most defendants who attempted to have it applied to their
cases would be barred from doing so on collateral review. This is in keeping with other
U.S. Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court has decided the retroactivity issue
in other cases and has given us clear direction on its application.
One such recent case is Tyler v. Cain, 533 US 656, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 150 L.Ed.2d
632 (2001). A synopsis of the issue before the court in Tyler was set out by Justice
Thomas in the first paragraph of the decision as follows:
"Under Cane v. Louisiana, 498 US 39, 111S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339
(1990)(~ercuriam), a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction to allow
conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, we must
decide whether this rule was "made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(b)(2)&) (1994 ed.,
Supp V). We hold that it was not." 533 U.S. at page 658.
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I n 1975, the petitioner Tyler shot and killed his 20-day-old daughter during a
fight with his girlhiend. Tyler was convicted of second-degree murder and his
conviction was afirmed on appeal. Over the next ten years, Tyler filed five (5) post
conviction petitions, all of which were denied. I n 1990 the United States Supreme
Court issued the

decision, aRerwhich Tyler filed a federal habeas petition

claiming t h a t the jury instruction defining reasonable doubt i n his trial was
substantially identical to the instruction condemned in the Cage decision. Tyler also
filed a sixth state post-conviction petition raising the Cage claim. The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit allowed Tyler to raise the claim, but the Federal District Court
denied his petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the petition, which sets
the stage for the Tyler v. Cain decision.
The Supreme Court held that the Cage decision was not retroactively applicable
to Tvler. This was done in the context of interpreting the federal rule, which prohibits a
successive petition based upon the application of a new rule of law, much the same as
Idaho Code $19-2719(5)(c) does in Idaho. The Court stated the following:
Quite significantly, under this provision, the Supreme Court is the only
entity t h a t can "make" a new rule retroactive. The new rule becomes
retroactive, not by the decisions of a lower court or by the combined action
of the Supreme Court and the lower courts, but simply by the actions of
the Supreme Court. The only way the Supreme Court can, by itself, "lay
out and construct, a rule's retroactive effect, or "cause" t h a t effect "to exist,
or occur, or appear," is through a holding. The Supreme Court does not
"make" a rule retroactive when it merely establishes principals of
retroactivity and leaves the application of those principals to lower courts.
I n such a n event, any legal conclusion that is derived from the principles is
developed by the lower court (or perhaps by a combination of courts), not
by the Supreme Court. We t h u s conclude t h a t a new rule is not "made
retroactive to cases on collateral review" unless the Supreme Court holds it
to be retroactive. 533 U.S. a t page 662.
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THE RING HOLDING IS NOT RETROACTIW BASED ON A "TEAGUE'XANALYSIS
also argued that the Cape rule should be retroactive under a Tearrue v.
Lane, supra, analysis. The Tyler court rejected the argument that the Teaaue case
made Cage retroactive as well. An understanding of the

case is helpful in

understanding why the Tyler court held that Cage was not retroactive to Tyler. As
quoted above, the Tvler, case analyses at len@h the T e a ~ u ev. Lane, decision. In the
Teacrue case, the question before the court was whether nor not the court's decision in
Batson v. Kentuckv, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986) should be
applied retroactively to petitioner Teaaue.
Teague was a black man who had been convicted by a n all white jury in Illinois.
The prosecutor had used all ten of his preemptory challenges to exclude blacks from the
petitioner's jury. The petitioner was convicted and his conviction became final prior to
the decision by the Supreme Court in Batson.
As is well known, the Supreme Court in Batson held that a prosecutor could not
use peremptory challenges to remove jury members based upon the juror's race.
Even though Teame's conviction was final in state court, his conviction was
being collaterally reviewed in federal court on a writ of habeas corpus when the Batson
case was decided. Much of the T e a ~ u edecision deals with procedural default and other
issues related specifically to T e a ~ u e ' petition.
s
However, T e a ~ u eurged that the Sixth
Amendment's fair cross section requirement should apply to petit juries. In that
context, the Court addressed the question of retroactivity.
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The Court pointed out that the retroac~veapplication of a new rule upon state courts
causes a great deal of cost and frustration. The Court stated the following:
The "costs imposed upon the states by retroactive application of new rules
of constitutional law on habeas corpus... generally far outweigh the
benefits of this application.'3n many ways, the application of new rules to
cases on collateral review may be more intrusive than enjoining of
criminal prosecutions for it continually forces the states to marshal
resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals
conform to then-existing constitutional standards. Furthermore a s we
recognized in Engle v. Isaac, "'state courts are understandably frustrated
when they faithfully apply existing constitutional law only to have a
federal court discover, during a [habeas] proceeding, new constitutional
commands. citntions omitted 103 L.Ed.2d a t p .355
The Court said that it found those criticisms to be "persuasive" and so held the
following:
Unless they fall within a n exception to the general rule, new constitutional
rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases, which
have become final before the new rules are announced. 103 L.Ed.2d a t
page 355 and 356.
It is for that reason, that the Tyler court held that a new rule is not retroactive
unless the Supreme Court specifically held that it was to be retroactive a t the time the
decision was made or unless some subsequent case or a series of cases specifically
makes it retroactive.
The Teague court goes on to hold though that a new rule can be applicable to a
case on collateral review if, and only if, it falls within a n exception to the non retroactivity rule. The Court found two exceptions. The first being that a new rule
should be applied retroactively if it places "certain kinds of primary private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law making authority to proscribe."
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The second exception was to be the observance of "'those procedures that are
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" which the court defined to mean '"watershed
rules of criminal procedure." The Court further defined watershed to mean "bedrock
procedural elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular
conviction." An example the Court gave would be the right to counsel a t trial.
The Court expanded on "bedrock procedural elements" with the "requirement
that the procedure a t issue must implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial." 103

The Court gave an example of a n 'kccuracy enhancing procedural rule" to be a
rule "without which the likelihood of a n accurate conviction is seriously diminished."
The Court said the following:
We are also of the view that such rules are best illustrated by revealing
the classic grounds for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus - - that the
proceeding was dominated by mob violence; that the prosecutor knowingly
made use of perjured testimony; or that the conviction was based on a
confession extorted from the defendant by brutal methods." 103 L.Ed.2d a t
p. 358
The Teame court went on to determine that the rule requiring that petit juries
be composed of a fair cross section of the community was not a "bedrock procedural
element" that should be retroactively applied. The defendant's petition was denied.
Once Teague is understood, the holding in Tyler is not surprising.
The Tyler court said the following of Teame:
Under Teague, a new rule can be retroactive to cases on collateral review
if, and only if, it falls within one of two narrow exceptions to the general
rule of non-retroactivity. Id. a t 3 11-313 109 S.Ct. 1060 (plurality opinion).
See also 07Dellv. Netherland, 521 US 151, 156-157, 117 S.Ct. 1969, 138
L.Ed.2d 351 (1997).
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The exception relevant here is for "watershed rules of criminal procedure
implicating the k d a m e n t a l fairness and accuracy of the criminal
proceeding." Graham v. Collins, 506 US 461, 4'78, 113 S.Ct. 892, 122
L.Ed.2d 260 (1993). To fall within this exception, a new rule must meet
two requirements: Infringement of the rule must "seriously diminish the
likelihood of obtaining a n accurate conviction," and the rule must "alter
i
essential to the
our understanding of the bedock p r ~ c e d u r aejemends
fairness of a proceeding." Sawyer v. Smith, 497 US 227, 242, 110 S.Ct.
2822, 111L.Ed.2d 1993 (1990)(quoting Teague, s u p a t 311, 109 S.Ct.
1060 (plurality opinion), in turn quoting Mackev v. United States, 401 US
667, 693, 91 S.Ct, 1160, 28 L.Ed.2d 404 (1971)(Harlan, J.,concurring in
judgments in part and dissenting in part.)
According to Tyler, the reasoning of Sullivan demonstrates that the Cage
rule satisfies both prongs of this Teague exception. First, Tyler notes,
Sullivan repeatedly emphasized that a Cage error fundamentally
undermines the reliability of a trials outcome. And second, Tyler contends,
the central point of Sullivan is that a Cage error deprives a defendant of a
bedrock element of procedural fairness: the right to have the jury make the
determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Tyler's arguments fail to
persuade, however. The most he can claim is that, based on the principals
outlined in Teague, this court shouldmake Cage retroactive to cases on
collateral review. What is clear, however, is that we have not "made" Cage
retroactive to cases on collateral review. 533 U.S. a t page 665.
Tyler also claimed that the Cage error was "'structural error" and that a s such
should apply retroactively to him. The Court rejected that argument as follows:
The only holding in Sullivan is that a Cage error is structural error. There
is not a second case that held that all structural error rules apply
retroactively or that all structural error rules fit within the second Teague
exception. The standard for determining whether a n error is structural,
see generally Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113
L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)~is not coextensive with the second Teague exception,
and a holding that a particular error is structural does not logically dictate
the conclusion that the second Teague exception has been met.
Footnote 7 - as explained above, the second Teaaue exception is available only if the
new rule "alters our understanding of the bedrock procedural essentials "essential to
the fairness of a proceeding." Classifying an error as structural does not necessarily
alter our understanding of these bedrockprocedural elements. Nor can it be said that
all new rules relating to due process (or even the "fundamental requirements of due
process,") alter such understanding. Citations omitted. P.665
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The court went on to reject

argument t h a t Cage was retroactive and

denied his request to make it retroactive. The Tyler ease clearly stands for t h e
proposition that a Supreme Court holding is not retroactive until either the court says
t h a t it is retroactive or the holdings in multiple cases necessarily dictate retroactivity of
the new rule. It also teaches us t h a t calling a procedural error structural does not
necessarily require retroactivity under Teague. As applied to Tyler, even though. his
jury instruction was unconstitutional because it did not require a proof beyond a
reasonable doubt finding by the jury, the Cape rule was not retroactive.
As pointed out above, nothing in the Ring decision makes the holding retroactive.
The State has been unable to find any reported case holding t h a t the Ring decision h a s
been applied retroactively. The Tenth Circuit h a s specifically held that the Ring
decision is not retroactive. I n Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d. 989 (10th Cir. July 19, 2002)
the court addressed the Ring retroactivity question directly.
Cannon was convicted of first-degree murder under a n Oklahoma law t h a t
required the jury, if they made a unanimous recommendation of death, to find a
statutory aggravating circumstance unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt. The
aggravating circumstance must outweigh the finding of any mitigating circumstances.
The question of the existence of the statutory aggravators was submitted to the
jury and expressly made subject to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but the jury was
not instructed that it needed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating
circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances. Both of those factual
determinations were necessary to make the defendant death eligible under Oklahoma
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law. The defendant was sentenced to death and filed a habeas corpus petition, which
was denied. I n the i ~ l s t a ncase,
t
the defendant sought to file a second or successive
habeas petition.
The Court held t h a t Cannon was entitled to file a second habeas petition only if
the Rinff decision 'ket forth a new rule of constitutional law t h a t was previously
unavailable and the Supreme Court h a s made the new rule retroactive to cases on
collateral review." The Court said the following:
Cannon's argument i n favor of his assertion t h a t the Supreme Court h a s
made Ring retroactive to cases on collateral review is two-fold: (1) because
Rinc?. announced a new rule of substantive criminal law under the Eight
Amendment applicable to state capital crimes, the limitations of Tearrue v.
Lane, 489 US 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 ( 1 9 ~ 9 therefore
)~
do
not apply, and the requirements of section 2244(b)(2)(A) are met; and (2)
the Supreme Court h a s made Rina retroactive to cases on collateral review
,
and cases preceding Ring i n the
through the combination of T e a ~ u eRing,
Apprendi line. Neither assertion is convincing.
Cannon is simply incorrect i n asserting t h a t the combination of Teague,
Ring, and the cases in the Apprendi line render the rule announced in
Ring retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. The Supreme
Court considered the contours of section 2244(b)(2)(A) in Tyler. The Court
began by noting that, "under this provision, the Supreme Court is the only
entity that can make a new rule retroactive.
The new rule becomes retroactive, not by the decisions of the lower court or
by the combined action of the Supreme Court and the lower courts, but
simply by the actions of the Supreme Court." The Court went on to note
that the only way it could make a rule retroactively applicable is through a
"holding7'tothat effect. "The Supreme Court does not make a rule
retroactive when it merely establishes principles of retroactivity and
leaves the application of those principles to lower courts." (quoting Tyler) .
. .the Court did recognize that it could "make a rule retroactive over the
course of two cases,"but only if "the holdings in those cases necessarily
dictate retroactivity of the new rule."
Despite this language from Tyler, the thrust of Cannon's multiple case
argument is that the rule set out in Apprendi and extended in Ring to the
death penalty context, fits within Teague7s second exception for watershed
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rules of criminal procedure and has therefore been rnade retroac"c;vely
applicable by the Supreme Court to cases on collateral review. This
. Page 992 - 993.
argument seriously misconstrues

The Court went on to find that the mere fact that a new rule might be retroactive
was not sufficient. The Court held that Cannon had failed to identify language in any of
the cases mandating "by strict logical necessity" that the Supreme Court has rnade the
rule in

retroactive.

However, Cannon argued in the alternative that

announced a new rule of

subsdaative criminal law and that the Supreme Court's decision in Bouslev v. United
States, 523 U.S. 614, 620, 118 Sup. Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998), holding that
Teague7sretroactivity analysis does not apply to substantive interpretations of criminal
statutes, and renders Ring retroactive for purposes of collateral review.
But the Court held that:
It is clear, however, that Ring is simply a n extension of Apprendi to the
death penalty context. Accordingly, this courts recent decision in United
States v. Mora, 293 F.2d 1213, (10th Cir. 20021, that Apprendi announces
a rule of criminal procedure forecloses Cannon's argument that Ring
announced a substantive rule. Page 994
Based on the above, the Tenth Circuit denied Cannon's request to be allowed to
file a successive petition. The Court found that Apprendi announced a rule of criminal
procedure and that Ring was just a n extension of that and therefore was not
substantive.
The Ninth Circuit has similarly held that the Apprendi decision is not
retroactive. In Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227 (May 2000) the Ninth Circuit refused to
apply Apprendi retroactively to a case where the defendant was convicted of attempting
to murder a cab driver. The language in the Information was, "willfully, unlawfully,
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and with malice aforethought". The Information did not allege that the attempted
murder was premeditated. The case went to trial with both the prosecution and the
defense assuming that premeditation had been alleged in the Infbrmation, and
premeditation was argued to the jury.
The jury was instructed that they could only find the defendant guilty of
attempted murder if the attempted murder was "willful, deliberate, and premeditated."
The jury so found and the defendant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.
The sentence of life imprisonment was only available if the defendant's attempted
murder was done with premeditation.
The sentencing court found premeditation, but a s noted above, the defendant's
charging document did not contain premeditation language. The California Supreme
Court held that the increased penalty for premeditated attempted murder was a
sentencing enhancement and upheld the defendant's conviction and sentence. Without
premeditation, the person guilty of the attempt could only be sentenced for up to nine
years.
The issue then before the Ninth Circuit was whether the Apprendi holding was
retroactive to the set of circumstances described above. The Ninth Circuit denied the
defendant's claim a s follows:
After Apprendi, California's treatment of premeditation a s a sentencing
factor, which was the basis for the California Supreme Court's holding in
Bright, 909 P.2d 1354, is open to question. We need not decide the
question of whether the petitioner's conviction comports with Apprendi,
however, because we find that the non-retroactivity principle pronounced
in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989)~
prevents petitioner from benefiting from Apprendi7snew rule on collateral
review. Page 1236
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The Court then analyzed the

case as it applied to the petitioner. Thc

Court noted the following, ""the retroactivity rule adopted in Teague reflects not only a
healthy measure of respect for state court decisions that complied with
contemporaneous constitutional norms, but it also serves a policy of treating all
similarly situated defendants equally on federal h a b e a s . ' T ~ a r r i ~v.
e r Lewis, 948 F.2d.
588 (9th Cir. 1991).
Tbe Court said of Teague, "A case announces a new rule when it breaks new
ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government [or] if the
result was not dictated by precedent existing a t the time the defendant's conviction
became final." Teague, supra, page 1236.
The Court then observed that Apprendi established a new rule and so determined
that a n analysis of Teague factors was appropriate. The Court viewed Teague a s
requiring a three-step inquiry as follows:
First, the court must ascertain the date on which the defendant's
conviction and sentence became final for Teague purposes. Second,
the court must survey the legal landscape a s it then existed and
determine whether a state court considering the defendant's claim
a t the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by
existing precedent to conclude that the rule he seeks was required
by the constitution.
Finally, even if the court determines that the defendant seeks the
benefit of a new rule, the court must decide whether that rule falls
within one of the two narrow exceptions to the non-retroactivity
principle.

A state conviction and sentence becomes final for purposes of
retroactivity analysis when the availability of direct appeal to the
state courts has been exhausted and the time for filing a petition for
a writ of certiorari has elapsed or a timely filed petition has been
finally denied. Page 1237
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With that criteria i n mind, the Court held t h a t a state court considering the
petitioners claim i n 1992, which was when his case was final, would not have concluded
t h a t the petitioners conviction violated the constitution.

The Court then turned to the third prong of

, which is whether the new

rule fits within the two narrow exceptions to the non-retroactivity principle.
The new rule must be of a kind t h a t either places "certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law making authority to
proscribe [or1 requires the observance of those procedures which are implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty." Teague, supra. Obviously, the first exception identified in
Teague was not applicable since the law against attempted murder had not been
changed.
The second exception identified in Teague requires retroactive application of
certain "watershed rules of criminal procedure." Teague, supra. The Court stated the
following:
Retroactive application will occur where both (1)a failure to adopt the new
rule "creates a n impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be
convicted," and (2) "the procedure at issue ...implicates the fundamental
fairness of the trial." I n order to qualify under this exception, the new rule
must do more t h a n systematically enhance the reliability a criminal
proceeding; the rule must be a n absolute prerequisite to the trial's
fundamental fairness. See C a r r i ~ e r948
,
F.2d. a t 598. Page 1237
I n the case a t bar, the Apprendi rule, a t least a s applied to the omission of
certain necessary elements from the state court information, is neither
implicit i n the concept of ordered liberty nor a n absolute prerequisite to a
fair trial. Page 1238
The court found t h a t the defendant was on notice of the nature and details of the
accusation against him, a s well a s the possible sentences he might receive and therefore
declined to apply the Apprendi rule retroactively. Under the state of the law a t the time
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the defendant was convicted, premeditation was constitutionally viewed as a sentencing
factor only.
The undersigned cannot help but observe the similarities between the Jones case
and Fields. At the time of Fields' sentencing, the aggravators were mere sentencing
factors under well-settled law. There was no question about it. Ring cannot be
retroactively applied to Fields on the theory that to do otherwise would "create a n
impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be convicted." The legality of his
conviction has been upheld by the Supreme Court and is not a t issue here. We are
arguing about sentencing procedure only.
The Ninth Circuit visited the Apprendi retroactivity question again in United
States v. Juan Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. November 2001). In that case,
Sanchez-Cervantes was convicted by a jury of several drug offenses, but the jury made
no finding as to the drug amounts. However, after a presentence report, the court found
that the defendant was responsible for having distributed methamphetamine, cocaine,
and marijuana in certain amounts. Based on the amounts found by the judge, SanchezCervantes was sentenced to a term of months much higher than he would have been
eligible for without the finding of drug quantities. The defendant appealed his
conviction and sentence which the Ninth Circuit affirmed in 1996.
Later, the defendant filed a n ineffective assistance of counsel claim and while
that claim was pending in federal district court, the Supreme Court decided Apprendi.
Sanchez-Cervantes sought to amend his petition arguing that his sentence violated the
ruling in Apprendi because his jury had not made the drug quantity determination
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Ninth Circuit noted that at the time of SanchezSTATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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Cervantes trial, all of the circuits in the country allowed a judge to determine drug
quantity for sentencing purposes. The Court denied the defendant's

claim,

and stated the following:
Our decisions that subjected
claims to harmless error analysis or
plain error review lend additional support to our determination that
A p ~ r e n dis
i not a bedrock procedural rule. In these cases, we did not
consider Apprendi errors to be structural. A structural error is one that
necessarily renders a trial fundamentally unfair and therefore invalidates
the conviction.
We only review for plain error or assess whether a n error is harmless
when the error is not structural; in those circumstances, the court must
determine whether any substantial rights were prejudiced by the error. By
i
applying harmless error analysis or plain error review to A p ~ r e n dclaims,
we have necessarily held that Apprendi errors do not render a trial
fundamentally unfair. Therefore, it would seem illogical to hold that such
a n error is a watershed rule that "implicates the fundamental fairness of
the trial." In addition, the Supreme Court noted in Tyler v. Cain, supra,
that not all structural-error rules fit into Teague's second exception. This
implies that Teague's second exception is even narrower than the category
of structural error rules. From these holdings, it follows that the new
A ~ p r e n d rule
i
is not so fundamental a s to fit within Teague's second
exception. Page 670
In other words, the Court found that the Apprendi decision was not a "watershed
rule" that implicated the trial's fundamental fairness. The Court noted that some
decisions were given retroactive effect because they were to "overcome a n aspect of the
criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth finding function" and so raises serious
doubts about the accuracy of guilty verdicts. The Court points out that "the application
of Apprendi only effects the enhancement of a defendant's sentence once he or she has
already been convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it does not rise to the
importance of other cases that have been made retroactive.

STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISMISSAL (FIELDS/HCR16259/SPOT0200nlD),Page 17

00111'

The Sanchez.Cervatnes court cited the examples of In re Winship, 39'7 U.S. 358,
90 S.Ct. 1068, 35 L.Ed.Bd 368 (1970) and Mullanev v. ?Vilber, 421 U.S. 684 95 S.Ct.
1881, 44 L.Eda2d509 (1975) a s decisions later made retroactive by the Supreme Court.
Winship requlred that the standard of proof in juvenile prosecutions be proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Mullanev required that the state prove the absence of heat of passson
upon sudden provocation in. a homicide case. The burden of proof could not be shifted to
the defendant.
The Court said Winship and Mullanev were given retroactive effect because to do
otherwise would "substantially impair" the trial's "truth -finding function" and would
raise "serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts."
Apprendi does not "rise to the level of importance of Winship or It%ullanevn
because it does not affect verdict accuracy. Allowing the judge to determine the quantity
of drugs for sentencing purposes does not impair the jury's ability to find the truth
regarding whether the defendant possessed, distributed, or conspired to distribute some
amount of drugs.
There is no question that the Apprendi decision is only procedural and not
substantive. The Supreme Court said a s much in the Apxtrendi decision a t 530 U.S. a t
475, 120 Sup. Ct. a t 2348: "the substantive basis for New Jersey's enhancement is thus
not a t issue; the adequacy of New Jersey's procedure is." A number of federal circuit
courts have also held that Apxtrendi is procedural rather than substantive. United
States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d. 139 (4th Cis. 2001); United States v. Brown, 305 F.3d. 304
(5th Cir. 2002); Curtis v. United States, 294 F.3d. 841 (7th Cir. 2002); U.S. ex rel. Perez
v. Warden, FMC Rochester, 252 F.3d. 993 (8th Cir. 2002); McCoy v. United States, 266
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As noted in Harris v. United Stat-,

U.S. -,

122 S.Ct. 2406,2427

(2002)(Thomas J., dissenting), "No Court of Appeals, let alone this Court, h a s held that

Apprendi has retroactive effect." See also Curtis v, United States, 294 F.3d 841, 842 (7th
Cir. 20021, listing cases.
The State is eongdent that, following these rulings, the Ninth Circuit would also
find that the Ring decision flows from

and a s such is a procedural change that

does not affect the fundamental fairness of the trial and so is not retroactive.
APPLICATION O F THE LAW TO THE FACTS I N FIELDS' CASE
There is no question that Fields' case was final before the Ring decision was
announced. I t was final before the decision in Apprendi. The United States Supreme
Court has made it clear that a decision is only retroactive if the Supreme Court makes
it retroactive or a series of Supreme Court decisions dictate that the decision be
retroactive. The Supreme Court did not make the Ring holding retroactive.
There has been no series of Supreme Court cases since that time dictating that
the Ring decision be retroactive.
That means then, that the Ring decision can only be applied retroactively if it
meets the narrow exception set out in the Teague case. The Teague court held that a
new rule can only be applied retroactively if it: (1) "places certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law making authority to
proscribe." That obviously is not the case here. Or, (2) "a new rule should be applied
retroactively if it requires the observance of those "procedures that are implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty."
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The phrase, "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" is further defined by the
court to be watershed rules that "alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural
elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction."
The court gives examples of it's "accuracy-enhancing procedural rules" that might
be applied retroactively a s being proceedings dominated by mob violence, the use of
perjured testimony, or the use of a confession extorted from a defendant by brutal
methods. In the court's view, those are bedrock procedural elements that are in place to
ensure an accurate conviction.

By comparison to the issue at hand, there is no argument, and indeed there can be no
sensible argument made, that any of the classic examples given by the court as requiring
retroactive application are at issue here. The only issue is whether a jury should have been
asked to find statutory aggravators instead of the judge. That has nothing to do with the
accuracy of the underlying conviction.
The Ninth Circuit has denied retroactive application of the Apprendi case in
Jones where premeditation language was left out of the Information charging Jones
with attempted murder and that the judge thereafter found. The court finding of
premeditation greatly enhanced the defendant's sentence. The Ninth Circuit again
denied retroactive application of A p ~ r e n din
i U.S. v. Sanchez-Cervantes where the jury
was not asked to make a finding as to the quantity of drugs possessed by the defendant.
Rather, the court made that finding and enhanced the defendant's sentence. There is no
reason to think that the Ninth Circuit, following their own line of cases, would make a
different finding in applying Ring retroactively.
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As pointed out above, the Tenth Circuit in Cannon v. Mullin, supra, determined
that

was not retroactive. The Tenth Circuit Court found that

was simply a n

extension of Apprendi in the death penalty context and since they had found that
was a procedural rule and not retroactive, they held that Ring was not
retroactive. That is basically the same analysis used and applied by the Ninth Circuit
in Sanchez-Cervantes and Jones.
There is no reason to think that the Ninth Circuit would apply Riqg retroactively
to Fields. At the time Fields was sentenced in 1991, his sentencing procedure was on all
fours with existing Idaho and United States Supreme Court case law.
CONCLUSION
The basic principle of retroactivity as discussed above is not new. It was clearly
understood by the Idaho Supreme Court in Fetterlv v. State, 121 Idaho 417 (1991); in
Stuart v. State, 128 Idaho 436 (1996); and in Butler v. State, 129 Idaho 899 (1997).
Each of the defendants named above sought the retroactive application of a later
holding to their own conviction after their own conviction had become final.
The holding in Stuart is representative of the holdings in all three of the above
cited cases:
Even if Tribe had overruled Stuart 1: the fact that Stuart I w a s final when
Tribe was issued would preclude retroactive application. See FetterIy v.
State, 121 Idaho 417, 418-19, 825 P.2d 1073, 1074-75 (1991), cert. den. 506
U.S. 1002, 113 S.Ct. 607, 121 L.Ed.2d 542 (1992) (holding new decision on
death penalty sentencing did not apply retroactively to already final
cases.) Page 438
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Idaho Code 19-2719(5)(c)similarly precludes the retroactive apphcation of a new
rule in a successive petition. The petition belfore the court is, without question, a
successive petition filed long after the conviction became 6nal.

I.C. $19-2"19(5)(c)
A successive post-conviction pleading asserting the exception shall be deemed
facially insufficient to the extent it seeks retroactive application of new rules of
law.
The Rinc;decision is a new procedural rule flowing from the Apprendi holding.
For the reasons set out above, Ring cannot be applied retroactively and A ~ p r e n d has
i
not been applied retroactively by the Ninth Circuit. Fields' sentence wa s constitutional
a t the time it was entered. The retroactive application of the

decision to Fields'

sentence certainly "far outweighs the benefits of this application" and "continually
forces the states to marshal resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials
and appeals conform to then existing constitutional standards." Teague, supra, 103
L.Ed.2d page 355.
Additionally, the petitioner argues that I.C. 9 19-2716(5)(c)should be found
unconstitutional because it violates due process. This issue has been considered and
rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in McKinnev v. State, 133 Idaho 695 (1999).
Finally, many of the same claims made by this petitioner were made by another death
row inmate, Maxwell Hoffman. Judge Culet in the Third Judicial District rejected those
arguments in a written opinion which is attached for reference. The State understands
that Judge Culet's opinion is not binding, but may be of some use to the Court.
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For those reasons, the State moves this court to dismiss this successive petition
and to deny the motion to correct illegal sentence or vacate the sentence of death.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

5day of January, 2003.
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Atturney

Roger Bourne
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

ifi day of January, 2003, I served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Response to Petitioner's Opposition to the State's Motion to
Summarily Dismiss Petition for Post Conviction Relief andlor Motion to Correct Illegal
Sentence, Sentences, to Vacate Sentences of Death and for New Sentence and Trial to
Joan Fisher, Federal Defender's, 201 N. Main, Moscow ID 83843, by depositing in the
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The above-entitled cause came before the court on the State's motion for

m Dismissal, of Maxwell Hoffinan's Petition of Post-Conviction Relief andfor
Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to Correct Illegal Seitence, to Vacate Sentence of
Death and for New Sentencing Trial filed by defendant on August 2,2002. Rxe court
heard oral argument on the matter on November 19,2002, with L. LaMont Anderson and
S

G. Edward Yarbrough appearing for the state, and Ellison M. Mathews and Joan M.

Fisher appearing with the defendant Maxwell HofFman, who was also present. Mr.
Anderson and Ms. Fisher presented mgument, at the conclusion of which the court took
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the nzaaer mder advisement m d now issues its decision g r m h g the Motion for

Eaetual and Procedural Background
On September 23,1988, m Momation was filed chmging Ho&m with .the
September 19, 1987 &st-degee murder of Denise Willims. (Owyhee County Case No.
4843) ,A jury trial comenced Mwch 7,1989, after which Ho%m was found @lty of

first-degrce murder.
Mer the verdict, Hofian hied a motion with the court to Imve a jury impaneled
I

for purpose of sen~encing~
or in the alternative, to serve as an advisoryjury, which was
denied by the district court. On June 9,1989, after a sentenckg hearing before &e
district court, without a jury, the presiding judge read his written hdings, which were
subsequrntly filed June 13,1989. The court found the sate had proven two stakutory
agpvatiag factors beyoxld a reasonable doubt; (I) thatthe murder was especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity, and (2) that the murder

was committed against a witness or potential witness in a legal proceeding because of
suc11 proceedings. The c o w rejected two other staatory aggavahg factors requested
by the state. The court also found additional non-statutory a g g a v a m factors m d

several m l t i g a ~ gcircmtaaces. After v v e i w g the collective Illltigating circustanccs

against each of the statutory aggravating factors individually, the court imposed the death
pedty.

On July 25, 1989, Hoffman filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief. (Owyhee
County Case No. 4888) In an amended post conviction petition, Hoffma~specially
alleged, ' m e Idabo death penalty statute is unconstiuhonaf, as it does not permit the
pdcipation of the jury, in violation of the Idriho Constitution a d the United States
Constititutioa." After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the petition. In
addressing the claim regarding jury participation, the district court denied the claim based
upon State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,774 P2d 299 (I 989).

On J a n w 29, 1993, in a consolidated appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed
HoEfntanYsconviction, sentence and the denial of post conviction relief. State v.
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Hoffiman, 123 Idaho 638,851 P.2d 934 (1993). Addressing the quesdon of whether jury
involvement in a capital sentencing is mcmhted, tbe court concluded, ''itis well settled
that p u i s b e n t in a capital Gstse is to be dete
123 Idaho at 643.

aced federd habeas proceedings in May of 1994, and
o nWrit of Habeas Corpus on December 1,1994, ( M o f i a n vfiled his initial P e ~ ~ for
Avave, Case No. GTV94-200-S-EJL), cl
Pe~tionerwas sentenced to death under an Idaho SBmte
wbicl~allows the sentencingjudge to determine elernma of the
crime in violation of Pe.1J.tioner's right under the Sixth, E i & ~ and
,
Forneenth Amenhents to the United States Comtiw~onto have
the elements ofthe crime.

An identical claim was raised in H o m m ' s Find Petition for Writ of Habeas
dismissed the claim
Corpus in that same case. On June 13,1997, the federal district COW
s
presented as a federal conshmtiond claim before the Idaho Supreme
because it ~ f a not
Court. 230Jyi.mv. Arave, 973 F.Supp. 1152,1162 (D. Idaho 1997). Alternatively, the
court concluded that based upon tVuZton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647 (1990), '%ere is
no con&m~onalrequirement 'that a jury impose the sentence of death or make the

findulfIs prereqksite to hposition of such a sentence."Yd., at 1163.
On appeal, Hoffinan challenged the Federal District Court's opinion.. In the
interim, t11e U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, (2000). Ninth Circuit still concluded, "Wulton forecloses HofEnan's Apprendi-

based challenge to Idaho's capital sentencing scheme." Hoflman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523,
542 (gh Cir. 2001). However, the court reversed on other claims and ordered the district

court to conduct sa evidentiary hearing regarding ineffiective assistance of counsel
claims. Id., at 542-43.
After the evidentiary hearing, the Federal District Court granted the wit with
respect to ineffective assistance of counseJ claims at sentencing, but denied the writ with
respect to ineffective assistance of counsel claim at trial. H o h a n ' s appeal and the
state's cross-appeal are pending before the Ninth Circuit Come1 have informed the
court: that the Ninth Circuit C o w of Appeals has stayed the pending cross-appeals from

Ho&m's

federal habeas proceedings pending both the m t e court" final disposition of
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~ o & a ~state
s post-conviction per4tion based upon Ring v Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428
(20021, a d the Ninth Circuit's decision on the retroactive effect of Ring.

While liciga~nghis federal habeas petition, Ho&m filed a successive post
conviction petition in State CoW on July 7, 1995. (Owhee County Case No. SP95-492)
Bed
On May 20, 1996, the trial court dismissed H o f i m ' s successive petition. Ho
a Notice of Appeal June 7,1996. On December 6,1996, the Idaho Supreme Court

panted the state's motion to dismiss and djsmissed Ko*an's
Ho&m filed a second successive post conviction

appeal.
- g ineffective assistance

of counsel wkch is still pendhg befare the district court. Homnn v. State, #SP0 1-1551.
That matter had been stayed pending outcome of the State's s d HofEnan's
d o r e m a ~ o n e dfederal appeals in the Ninth Circuit.
On A u p r 2,2002, Hornan filed the present ssuccessive post conviction petition,

claiming the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona, supra, " is truly
[an] exwaordinary legal development which compels this Court's reconsideration of the
c o n ~ ~ u ~ oofn Petitioner's
di~
death sentence under both the United States' and Idaho's
comtitutional protections. The petition is being filed so that this Court can give this case
that reconsidera~on.'"

The State of Idaho has filed a Motion for S m a r y Dismissal, which was argued
on November 12,2002.

Analysis
Hoffman argues the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona,
122 $. Ct. 2428 (2002), '4s truly [an] extraordinary legal development which compels this
Court's reconsideration of the constitutionality of Petitioner's death sentence under both

the United States' and Idaho's constitutional protections." The state responds that the
petition must be dismissed under Idaho Code 5 19-2719.
1. Hoffman's ciaims raised in his successive petition for post-conviction relief must
be dismissed under Idaho Code 15 19-2719.
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Idaho Code tj 19-2719' requires that the defendendant in a capital case must "file any
legal or facrud challenge to the sentence or conviction that is b o w or reasonably

should be known" ' ~ n 42 days of the date of

I.C.

fiw o f f e j u d p e n t bposing deatll.

8 19-27 1963). The stamte is qujte specific in its requirement that d l such actions,

including post conviction relief and habeas coipus actions, must be commenced within
the 42-day time period and in accordance to the

of the statute. LC.

8 19-

2719(4). Any defendanr who fails "ro frle such proceedings within the h e requirements
of and in codommce with I.C. 8 19-2719 is deemed to be have waived any such claiuu

(In p e h e n t part) &P&.'
If*

Ih,l~U

8,

special appellate and posbeonvicdon procedures for capital cases

-

Automatic sray.
The followhg special procedures shall be interpreted to accomplish the purpose of eliminating unnecessary
dcfay in q i n g out a d i d death sentence . . .
(3) Within forty-two (42) days of the filing of the judgment imposing the punishent o f dearh, and before
the death w a m t is Ned, the defendant must
any legal or factual challenge to the sentence or
conviction that is known or reasonably should be known.
(4) Any remedy available by post-conviction procedure, habeas corpus or any other provision of state
law must be putsued according to the procedures set forth in this section and within the time
limitations of subsection (3) of this section. ...
(5) If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section and within the time limits
specified, he sllall be deemed to hava waived suclt claims for relief as were known, o r reasonably should
have been known. The courts of Idaho shall have no power to consider any such claims for relief as have
been so waived or giant any such relief.

(a) An allegation rhat a successive posr-conviction petition may be heard because of the
applicability of the exception herein for issues that were not known or could nor reasonably have
been known shall not be considered unless the applicant shows the existence of such issues by (i) a
precise statement of the issue or issues asserted together with (ii) inaterial facts stated under oatb
or affimation by credible persons with k t hand knowledge that would support the issue or insues
asserted. A pleading that fails to make a showing of excepted issues supported by material facts, or
which is not credible, must be summarily dismissed.

(b) A successive post-conviction pleading asserting the exception shall be deemed facially
insufficientto the extent it alleges matters that are: curnularive or impeaching or would not, even if
the allegations were true, cast doubt on the reliability of the conviction or sentence.
(c) A successive posr-conviction piending asserting the exception shall be deemed Eacially
insufficient to the extent It seeks retroactive application of new rules of law.
(6) in the event the defendant desires to appeal froin any post-conviction order entered pursuant to
this section, his appeal must be part of any appeal taken 60m tbe conviction or sentence. All

issues relating to conviction, sentence and post-conviction challenge shall be considered in the
same appellare proceeding . . . ( E m p h i s added)

...
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for relief

""as

were lrtlown or reasonably should have been h o w n to the de_Jendant."

LC.

4 19-2719(5). F d e r , ""The cows of Idaho shall lave no power to consider any such
for relief as have been so waived or grant any such relief" Id
The c o r z s ~ m ~ o n aofl iIdaho
~
Code 8 19-2719, with regard to the defendat"
rights under an equal protection analysis, was upheld in State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208,

766 P.2d 678 (1988), cerr. denied,489 U.S. 1073,109 S, Ct, 1360, 103 L. Ed. 2d 827

(1989). The Court noted that the while the starute provides for special expe&ted
procedures for post convic~onreview in capital cases, it does not involve a suspect class
g of t l ~ eUnited States C o n h a ~ o or
n the ldaho Constitution, and

accordingly, strict scrutiny is not requizled. In addition, the C o w found no "obviously
in~diouslydiscdinatory classification" in the statute that would warrant a mems-focus
clclssihcation review to determine any e q d protection violation. Id. The statute has also
been held to be constitutional under a due process analysis. State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho

795,820 P.2d 665 (1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 987,112 S.Ct. 2970,119 L.Ed.2d 590
(1992). The coa(jtitution&w of Idaho's statutory scheme for capitol post-conviction
proceedings has most recently been upheld in Creech v. State, 5 1 P.3 d 3 87,2002 WL
1225040 (2002).

Finally, while the Unifom Post Conviction Procedure Act (Idaho Code 9 Ij 19490 1, et seq.) applies to capital cases, that act is modified by Idaho Code fj 19-2719,

which supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their provisions conflict NcKinney v.
Srate, 133 Idaho 695,992 P2d 144 (1999).
A.

Hoffman's claims raised in his successive petition for post-con&ction relief
were known when he filed his first petition for post-conviction relief. I3;e has
failcd to make a prima facie showing that his successive post conviction
claims where not known or reasonably should not have been known when he
filed his initial petition for post-conviction relief, Therefore, his claims do
not fall under the exception in Idaho Code 4 19-2719(5) and must be
dismissed pursuant to that statute.
As reflected in the history of this case, H o f i a n timely filed a motion for jury

sentencing or alternatively, for an advisory jury, following the jury's guilty verdict of
first degree murder. Me timely raised the issue again in his initial post-conviction petition
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d a t was filed within the 42-day req&ement of Idaho Code 5 19-2719. Both requess
were properly denied under the exi

at

~ ~ - t y

lira@2.

l&&o Code fj19-2729 has bean held to prwide a defend-

one o p p o b " r ) rto

raise d l challenges to a convicdon and sentence in a capital case in a posi-convicdon
petition, d e s s the paitioner can show that the claims raised in a successive petition
w
i 42 days of the enixy
were not known and could not reasonably have been lullown w
of the judgmmt of conviction. State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 820 P.2d 665 (1991),

cat. denied, 504 U.S. 987,112 S.Ct. 2970,119 L.Ed.2d 590 (1992); Pizzufo v. S'rate, 127
Idaho 469,903 P.2d 58 (1995). IH[o%an must meet a hei&tened burden and must make

aprimafacie showing that the issues raised in his pe~tionfdl within thc:naxrow

exception provided by the statute, Pkndo, supra. Finally, the t i n e Ifitations contained
in Idaho Code Ij 19-2719 "are jurisdictiona1 in nature, the statute specifically depriving

the c o r n of Idaho the power to consider any claims for relief that have been waived
under the statute. I.C. $ 19-2729(5)." Id. at 471 and 60.
In the present case, Hofhan's argues that he could not have prevailed on the

same claim earlier because of the "erroneous analysis applied to by the Idaho Supreme
Court until the United States Supreme Court recognized that only a jury may rnake the
factual findlngs which rnake a defendant eligible for the death penalty." That argument is
essentially a request that Ring be given "retroactive effect," which is addressed elsewhere
in this decision- The issue under 8 19-2719(5) is whether the petitioner bevy or
reasonably codd have k n o w of tlxa claims at the time he filed his initial post-conviction
petition, not wl~etherhe could have prevailed.

B. Hoffman's successive petition is expressly barred by Idaho Code 6 19-2719(5)(c).
Hoffman argues that he could not have prevailed earlier, and did not, on the issue
of jury fact finding of aggravating factors because of erroneous constitutional analysis by
the Idaho Supreme Court, until the United States S u p m e Court recognized in Ring v.

The thm existing benchmark case was Waltonv. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 111 L. Ed. 2d 5 11,110 S.
3047 (1990).

mMORAJ\JDUM DECISION

Ct.

----

01/09/2003 10:02 FAX 208 3

,

A

A.G. OFFICE CRIMINAL

i

Arizona, mpru, that only a jury may make the factual finding which would make a
defendant eligible for the death penalty.
Despite the exceptions provided in Idaho Code 19-2719(5) for issues raised that
were: not known or reasonably could not have bem known within the time frame allowed
by the statute, Idaho Code $ 19-2719(5)(c) provides fwther r d c t i o n regardmg postconviction applications that seek retroactive application of new law:
A successive post-conviction pleading asserting the exception shall be deemed
facially insufficient to the extent it seeks retroactive application of new rules
of law. LC. 5 19-2719(5)(c) (Emphasis added).

At the time of Hoffman's trial and sentencing hearings, and initial post-conviction

proceedmgs, as well as his initial appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, the existing law

was that the U.S.Constitution did not mandate that juries impose the death sentence or
h d the aggravating fictors prior to sentencing. (See, ProfJift v. Florida, 428 U.S.242,

49 L. Ed. 2d 913,96 S. Ct.2960 (1976), Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.639,111 L. Ed. 2d
511,110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990).)
Idaho Code 5 19-2729(5)(c) expressly prohibits successive post-conviction
petitions which seek the retroactive application of new rules of law. There does not
appear to be any Idaho appellate case specifically addressing the constitutionality of 9 192719(5)(c), which was added by the legislature in 1995. However, prior to the adoption
of 5 19-2719(5)(c), the Idaho Supreme Court distinguished between retroactive

application of new rules of law on capital cases that were already final as opposed to
capital cases that were still open for sentencing, holding that the distinction is a proper
basis for denying retroactive effect of new rules of law. Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417,
825 P.2d 1073 (1991).

In Fertlerly, a defendant under a death sentence had fled a successive post
conviction relief petition on the basis of State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,774 P.2d
299 (1989), requesting retroactive application of the Charboneau rulmg that "the triaI
court may sentence the defendant to death, only if the trial, c o w finds that alJ the
mitigating circmnsraa.ces do not outweigh the gravity of each of the aggravating

circumstances found and make imposition of death unjust."

F m r l y . supra, at 419 and 1074.
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agument, the Court followed the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Griflth v. Kenmcky.
479 U.S. 314,107 S.Ct. 708,93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987):
Obviously, the Chorboneau decision wss issued after petitioner-appeuaot's initial
the Charboneau
petition for post-conviction reiid Tnus, the claim
interpretahon of 1.C. $ 19-2515 was not b o r n or should not have been h o r n
misses the real issue, The real issue is whether Charboneau applies
retroac~elyto eases that were final at the time of its issuance.
We have not applied the Charboneau decision to my case that was find
prior to the issumce of Charbangau on April 4,1989. Conversely, it has been
applied to cases that were s t i l l open for sentencbg on rhis date. The distinction
between defendants whose cases were fmal before the issuance of
Charboneau and tbose whose eases were not is zl valid dishction. IIIGrgfith
v. Kentuckyt 479 US,314,107 S-Ct. 708,93 L,Ed2d 649 (1987),the United
States Supreme Court recognized this distinc~onas a proper basis for
denying retroactive effect of new rules to cases that are already final.
Tberefore, the Charboneau interpretation of LC. fj 19- 25 15 does not apply to the
present case because the p r e s a case was final prior to the issuance of
Charboneau.
Fetterb v. Sfate, 121 Id&o 417,418-419, 825 P.2d 1073,1074 - 1075 (1991) (Emphasis
added).
The reasoning behind such a policy is addressed in Teague v Lane, 489 U.S. 288,
109 S-Ct. 1060 (1989), in which the U.S.Supreme Court addressed the issue of
retroactive effect of new cornti-od

rules on collateral review of cases that are already

final:
Application o f constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction
became fmal seriously undermines the principle offinalify which is essential
to the operation of our criminal justice system. Without kality, the crimind
law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect. Tl~efact that life and liberty are at
stake in cximinal prosecutions ''shows only ihat 'conventiod notions of f d t y '
should not have as much place in c h i d as in civil litigation, not that they
should have none. " (Citation omitted)... " fqf a crirninal judgment is ever to be
find,thenotion of legality must at some poht include the assignment of h d l
competence to determine legdity ." (Citations omitted). ..
The "costs imposed upon the State[s] by retroactive application of new rules o f
constitutional law on habeas corpus ... generally fhr outweigh the benefits of rhis
application." (Citation omitted) In many ways the application of new NZes to
cases on collaterd review may be more intmsive than the enjoining of criminal
prosecutions (citation omitted), for it continually forces the States to marsh&
resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals

confomed to then-existing constitutional standards. Furthermore, as we
recognized in Engle v. Isaac, "[sltate courts are understandably frusfrated when
they f a i W l y apply existing constitutional law only to have a federal court
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discover, duiing a [habeas] proceeding, new co~lstitutiondcommands." 456 U.S .,
at 128,n. 33, 102 S,Ct., at 1572, n. 33.
Trague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,309-310,109 S.Ct 1060,1074 - 1075 (1989) (Emphasis
added).

h tbe present case, both Idaho Code. 5 19-2719 and case law dictate that H o f h m
is barred %om b r i n a g this successive post coavicfion peticion seeking retroacirve
applicahon of new rule of law.

C. Ring v. Arizona is does not appear to have retroactive application to Hofhan's
case.

On the other hand, Hoffman argues that 3!ing4 enwciates a "watershed" exception
that is so h h e n t a l that it warrants retroactive applicatio~~
to all defendants who have
gone through the death penalty sentenchg aspect in. the Idaho court system since the

He argues that Idaho Code $ 19-27 19 merely
& d a t e s what has been stated in Mamr ofGnfjord, 127 Idaho 472, 903 P2d 61 (1 99515,
and Teague v Lane, 489 US 288,109 S-Ct. 1060 (1989), which he argues stand fox
current system has been in place.

retroactive application of "watershed" rights, or rights that are so hdamental as to be
paanteed and "implicit to the concept of ordered liberty."
Essentially, the " G a p e doctrine" bars retroactive application, in the collateral
attack on a sentence, of any new constitutional rule of criminal procedure which had not
been announced at time that the petitioner's conviction became final. The Teague court
did note tvvo exceptions under which the new rule should be applied retroactively, (1) if it
pla~escertain kinds of primary, private individud conduct beyond the power of criminal
law-&g

authority to proscribe, or (2) if it requires observance of those procedures

that are 'kplicit in concept of ordered liberty," which the court fixther limited to
'"uvatershed rules of criminal procedure." 489 US 288, at 307 and 311, 109 S.Ct.1060.
The second exception has been further defined as requiring observance of "watashed

-

Qing has been held KO invalidate Idaho's death penally statute. Srate v. Fenerly,
I d a h o , 52 P.3d
874 (2002).
Guard involves a petitioner who had been committed to a stare mental hospital after being acquitted of
criminal cllargcs by reason of insanity. Thereafter, his mental condition improved and he contcndcd thar he
was no longer mentally ill. The lidaha Supreme Court held that the case turned on the prospective
application of a new rule of law as opposed to a retroactive application. 127 Idaho 472, at 476. The case
did not involve successive post-conviction relief petinons.

'
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d e s of c d i n a l procedure implicahg the h h e n a

of the

criminal proceeding." Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656,665, 121 S.Ct. 2478,2483 - 2484

Obviously, the first exception is kapp1icZ"blein the present case. For the second
exception to apply to Hoffman's case, the new rule must meet two require men^:
gement of the rule must "seriouslydiminish the iikdihood of obtaining an
accurate conviction," and the rule must " ' "a.l%arour u n d e r a m h g of the
bedrockprocedural elements " ' essential to the f ~ e s ofs a proceedbg." Sa~ryer
v. Smith,497 U.S. 227,242,110 S.Ct. 2822, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990) (quoting
%ague, supra, at 3 11,109 S. Ct. 1060 @lmaliry o p ~ o n )in
, f x m quoting M u c k y
v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,693,91 S.Ct 1160,28 L.Ed.2d 404 (1971)
(IrEarllan, J., concu~ingin judgments in part and dissenting in part)).
I)iler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656,665, 121 S.Ct. 2478,2483 - 2484 (2001) @old emphasis
added).

In Qler, the Court held that a "sWctM'kerror, which the court defined as one
whicb '"is not amenable to hdess-error analysis and 'will always invalidate the
conviction,"' (Id at 665), does not logically dictate the conclusion that the second Teague
exception has been met. Id at 666-667. The primary issue in that case was whether the
Supreme Court's earlier ruling in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S.39,111 S.Ct. 328,112
L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), (in which the court determined that a jury instruction is
unconstitutiond if there is o. reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction
to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasondble doubt), was made retroactive to
cases on collaxeral review by the Supreme Cow. The court was quite unequivocal with
regard to how and when they determine the retroactive effect of even new substantive
rules on collateral review:
According to Tyler, the reasoning of Sullivan demonstrates that the Cage rule
satisfies both prongs o f this Teague exception. First, Tyler notes, Suflivan
repeatedly emphasized that a Cage error fundamentally undermines the reliability
of a trial's outcome. And second, Tyler contends, the central point of SzlZivan is
tlzat a Cage error deprives a defendant of a bedrock element of procedural
fairness: fhe right to have thejury make the determination of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Tyler's argumenl fail to persuade, however. The most he can
claim is that, based on the principles outlined in Teugue, this Court should
make Cage retroactive to cases on collateral review. What is clear, however,
is that we have not "maderrCage retroactive to eases on collateral review.
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Tyler v. Cnin, 533 U.S. 656,665-666, 121 Sect.2478,2484 (2001) Gmphasis added16

The C o w Wxer noted at foolnote 7 of the decision:
As explained above, the second Teogue exception is available only if the new rule
" ' "aZter[s]o w undersrandi~gof the bedrock procedural elements" ' essential to
ess of a proceedhg." (Cit8tions o ~ ~ e Clasfiing
d )
an error as
structural does not necessarily alter our u r n d a s ~ d h gof these bedrock procedural
elements. Nor cm it be said that all new rules relabg to due process (or even the
" m d m e n a requirements of due process," see post, at 2489 (dissenhg
op*on)) alter such, u n d e r s a h g . ...
On &e conwq, the second Teague exception is reserved only for truly
"watersfied" rules. ... As we have recognized, it is unlikeIy that any of these
watershed rules "hha[s] yet to emerge."
Tyler, 533 U.S. 656,665-666,121 S.Ct. 2478,2484 (2001) (Bold emphasis added)

'

The U.S.Supreme Court decisions in Jones v. United Srates, 526 U.S. 227, 119
S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 3 11 (1999),Apprendi v New ~ e r s e ~530
? US 466, 120 S.Ct.

2348 (2000), and Ring mark a shift in the manner in which the courts will view and apply
enhanced sentencing factors. Prior ro Ring,the Idaho statutory scheme was deemed

valid, (See, fifton v Arizona, 497 U S 639 (1990)). A trial judge sitting as the trier of
fact could make "rhedetermination of statutory aggravating factors, and thereby determine

whether those factors (what are now deemed additional elements) had been proven

X
l within the confines of both the Idaho
beyond a reasonable doubt, and still be m
Constitution sund the Constitution of the United States. Those d e t e k a t i o n s have

"he

case slso refers lo Suffivan v. LouLrinntt, 508 US.275,113 S.Ct. 2078,124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1 993).

"Under d ~ Due
e Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury vial guarantees ofthe
Sixth Amendment, my fact (otber Than prior conviction)that increases the maxiaurn pen* for a crime
must be charged in an indiment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubLFY
Jones V. Us,526 U.S.227, fn.6,243, 119 S . a . 1215, 1224 (1999)

"*hsum, ow reexamination of our cases in &isarea, and of the history upon which they rely, con&-msthe
opinion that we expressed in Jones. Other than rhe fact of a prior conviction, any fact thar increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed smmtory maxirnum must be submined to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. Witb that exception, we endorse the srarement of the rule set forth in the
concurring opinions in that w e : '[Ijt is unconstitutjonal for a legislature to remove from the jury the
assessment of fads that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is
exposed. It: is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt."'
Apprendr' v. Nav Jersey,530 U.S.466,490, 120 S.Ct 2348,2362 - 2363 (2000)(Emphasis added)
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repeatedly been subject to stringent appeUate scrutiny by the Idaho Supreme Court and
by the federal court system.9
After a review of the case law history arising ffom the Idaho capital punishment
scheme, which is largely the same as the Arizona statutory scheme invalidated in Ring,
this court does not conclude that Ring enunciates an exception so fundamental as to
"seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction"(See Tyler u.

Cain, supra.)

In the alternative, Ho&m argues that Idaho Code 8 19-2719(5),and particularly
$ 19-2719(5)(c), violate his rights to due process and equal protection guaranteed under

the U.S.and Idaho Constitutions. Nis argument partially stems from his position that

Ring announces a substantive rule of law that is not contemplated by $ 19-2719(5),that
the statote's blanket prohibition against retroactive application of new rules of law to

cases on collateral review denies him his fundamental right to a jury trial. This argument
has been partially addressed elsewhere in this de~isiori,'~
in addition to the following

discussion.
While Apprendi and Ring represent a change in the manner in which the courts

will view and apply enhancing sentencing factors, those cases have been determined to

'

E.g. Sate v. Creech, 105 Jdaho 362,670 P 2 d 463 (1983), c c n denied, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S. Ct. 1327,
79 L. Ed. 2d 722 (1984); State v. Sivak, 105 ldaho 900,674 P 2 d 396 (1983), cen. denied, 468 U.S. 1220,
104 S. Ct 3591,82 L. Ed. 2d 887 (1984); State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358,690 P.2d 293 (1984); State v.
Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766,710 P.2d 1202 (1985), cen. denied, 479 U.S. 870, 107 S. Ct. 239,93 L.Ed 2d 164
(1986); S a t e v. Wood, 132 ldaho 88,967 P.2d 702 (1998), cert denied, 526 U.S. 1118,119 S. Ct. 1768,
143 L.E d 26 798 (1 999); State v. Charboneay 1 16 Idaho 129,774 P2d 299, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 922,
110 S. Cc.287, 107 L. Ed. 2d 267,, 493 U.S. 923, 110 S . C t 290,107 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1989), overruled on
other grounds, Sfate v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,825 P.2d 1081 (1991), cert denied, 506 U.S. 915,113 S. Ct
321, 121 L. Ed. 2d 241 (1992); State v. Fields, 127 Idaho 904,908 P.2d 1211 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
922, 116 S. CI, 3 19,133 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1995); State v. Pizzuto, I 19 Idaho 74581 0 P 2 d 680 (1991), cert.
denied, 503 U.S. 908,112 S. Ct.1268, 1 17 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1992), overruled on other grounds, S m e v. Card,
121 Idaho 425,825 P2d 1081 (1 99 I), cerr. denied, 506 U.S. 9 15, 113 S. Ct. 321,121 L. Ed. 2d 241 (1992);
S w v. Rhoades, 121 ldaho 63,822 P.2d 960 (1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1047, 113 S. C t 962,122 L.
Eh 2d 119 (1993); State v. Fain, 119 Idaho 670, 809 P 2 d 1149 (1991), cen. denied, 493 U.S. 917, 110 S.
h 277, 107 L. Ed 2d 258 (1989), 504 U.S.987, 112 S. Ct.2970, 119 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1992); State v. Beam,
109 Idaho 616,710 P2.d 526 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.1153,106 S. Ct 2260,90 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1986);
State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860,781 P.2d 197 (1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S.1032, 1 10 S. Ct.3295, 111
L. Ed. 2d 803 (1 990); State v. Leavitr, 121 Idaho 4, 822 P2d 523 (1991), cert denied, Leavitt v. Idaho, 506
U.S. 972,113 S. Ct.460,121 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1992); State v. Hoffiman, 123 ldaho 638, 851 P 2 d 934 (1993),
cert denied, 511 U.S.1012, 114 S. Ct 1387,128 I,. Ed. 2d61 (1994).
' O This issue has partially been addressed in the previous discussion (section l., above) of the ldaho
Supreme Court's consritutional analysis of Idaho Code 8 19-2719 prior to the 1995 enactment of 5 19-
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d c d a t e a new rule of p r o c e d d , sarher than sub

e, law. Prior to t h e issuance of

Ring, the U.S. Eleventh Circuit addressed the retroactive effect of Apprendi in McCoy v.

US,,
266 F.3d 2245,1257 -1257 (C.A.11 (Fla.) 20011, in which a d e f e n b q who h d
been conected of possession with intent to dislrj3ute crack coc&e, moved to vacate, set
aside, or to correct the sentence. The court cvduted the case in lieu of Teague and held
that rhe new c o d m ~ o n arule
l of c a d procedure mounced in Apprendi does not
apply r e ~ o a ~ ~ vtoe lcases
y on c o l l a t d review. The court further noted:

FN16. We reject- the: c o n c ~ n opinion's
g
position that the Apprcrvrdi decision
creates a new substmtive rule of law. ]InApprendi, the S u p m e Court
specScally noted that "[tlhe substantive basis for New Jersey's enhmcemeni
... is not at issue; the adequacy of New Jersey's procedure is."53 0 U.S.at 475,
120 S.Ct 2348 (2000). The application ofApprendi merely changes the
method or procedure for detemining drug quantity and his sentence; it
does not make McCoy's conduct not criminal, thereby raising the spectre
of actud innocence as the concurring opinion implies. Thus, as other
circuits have, we conclude Appre~diannounced a new rule of criminal
procedure.

McCoy V. US,266F.3d 1245, 1257 -1257 (C.A.ll (Fla.) 2001) (Emphasis added).
Similarly, in Cannon v Mullin, 297 F 3d 989,994 (lo&Cir. 20021, the U.S.
Tenth Circuit held that Ring enunciates a procedural, rather than a substantiye change

in the law.
It i s clear, however, that Ring is simply an extension ofApprendi to ihe death
penalp context. See Ring ... 122 S.Ct. at 2432. Accordingly, fhis court's
recent conclusions in Untied States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213,2002 WL
1317126, at *4 (1 0thci.r. 2002), that Apprendi announced a rule of aimind
procedure forecloses Cannon's argument that Ring announced a substantive
rule.
Cannon v Mullin, 297 F 3d 989,994 ( 1 0 ~
Cir 2002). The court also concluded that

"Cannon is simply incorrect in asserting that the combination of Teague, Ring and the
cases in the Apprendi line render the rule announced in Ring retroactively appIicable
to cwes on collateral review." ld. at 992-993.
The Seventh Circuit Corn of Appeals was also unable to conclude that Ring had

-

-

2719(5)(c) (See State v. Beam, suprq and State v. Rhoades, suprc) and after its adoption (Creech v. State,
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ffier the argment of this appeal, the Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona,
U-S. ----,
122 S.Ct. 2428,153 LBd.2d 556 (2002), holding t b t capital defendab
ation of m y fa& such as the e-xlismce of a
are en.t_idedto a jury det
mitigating or aggavating factor, that consritutes a legislatively o r d h e d condition
of cwiPal punishme~t.The parties agree that we cannot consider Ring in decidmg
this appeal because the Supreme C o w has not yet held it to be retroac~ve.See
Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656,662-64, 121 S-Ct. 2478, 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001).
Truebloodv. Davis 301 F.3d 784,788 (C.A.7 (Ind.) 2002).

Both the Cannon and Tmeblood cases involved p e ~ ~ o n ewho
r s were convicted in
state c o w af &st-de~eemurder and sentenced to death, and tilereafter s o u b t to
cbaflenge their death sentences in federal habeas actions. Tyler involved a peti'trioner who
was convicted in state court of second-degree murder and who likewise, sought to
challenge the state court conviction and sentace in a federal habeas a d o n . Both Tyler
and Canmn involved federal siatutes that require dismissal of successive habeas
appljcations unless ''the applicant shows thatthe c

f relies
~ on a new rule of

c o n s u ~ ~ law,
o d made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme
CoLlrt."'

'
Wile Ida110 Code 19-2719(5)(c) does not contain similar language as the

federal counterpart applicable in those decisions, the Tyler,McCoy and Cannon cases
shed persuasive andysis on the issue of whether &is court is in a position to declare that

Ring has retroactive application to Hofhau's case.
F d e r , because this court has not d e t d e d that Ring i s re&oactive to
Hoffinan's casee,the specific constitutional conflicts of Idaho Code $ 19-2719(S)(c) that
have been raised by H o f i a n need not be determined, as the issue is not dispositive of
the case before the court.

D.

Hoffhau's alternative Rule 35 petition is barred by 19-2719.
Ho&m also raises his claims under Idaho C

M Rule 35, vylzich states in

part:
The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time and may correct a sentence
that has been imposed in an illegal manner within the h e provided herein for the
reduction of senten~e-...

supra), and discussed inthe Teague analysis of retroactive effecc above,
" 28 U.S.C. 5 2244@).
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2. This court is without jurisdiction to hear Hoffmsn's case as a writ of habeas
corpus.
R o m a n has filed his claim in the d t e m ~ v aes a p e a o n for writ of habeas
corpus. However, idaha Code $ 19-4202 grants origin& jurisdiction to consider a writ of
habeas corpus in the Idabo Supreme Court or the District Court of the county inwhich
rhe person is

In Row v. Stute, 135 Idaha 573,21 P.3d 895 (2001), rhe

defendmlt's petition for habeas corpus relief was dismissed without prejudice because the

pefidoner failed to file it in the county in which she was being detained. Ho&m is
currently being detained at the Idaho Maim=

Security Institution in Ada Gomty,

Idabo. This court is without jurisdiction to hear his petition for w i t of habeas corpus in

an Owyhee County proceebg.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the state's motion for sxmmary dismissal of the above-entiaed cause

is granted.

Rated this

l2

'

.day of December, 2002.

19-4202.Jurisdiction to comider petitions for writ of habeas corpus.
The following c o r n of this state shall have originaljurisdiction to consider a petition for writ of
habeas corpus, grant the writ d o r order relief under this chapter:
(1) The supreme court; or
(2) The district c o r n of the county in which the person is detained.
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JOAN &I.FISEIER
Idaho State Bar No, 2854
Capital Habeas Unit
Federal Defenders of Eastem Washington & Idaho
201 N.Main
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-0180
Attomey for Petitioner Zane Fields

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE: COUNTY OF ADA

ZANE FIELDS,
Petitioner,

1
1
1
1
1
1

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

Case Nos. SPOT02-0071lD
PETITIONER'S
SUPPLEItlENTAL AUTHORITY
IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

)
)

In support of his above-captioned Petition For Post-Conviction Relief And/Or Writ Of
Habeas Corpus, Petitioner submits a recent decision by the Hon. John Bradbury of the Second
Judicial District, Lewis County, Porter v. Stute, Nos. Sp-02-041 & 6053, slip op. (Memorandum
Decision, April 2,2003), a copy of which is attached.

Petitioner incorporates herein the legal

arguments and authority relied upon in said Memorandum Decision.
Dated this

+
day of April, 2003.

Respectfully submitted,

Attorney for Appellant

-

PETITIONEK'S SUPPLERlENTAI, AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION KEIJEF 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
ay of April, 2003, 1 caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method irldicated below, first class postage
prepaid where applicable, addressed to:

Roger Bourne
Deputy Prosecuting Attomey
200 Mi. Front St., Room 3 191
Boise 1D 83'720

0.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile
Federal Express

PETITIONER'S SUPPLEBfEhTAI. AUTHORITY IN SIIPPORT OF PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 2

Porter v. State
Case Nos. SP-02-041 & 6053
Memorandum Decision
April 2,2003

btBlTRlCT COURT

O'CLOCK

+M

APR 0 2 2003
CATKY LaRSON

IN T H E I3ISTRICT COURT OF T H E SECOND P I C I A L D I S W a OF ?"HE

STATE OF IIDGWO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWS
GEORGE TUNIOR PORTER,
Petitioner,

)

1
1

1

v.

Case No. SP42-041
Case No. 6053

m M O M m U M DECISION

)
)

STATEi Of;IDAHO,

1

Respondmt.

I. moDuCTX?ON
George Junior Porter filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief andlor
Writ of Habeas Corpus (Lewis County Case No, SP4244I) and a Motion to
Correct Illegal Sentence, To Vacate Sentence of Death and for New Sentencing
Trial (Lewis County Case No. M)53)."e

S-ary

State responded by filing a Motion for

Dismissal, The issues have been joined and both Porter's petition and

the State's motion are now before me for decision,
It is important at the outset to undersmd what Porter's petition does not
involve. It does not involve whether or not he was guilty of first-degree murder.

A jury of his peas decided beyond a reasonable doubt that he was. Verdict, filed

1

Porter's petition and n~otionare referred to as the petition unless individually identified.
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Jmuw26,1990. Nor does it hvdw whetiher the trid for fimt-degree murder
was far. The Idaho Suprme Court b decided it was. Porfe v. State ofIdafro,

130 Idaho 772,948 P.2d 127 (1997) rrh 'g. denied Dec. 12,1997, cert. denied 523 U.S.

3126,118 S.Ct, 18113 (May 18,1998)(P"orferI). Nor does it involve w h e ~ e rthere is
a right for a pemon accused of

capital murder to have a jury rlriher than a judge

decide the facts that justify a death sentence. The United States Supreme Court

has decided there is. Ring v. Anmm, 536 U.S. 584 122 S+Ct.2428 (2002).

The question presenkd for decision i s whether the right to have a jury
decide the factors that justify a death sentence applies retroactiveiy to Porter. if it

does, I am.obliged to vacate his death sentence and resentence him. If it does
not, then Porter's death sentiEince will stand.

III. PROCEDtTRAL E-IISTORY

The State of Idaho charged that Porter murdered Theresa Jones at KamiaPl
on December 21,1988. The dormation charging Porter with first-degree murder

chd not list as elements of the crime the aggravating factors specified in Idaho

Code 5 19-2515 h a t warrant the death penalty. Criminal Information, filed July
13,1989; Amended Criminal. Momation, filed September 22,1.989.

Nor did the instructions to the jury at trial defining first-degree murder
include the aggravating fact-

as e h e n t s of the crime. Porter was neither

charged nor tried for the crime of capital murder, Instead the jury was instructed
that it was not to concern itself with the p e d t y .

The jury has notlung whatever to do with the penalty which
ma be idicted in this case if conviction is had, The province
of e jury is simply to determine the facts. The penalty is for
the Court to determine.

X
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Jury h h c t i o n s Given by the C a r t , filed Jmuary 26,2990.
Based on the evidenm and those imtrucbons, the jury convicted Porter of
murder. Verdict, filed January 26,1990. The State hen notrfied the

defendmt it would seek the death penalty. Notice of Intent to Seek the Death

ty, filed February 1,1990. The State presented evjdmm of aggravaGng
fa-

to tile district judge at a sentenhg henring. Court Mnuks, June 15,

3.990, June 29,1990, That evidence, if stabfished beyond a =asonable doubt and

found by the judge to outweigh the mitigating factom, permitted him to impose

dte death penalty. Idaho W e § 79-2515. Porter did not ask the judge to include
h e aggravating factors as elements of the crime in his instructions to the jury or

to involve the jury in the penalty phase of the proceedings.

'rhe district judge found the State established beyond a reasonabIe doubt
that the murder manifested exceptional depravity, that Port= probably would be
a continuing threat to society, and hat the murder was of an actual or potential
witness m a criminal proceeding. Findings of the Court in Considering the

Deatk Penalty hrsuwlt to the Provisions of Idaho Code Section 19-2515(e),filed
September 7,1990. The procedure followed by the trial. judge comported with
supreme court precedent and I.C. 9 19-2515(e). After weighng the aggravating

factors against the nlihgatring factors and basd on his findings, the district judge
imposed the death penalty. Judgmentand Sentence, filed September 7,1990.

Porter then appealed his conviction and death sentence to the Idaho Supreme
Court. Notice of Appeal, filed September 30,1990.

Porter next filed a wries of post-conviction relief petitions. On November
28,1994, more than four years after the judgment of conviction and the death
sentence had been filed, Porter k t broached the issue of the constitutionality of
IrYIEMORANDbM DECISION, PORTER V. STATE, SP-02-041

the sentmdng procedure. He contended the fdure of the State to implement the

ldaho Constitution and laws requ%g "a jury to determine all questions of fact
and the d t i m a k p ~ s h m e noft life or death deprived the Pedtioner of h s

guarantees to equal prokction as agendtred by the United States Constilu~on."
Second -ended

Pczgcilion for Post-ConvicCion Relief, filed Novmber 28,1994, at

15. The dis.bict judge denied the petilims.

O n appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld Porter's conviction and

death ~ntence.It cmluded t;he record did not suppol the &strict court's
findingthat an actual or poten~af.
witness had been murdered. It also held the

Federal and Idaho Constitutions did not require the jury to decide the

a g p a v a h g factors:

The United States Supreme Court has concluded definitively
that the f e d d constitution does not require a jury
detehnatlon of aggravating cirmstances. Spmiano u. Florida,
a 8 U.S. 447, 460, 104 S.Ct. 3154,3162,82 L.Ed.2d 360 (1984).
consistently has rejected arguments
Additionally, this COLU~
similar to Porter's and has upheld judicial determination of
aggravahg &cumstmces, as consistent with the Sixth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments to the US, Constitution and
Article I, Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution. (Citations
omitted.)

Porter v. State, 130 Idaho at 795-%.

At the time of the t n a l and sentmang, the Idaho Supreme Court had
repeatedly held that the death penalty phase of a capital murder .trial was
appropriately decided by a judge and that excluding the jury from that process
d;ld not offendthe Sixth Amenbent right to a jury trial. See, e.g.,State u. Creed,
105 Idaho 362,670 P.2d463, (1983); State u. Siunk, 112 Idaho 197,731 P.2d 192

(1987); State u. Fain, 116 Idaho 82,774 P.2d 252 (1989); State v. Charboneatd, 116
Idaho 129,774 P.2d 299 (2989)
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Following the Idaho Sapreme Court decision on thtt appeal, the distsja
judge issued a death w m m t commding the warden to put Porter to death.

Death Wmant, filed January 12,1898. The e x e c u ~ m
was scheduled for
February 4,1998. Supreme Court Justice Sm&a Day CYComm stayed Porter's

execu~onon Jmuary 23,1998, p n h g Porter's pet-itian for cedar.& to the
Unitpd State Supreme Court. Order, filed January 29,1998. Upon denid of the

eertiarrari pelilion, the district judge issued,a new death wanrant. Death Warrant,
fded May 29,1998.
Porter filed a successive p t a n v i c t i o n peri~on;the State moved for

s m a r y drsmissal; the district judge grmkd thts motion; and the aupEme court
dismissed the appeal, Porfer v. Sfate, I36 Idaho 257,32 P.36 151 (2001) (Porter If).
Portds current petition w e b etroactive. relief h r m lus death sentence

pursuant to the United States Supreme C o d s decision in Ring. The Ring court

held &at aggavating factors which an Arizona trial judge had found justified
the death penaIty in comectians with a first-degree murder conviction, were
elements of the crime of capid murder. Since ttte Sixth Ammdmmt right to a

jury trial contemplatw a jury, not a judge, decide dl the factual elements of a
crime, the Court concluded the death sentence violated Ring's right to a jury
trial.

Ring, 122S.Ct.at 2443

On August 27,2002, the State moved for s m a r y dismissal of the
petition. I am now d e d on to decide Porter's petition for relief and the Stiate's
motion for summary dismissal.
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Because the conclusion I reach dqends largely on the nature and role af

the jury in heric'm ct.imin;tl jwispderrse, a brief htstory of the jury's
evduGon i s hefpfd.
By h e ~ d d ofethe!thirteenth cenhuy the jury had become the body that
determined the facts m English criminaf caws. See, Welsh S. a t e , fief -Finding
a d the Dmth Pennlg: The Scope oja wilfatD 1 3 f d n f ' s Right. to a Junj Trial, 65

NCIW DAMEL.REV.1,6 (1989). In their early rofe jurors were per-

who had

personal knowledge of:the fa&. The judge's role was to tell the jury what crime
the law ascribed to the facts and the jury had found k, exist. Id.
The jury, with its unfettemd role as the factfinder, became the buffer

bemeen an overreaching and harsh sovereign and the subjeds whom the
ssvereign accused of wrongdoing. Jurors used their facdinding power to nullify

or reduce the charges by what they found the facts to be. By that means the jury

could refuse to impose the penalty that the sovereign was trylng tu exact. Id. a t 7.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centwies jurors became Iimited to
conside~ngonly evidence presented to them during a trial. Despite threats and

prtlssure by Crown-appointed judges to accommodate the Crom'c wishes, the
jury resisted intrusions on its independence and role in criminal cases. Id. at 7 11. The turning point in jury independence occurred in Bushell's h e , which

held a judge could not impose fines or imprisonment on jurors whose verdict he
disliked. Id. at 9 (citing Case ofthe Imprisonment of Edward Bzishell, 6 Howell's

State Trials 999,1010,124 Eng.Rep.1006,1012 (1670)). The rationale was that
since the decision of what the facts were was the sole provine of the jurors,the.
M m O R A N Z ) w DfiCEION, PORTER V. STATE, SF-0241

judg";', as a rnaeer oi defisrit-ion, could not crzndude the verdict w s cmtra~yto

the law. Rather, the legal penalty had to empod with the facts the )ury found.
Id.

The American colonists were keenly aware of the vital role a jury played
in ~ o t d n the
g king's ~ubjectsfrom his arbihary wfrirrts. In 1735, John Peter
ZI-?ngerpI"ubsh:ht.clthe Nuw York Weekly Journal in New Yvrk City. The Crown

charged anger with the

e of sedi~on
by "prin-

and publishng a false,

wandalw~and d t i o u s libel in wheh His Excaency, the Governor who is the

h g ' s i m e d i a t e repscscntative here, is p a d y and luljustly scandahzljd as a

person that has no regard to law or justrice."V. BuraneUi, The Trial O f P p f p y

Zenger, 94 (1957); 17 Howell's State Trials 675 (1'735).
h & e w H b l t o n , k & e r l slawyer, admitted Zenger had published the

issues of ~e

J O U T T U ~the
~ governor found offensive.

The Crown argued the

sedition sbtute required the jury to return a guilty verdict, The judge agreed

and prohibited Harmlton h m prrsenting evidence that what Zenger had said
was h e .

But Hamilton argued to the jurors that they w a x "witnesses to the

truth of the facts we have offered, and are d d e d the liberty to prove." Bwanelli
at 112. The jury acquitted Zenger "in a sxnd time." Burmelli at 132.

The tension between the praagatives of the sovereign and the rights of
the governed could not have been more pronounced. The jury, and the jury

alone, decided Zenger would be free, the truth would be known,and the
governor's prerogatives would be banished from the courtroom.

By the time of the American Revolution, in the colonies, as in Englad, the
jury's mlc in criminal cases was secure. The jury had become an especially
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hpa&mt buffer behYeen khe savezeip and the governed because mmy gimes

were pdshable by death. Wk, at 9 - 11,

Whm a person was charged with a mme he or she knew exactly what the
penalv would be if they were con~ctedas

ged. n e judge's role was not

he administratively imposed the penalty the st-abte pmdbed f o r

the off-

the jury found had been commieed. If the jury found a lesser offense
eed, the judge, again, was Ifited to imposilzg the sentence

presoibed far that offew, rather than the offense that had been charged.
A~reTzdiv. Nrw Jersey, 530 US.466,47&80 (2000), (citing 4 Blackstone,

Cmment;uies m the Laws of England, 368-70 (Cooley ed. 1899)).
Our DeCtara ticm of Independence complained of the king "depriving us in

rnany cases, of the brnefits of Trial by Jury. . ." Alexander Hamilton authored

the pamphlet supporting the right to a jury during the Federalist Papers
campaign to persuade the cdonies to approve the new constitution.
The bends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if
they a ee in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set
UPOR
e trial by jury;or if there is any vast difference befween
&ern it consists in h s : the f o m a regard it as a valuable
safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very palIadium
Irf free g o v e m m t .

fi

THE FEDERALIST
NO. 83 (Alexander Hamifton),
It is little wonder, therefore, that when the hot-headed revolutionaries

who put their lives, fortunes and sacred honor at risk during our war of
independence became the sedate and somber founding fathers we now revere,

that they included the nght to a jury trial in both the Constitution and Bill of

Rights.
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The Constitution provides, "[tjhe Trial of all Crimes, except in cases of

i m p a c h m l ; shall be by Jwy . . ." U.S. CONST.art nI, 5 2, cl. 3. The Sixth
h m h e n t stipdates that "in

aU criminsl p

the right to a speedy and public ~ dby,an impartial jury . . . .'r U.S. C o ~ n .
m e n d m.

As the Nation mamed, legislafimgave judges more disuetion in

mteneng by establisking a range af punish&
came to tfie death pendty, however, juror &=tion

for s p r j f i e d crimes. When it.
led to its arbikary

appticatim. For the same crime mine died, others lived. 'fie poor and
minoritJes fared worse for the same offense. This disparity beeme so

pronounced that in 1972 the United Slates S u p m e Court declared that I.he

death penalty, as appIie& violated the auel and unusual punjshment prohibition
of the Eighth Ammdment. Furmarl v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,92 S.Ct.2726 (1972).

Justice Potter Stewart c o n h in the decision, saying, "I simply conclude that

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments c m t tolerate the intlictxon of a
sentence of death under legal systems that permit ttus unique penalty to be so
wantonly and so freakishly imposed." 408 U.S. at 31 0,92 S.Ct. at 2763.

FoIlowing Furman, the states that wanted to retain the death penalty
redrafted their statutes to ensure a mow objective and uniform application of the

penalty. Those states established aggravating iadors, which, if pmven to

outweigh mitigakg factors, would justify the death sentence. Most of the states
Ieft the deternunation of those factors to the jury. Idaho, together with Arizona,
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Colorado. Montana, and Nebraska, assigned that role to the judge.' See, John W.
Foulos, Liability Rzdles, Sentencing Factors, and Sirth Amendnlmf Right to a Jury
Triul: A Prelirnirzgry Irrqtdiry, 44 W. M w t t.REV.643.65760 (1990).

During the last eightem years the United States Supreme Court struggled
with the issue of whether the aggravating factors were part of the penalty
dwe to be dedded by a judge or whe&er they were elements of

the crime

itself to be decided by the jury. Spazinno u. Floridn, 468 U.S. at 459 ("The Sixth
Anlendnlmt never has hem thought to guarmte a right to a jury determination

of that issue [death penalty sentence].");Watton v.Ariznna, 497 U.S. 639,110 S.Ct.

3047 (1990) (aggravahng factors properly assist the sentendng judge);
Almndarm-firres v. United Stales, 523 U.S.224,118 S.Ct. 1219 (1998) (some~mes
the aggravating factors are e1ement.s of the &me); Jones v. Unit& States, 526 U.S.

227,120 S.Ct. 2348 (1999)(interpreted statute so tkat the aggravating factors were
elements of the crime); Amrelzdi v. Nao Jersey, 530 U.S. at 490 ("Other than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fad that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed maximum must be submilted to a jury,and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt."1.
V. R2NC v. ARIZONA

The Supreme Court resolved this urgent question for capital cases in Kirrg

v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. at 2443. It conduded that any fact that increased a penalty is
an element of the crime and must be pmvm to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

It held that allowing a judge to determine if the death penalty should be imposed
infringed on an accused's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
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Because Mzona's enmerated ag~ava"cingcrlmtmstances

uymate as "the. b d o n a l e q ~ v d e notf an e1aent of a p a t e
o&ew," Apl"rmdi, 530 U.S., at 4494, n, 19,120 S.Ct. 2x8, the
Sixth hendmiezlt retfuires h t they be found by a jury.
***
"The guarant:eesof jury trial in the Federal and State
Gomtihrticins reflect- a profound j u d p m t about the way in
which law should be enforced and justice adwniste~d.. . . .If
the defendant prefmed the eo
judment of a jury
to the more tutored but perhaps less syolpa&etic reaction of the
single judge, he was to have it."Dtrncnn v, buisiarur, 391 U.S.
145,155-156,88 SCt. 1444,20 L-Ed.2d491 (1%8).

Id. The flawed Arizona m t e n h g procedwe in Ring is virtually identical to
Idaho's. The Idaho Supreme Court foUoM Ring's mmdate in Stgfe v. Fet.te*,
137 Idaho 729,52 P.3d 874 (2002).

VI.

Lf; m R E R ' S CLAM FUR RELIEF WAIVED?

The State first asserts that Porter did not comply with the Act's provision
that post-convidiun daims for relief that were "known, or reasonably should

have been known" are deemed wdved unless filed within forty-two days of the

"mng of the judgment imposing the judgment of death and before the death
warrant is filed. . . ." 1.C.

5 19-2719(3),

Porter did not directly raise the issue of whether all the elements of a
capital case should be tried only to a jury in his 1984 posi-conviction relief

petition. He did argue that try-ing all elements of all crimes to a jury except a
capital crime offended the Equal Protection Clause. Second Amended Petition
for Pwt-Conviction Relief, filed November 28,1994.

The State nonetheless argues that Porter reasonably s h d d have known
about the claim within forty-two days of the judgment imposing the death
sentence whidr was filed on September 7, 1990, Brief in Support of Motion for
Summary Dismissal, at 6-7,ll-13. Since Porter did not file any "legal challenge
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to the senmet:or convictiq" (X.C. tj 19-2719 (3)),vviCflin furty-hva days, the
State agues he is "deemed to have wdJvIQd" it by virtue of 1.C. fj19-2719 (5).

Brief m Suppod of Motion for S

xy Disdss& at 21-13.

Porter respctnds that he c d d not have raised the R% decision vvihn the

fow-hoday limit.btcause it was not dedded until twelve years later. He
contends he &gently complied with the Act. by bringing his petitictn dt-hin
forty-hvodays of the Ring dedsion. Petitionel's Response to Motion for
S m ~ i t r Dismissal
y
of Rule 35 M o ~ o nat 2,

When Porter was convicted the Unikd States S u p m e Court had held
that judges could decide the aggravating factors necessary to justify the

~mpitim
of the death p a t t y . Walfanv. Arizona, 497 US.at 649; see, Spaziano v.
Florzda, 468 U.S. at 459. The Idaho S u p m e Cowt had specificdly held that the

U.S. and Idaho Gonsetutions pemtted a judge to decide whether the death

penalty should be imposed. Strrfe v. Creecit, 105Idaho at 367,670 P.2d at 468

("We hold that here is no federal constitutional requirement of jury participation
in the sentenang process and that the deasion to have jury partiripation in the
sentencing process, as contrasted with the judicial discretion sentencing, is

within the policy d & e b a ~ o of
n the individual states,");S f a b u. Siuak, 1%

Idaho at 902-903. There was no reason at t h f time to thuzk that either of those
courts would rev-

itself.

The ady decision during that time that upheld an accused's right to have

a jury decide all the elements of capital murdw was Adamson v. Rickets, 865 F.2d

1011 (9th Cir. 1988). The Idaho Supreme Court specifically rejected
Adamson in State u. Cfitlrborzeau,116 Idaho at 146, 774 P.2d a t 317. It said:
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ent &at lfne jury must be
To accept [AppdlanYs]
involved in de
aggravaMg cirmstances
exist, we w a d
that the aggravating
eircumstmes Eat& in LC. 19-Z15(g)we elements of first
degree mmdm. We are unable to reach that mnclusion. The
stances listed in the stahte are clearly circumistmces to
be conside-d ~YI ~nten<ring
and not elementf,of first degree
rnurder. It is not uconstitrutional for a judge, instead of a jury,
tu d e t e d n e whether any of the aggravating fircumstances
listed in the statute exlst
Our opinion in this aspeck of the case is not changed by the
decision of the Ninth Circuit in Adamson u. Rickets, 865 F. ;ld
1011(9thCir ,1988). In Adamson the Ninth Circuit held
M o n a ' s death pnaIty sentencing statutes to be in violation of
the Sixth A m a d m a t . M n g reargummt of h s case to
determine what impad Adamson might have on our opixlion
h a , the solicitor general for the state of Idaho a c h w l e d g t d
that trheru! is no significant difference between the Arizona death
penalty mkncing statutes md those of Idaho. Nevertheless,
we are not convinced that Admsctn correctly states the
reguhments of the Sixth Amendment on this issue.

The undeniable fact is, as a matter of adjudicated law in Idaho, and in the
United States, there did net exist a credible claim for relief based on the assertion
that the judge rather than the jury decided whether a person convicted of first-

degree murder lived or died. That issue had been definitively decided. Wtton,
497 U.S. at 649; Creech, 1.05Idaho at 367; Charburrenu, 116 Idaho at 146. The Idaho

Supreme Court demonstrated the transparent futility of such a claim when it
peremptorily dismissed Perter's constitutional appeal on that issue in a single

paragraph without dissel~t.Stafev. Porter, 130 Idaho at 795-796,948 P.2d 15015l(quoted supra at 4).
The A d does not say that any issue which might conceivably have been

raised, even if contrary to all appeIIate precedent, must be raised within the
forty-two day time frame or be forever barred. Rather, it deems waived "such
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claims fDr rcliqf as known, or reasonably should have been known" (emphasis

added). I.C. 9 19-2719 (3).
A daim fur relief by d e ~ l t i o n
is a darn bawd on a prinaple of law ar a

cms~htionalnght that errtitles a plitimer to a change in his or her legal status.

Po&er/s sSatus qw is h a t of a pemon cantrid& of h t d e

whom a w m m t of death has been iswed, The relief he seeks is to have the
death warrmt vacated. The predicate for his petjGon is &at the agpvating
factors which reulted in the w m m t were decided by a judge instead of a jury.

The right to have a jury dedde those factors did not exist in a capital case until

JuIy 24,2002, the d a k Ring was decided.
The State contends dnar even though both the Nation's highest court and
Idaho's hghest court. had decided that the judges' hposition of the death
penalty passed cometu~onalmuster, Porter was none~elessobliged to raise

that issue within the forty-two day Ring limit prescribed by I.C. 9 19-2719. It

argues that Ring hmseIf raisd that issue as:a basis for a favorableruling on his
behalf and no less should be expected of Porter.

I am unpersuaded At the time Porter was sentenced, W f o nand Spaziano
were the only United States Supreme Court decisions on the jury-death sentence

horizon. When Ring was sentenced by the trial judge in 1997 (Ring, 122 S.Ct at
24351, the Iegal landscape was ~ i ~ f i c a n taltered.
iy
The Court had expressly

held that all the elements of a crime must be tried to a jury in Bowley v. United
States, 523 U.S.614, 118 S.Ct. 1604 (1998)and United Sfafesv. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506,

510, 115 S.Ct-.2310,2320 (1995), which put the comtitutiunal moorings of Walfon

on very shaky footings.
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The issue Porter raised in his 1994 pctilion for post-conviction relief and
on his a w e d to the IdJlv Sup
rclsult.

Porter I, 1% Idaho at 795796,948 P.2d at 1!3&151. I condude for one to

have reamn to h o w there is a cf
authorifit to su

for reBef hew must be at:least some nedible

it, Xn Idaho at the time Porter was mtenced to death there

was none. The judge's role in deddtng whether a pason who had committed

murder lived or died had tke ixn

of h e only two supreme

c u u h from whch Porter could seek relief,
VII. DOES

ACT'S BAR TO RETROAC3TVE EEFECTAPPLY?

The State next argues the application of Ring to Porter is precluded by the
Act because it provides that a pleading assuting an exception to the forty-two

day time limit for filing a daim for relief "shall be deemed fadally insuffidentto

the extent it seeks retroactive application of new rules of law." LC. 3 1927l9(5)(c).

The right to have all the elements of a capital case tried to a jury is not of
recent vintage. As discussed above, until the various states tried to cope with the
F t c r m m decision finding the death penalty unconstitutional, that right had never

been questioned. It was only after Idaho and four other states relegated that
duty to a judge that any question about the jury's role arose.Spaxiam validated

the aberrant approach in 1984, Walton confirmed it in 1990, and Ring ended it in
2002.

Having a jury try all the elements of a crime was not a n m d e of law
See, e.g., In Re Winship,397 U.S. 358,364 (1970) ("[Tlhe Due Process Clause

protects the accused against conviction except u

p proof beyond a reasonable

doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.").
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It: was not the d e of law however, d

Ifl.te b e Pofier was p m e c u a

sentaced m death. The Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged as much in State v.
Cree&, 105Idaho at 372-373.670 P.2d 47-74

when it said, "At other places or at

other times, juries have been given an integral mle in impsing the death
sentence. However, we hold that jury partidpation in the sentencing process is

not consabtionalf y required."

Even if Ring had announced a new rule of law, thfz Act's ban an its
retroactive effect wodd not apply to Porter. The Act was mended in 1995 to
include subsection (5)(c).The first inquiry, thereforeI is whetfter its constraints

against mmactivity apply to Porter, whose convicrtion and death penalty
preceded the date of h e mmdmentis enactment. The statute ~tselfmaker; no
provision for its retroactive effect. Idaho Code 6j 73401 instructs that "[njo part

of Lhese compiled laws is retroactive, unless rn declared.'' The Idaho

Supreme Court has decided the statute means what it says. Nebeker D. Piper

Airoaf) Corporation, 113Idaho 609,614,747 P.2d 18,23(1987). I conclude,
therefore, that Idaho Code 5 19-2719(5)(c)has no retroactive effect in this case.
Vllf. DOES HNG APPLY REmOAMmLY TO PORTER?

The next inquiry artd the gravamen of Porter's petition is whether Ring
applies retroactively to his death sentence.

The State argues that a new criminal procedural rule is not retroactive,
citing Te~guev. h n e , 489 US.288,109 S.Ct 1060 (1989), and that finality of death

sentences preceding Ring is essential, because "[tlorequire the application of

Ring to those cases and potentially force the resentencing of every capital
defendant wodd seriously undermine any deterrent effect associated with the
death penalty.*'Reply Brief In Support of Motion For Summary Dismissal at 4-7.
MEMORQWUM DECLSION, PORTER V. STATE, SP-02-M

Po&m mpes R i ~ gdefines a suhstanL.iverule, c i ~ n Bousfq,
g
523 U,S, at
620. We mntends the Teape ban on releu>ac%iviyonly appIies to pmcedurdl rules

of law m d that Ring involves a subsMtive right &at is w i h the "concept of

ordaed liberty," citJng Davk u. Uniied Slats, 417 U.S. 333 (1974). Peti~mer's

Rapon=

to Motion far

ruy Disfisc;al at 16-22.

The right to a fair trial is a furtdmmM li
hendatent. &ope

zl.

secured by &e Fou&wn&

Missouri, 420 U.S. I62,95S.Ct. 8% (1975); see a h ,

Maftfrrwszt. Eldrdge, 424 U.S. 329,96 S.Ct. 893 (1976). Porter's petition does not
question the fairness of h s trial for first degree murder. It does question the
f ~ m eofs a trial for ht-degree murder that resuIb in a sentenctt for the &me af

capital murder. Stated another way, he contends it is fundamentally unfair to
sentence hfor a crime for which he has not been convicted by a jury.

The history and role of the jury in Anglo-American jurisprudence is
pivotat to my decision. In my judgment the jury is the single-most vita1

guaantur of our demmatic form of govement. Legislators can legidate,
executives can execute and judges can adjudicate, but, as Peter k g e r

cfiscovered 265 years ago, it is ultimately a jury that protects our individual
liberties as citizens from their overreahng. There is a very simple reason for
that.

Twelve persons who are governed by the sovereign sit in judgment of the
charges agaimt the accused brought by the sovereign that g o v m them. Their
Iife experiences, common sense, m d co1Iective wisdom buffer the unsavory traits
that power and ambition often foster in those who govern. The fact that all

helve jurors must agree h a t the state has made its case beyond a reasonable
doubt tempers any arbitrary or suhective approach that any one individual
MEMORANDUM DECISION, PORTER V.STATE, SP-02-041
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nught indulge, whch is the peril of having just one per

makf: a dedsion as

fatefulas life and death.
The United States Supreme Coivt ahowledged the j w s role when it
held that "the right to a jury trial in &ous cJimfnal cases is a h d m e n t d right

and hence must be recoezed by the States as part of their ubligalim to extend
due prmess of law t-o all personsj within their j ~ s ~ d e n c e D-tincnn
."
v.
Louisiann, 391 US.145,154, I38 S.Ct. 1444,1450 (1968).

Both the United States S u p ~ m Co&
e
in Teape, 489 U.S. at-305-31I, 109
S.Ct. at 1072-1075, and the Idaho Supreme C w r t inIil the Maf.ter of Gaford, f 27

Idaho 472,476,903P.2d 61,65 (I%) c a v e out an excepfion to the general rule

that new comtitugo~xdrules are not rebadive if the rule is "implidt in the
concept of ordered liberty." Lf a right to a jury trial is a "fundmental right" and

an essential element of due process, as the m n a n Court has held it is, then, by
definition it is implieit in h e concept of ordered Iikrty.

The State's reliance on Fetlerly a. Sttzte, 121 Id& 417 (1992) and CriJ3"Ftjxv.
Ke~nttlcky,479 U.S. 314 (1987) is misplaced. There the courts assumed the new
constitutional ntles under review w e procdural. Both decisions preceded
Tmgtde and Gafird. The T e a p distinc~onbetween a procedural rule and

fundamental right is n o ~ rdispositive regarding retroactivity.
In that vein, the State argues that Ring just establishes a new procedural
rule for trying capital cases and therefore is not retroactive under Teague. I:

disagree. Iri Boustey the Supmrne Court held that the actual use of a weapon

rather than its mere possession was a necessary element of the crime of
"howing1y and intentionally [using] . . . firearms during and in relation to a
drug trafficking mime." 523 U.S. at 616. Because the existence or absence of
M E M O W f J M DECISION, PORTER V. STATE, SP-02041
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acbaLly using a weaport cl

establishg Chat dis~ncfionwas eomidmed substmtive, and thmfom
rekoadve. Bowlq, 523 U.S, at 620.

The Court in Bumley reached &at condusim because of the "significant
risk that a defendmt s h d s m n ~ d e of
d 'an act that tfte law does not make

&mind,'" (quo6ng Dmis v. United States, 417 U.5, at 3461, 523 U.S. at 620. Were
Porter stands stmtenmd to death for capital murder, which the Idaho legislature

had not made a crime and which was not submitted to the jury for its decision.
In sum, Porter has been sentenced to die for a crime for which a jury has

not convicted h m . His dmmmstance is indistinguishable in principle from
B Q U S ~In
~ .HowIqy the factual question was whether the weapon was being used

while drugs were being trafficked. 523 U.S. at 620. LnRing, it was whether an
aggravahg factor existed when the murder was committed. 122 S.Ct.at 2434-37.

The flaw in the Arizona and Idaho statutes was that the judge was entitled
to decide the aggravagng factors preasefy because that determination was
enonmusly considered to be procedural. The teaching of Ring is that the factors

that decide life and death am substantive elements of the h e e itself, not simply

a procedural protocoi ta be wrapped up by a judge at the end of the trial.
At its c m , the right to a jury trial is the right of all citizens to have the
State's criminal charges against them decided by their fellow citizens, rather than

by a judge who is employed by the same State that has brought the charges.
Thehere can be no more hrndmental and substantive right in a free society than to
have one's liberty decided by one's peers. Permitting a judge to dedde the facts
that detemitxe whetha a murder is capital mudm subverts the very essence of

the right to a jury trial. Even worse, it embraces the peril of an arbitrary judge

.

00157
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that the jury has to steadfastlyvanquished in &mind hials during the past eight
hundred years of A n g l o - h d c a n j ~ s p d m c e .

Poxtes was sentmced. to death for a crime h a t the jury had not found he

had additional factual

capiM fisstdepe murder. That
elements h e jury was not

E d to decide.

I condude, therefore, that

sentencing Porter to death far a crime for which the jury did not convict him
denied h m his Sixth h e n d n l m t right to a jury trial and the p r e s s he was due
by virtue of the JFoMmnh Annenhent.

The m e d y fur that wrong is p r e s d h d by prwedmt. Whm a person
has b m convicted for a crime based on an imhction that omitted an essential
element of that crime, the pwson c m be w n t e n d ody fur the crime whtch the
inshctions defined. State v.J&ppe$en, 138 Idaho T1,76,57 P.3d 782,787 (2QO2);
State v. Nururz, 133 Idaho 13,19-20,981 P.2d 738,74445

(1999). That principle is

no less applicable here. Since Porter was convicted by the jlxry on only those
elements which define first-delifreemurder, I condude that it the only m i l e for

whch he can be sentenced. id.
IX. ORDER

1.The State's Motion for S u m q D s m i ~ aisl denied;
2. Porter's Petifion fm Post-Conviction fielief and/or Writ ofHabeas

Corpus (Lewis County Case No. 02-041) is granted;

MMOMNDUM DECLSION, PORTER. V. STATE, SP-02-041

3. Po&&s MoGm to Corn& alegal *ten=,

to Vacate Z;enkmre of Death

and far New Sententing Trial (Lewis C o w 9 Case No. 6053) is denied
Mtk~tttprejudice as moot?
4. The Verdict, filed January26.1990, h d i n g Porter guilty of finirst-degree

murder s h d s b d ;
5. The district court's order and judpetlt &at Porter is "guilty of the

C

OF

FIRST DEGWE as charged in said

idoma~on
as found by the jury in their u n h o u s verdict"' contained in
the Judmmtand Sentence, filed September 7,1990shall stand;

6, The dislricf: murt's order, judgment and decree that Porter is
''smtenced to sufferthe punishment of death in accordance with the
provisions of Idaho Code Section 1 8 - 4 0 4 and in the m m e r prescribed by

Chapter 27 of Title 19, Idaho Code, at the Idaho State Penitentiary in Boise,
Ada County, Idaho" contained in the Judgmentand Sentme, f2ed

%tetember 7,1990 is hereby vacated;

7. A new date will be set to sentence Porter for first-degree murder, the
only crime of which he now stands convicted by a jury of his peers.

rr ISSOORDEREDt

h i s x day of April, 2003.

Although I have serious reservations about h s courfs jurisdidion to impose
the death penalty in this case, Hays v. State, 113 Idaho 736,739,747 P.2d 758
(Ct.App.1987) ("A jurisdictional defect exists when the alleged fads are not
made criminal by statute, or where there is a failure to state facts essential to
establish the offense charged"), because I conclude I.C. 9 19-2719 does not bar
Porter's petition for relief, I do not reach those issues raisedsby his Rule 35
motion.
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IN THE DISTMCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ZANE JACK FIELDS,
Petitioner,

1
1
1
1
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

1
1

Case No. SPOT 0200711D
W P L Y TO STATE'S MSPONSE TO
PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL

Zane Jack Fields ("Petitioner"), through counsel, files this Reply to State's Response to
Petitioner's Brief in Opposition to State's Motion for Summary Dismissal, dated January 15,

2003 [hereinafter "Response"]. For the reasons set fonh below Respondent's motion to
summarily dismiss Mr. Fields' Petition for Post-Conviction Petition should be denied.

ARGUMENT
A.

AEDPA's Successive Petition Requirements Do Not Apply to These Proceedings.
The State's first argument is that because the United States Supreme Court has not yet

made Ring v Arizonu retroactive, this Court cannot do so. Response at 2. The argument relies
in whole upon the State's fundamental misunderstanding of the Supreme Court's decision in
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Tyler v. G i n , 533 U.S. 656 (2001j. The principles of relsoactivity under Teugue 1). Lane, 489
U.S. 288 (1 989) must not be confused with the Anti-Tenorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
["%EDPA"]% requirement for successor petitions, in which claims must rely on a previously
unavailable "new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme C~LM."228 U.S.C.

5 2234(b)(2)(A).

The State thus misapprehends Tyler when it asserts "the Tyler court held that a new rule
is not retroactive unless the Supreme Court specifically held that it was to be retroactive at the
time the decision was made or unless some subsequent case or a series of cases specifically
makes it retroactive." Response at 7. In fact, Tyler v. Cuin, has no impact on the question of
retroactivity before this Court. In Tyler, the United States Supreme Court held that 28 U.S.C. $
2244(b)(2)(A) did not incorporate the Teague standard but that in order for a new rule of
constitutional law to be made retroactive to cases on collateral review, the Supreme Court must
expressly hold it to apply retroactively. 533 U.S. at 664-667. 28 U.S. C. §2244(b)(2)(A) is a
subsection of the federal statute regulating and limiting the federal courts power to grant relief in
successive habeas proceedings. It has no applicability or enforceability in the context of these
state proceedings. Thus, the thrust of the State's reliance thereon is seriously misplaced.
This misunderstanding of federal proceedings and the Supreme Court's rulings thereon is
muddled further by the State's argument that the Supreme Court rejected an argument in Tyler
"that the Cage rule should be retroactive under a Teague v. Lane " and thus, '-held that Cage was
not retroactive to Tyler." Response at 6. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court expressly
stated that "[tlhe most [Tyler] can claim is that, based on the principles outlined in Teague, this
Court shouM make Cage retroactive to cases on collateral review. What is clear, however, is
PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR WRlT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 2

that we have not h a d e ' Cage retroactive to cases on collateral review." Tyler v. Chin, 533 U.S.
at 666. The question of whether or not C ~ g will
e be retroactively applied was not answered in

Tyler- the only question the Court mswered was

at the time Tyler sought to file a

successive petition for habeas corpus the Cuge rule bad been "made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court" for p q o s e s of $2244(b)(2)(A). They held it had not.
533 U.S. at 664.
Similarly, the State relies on a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' case, Cannon v. Mullen
297 F. 3d 989 (lothCir. 2002). The State enoneously asserts that Cannon "specifically held that
the Ring decision is not retroactive." Response at 10. Cannon did not so hold. Cannon, like

Tyler and in reliance thereon, was held to be procedurally barred from proceeding in federal court
on a successive habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2)(A). 297 F. 3d at 994. The Court
held only that "Cannon has failed to make aprimu facie showing that the Supreme Court has
made Ring retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review" and denied his application for
permission to file a second habeas petition. 297 F. 3d at 995. The analysis of whether Ring
ought to be applied retroactively under Teague v. Lane is dicta and presented in a case in
procedural posture of Cannon has no relevance to the issues at hand. As such, cases like Tyler v.

Cuin, 533 U.S. 656 (2001), and Cannon are easily distinguishable from the requirements
imposed on Mr. Fields under Teague in these state proceedings.

B.

The "Rule of Ring" is Retroactive Under Boustey v. United States.
The State next argues that Ring is not retroactive under Teague v. Lane. Response at 6.

The argument fails for several reasons. Initially, this argument relies again on Tyler v. Cain in its
effort to explain the substantive holding of Teague. Response at 6-10. To the extent the State's
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targurnent relies on Tyler, an AEDPA case, to support its asgument on Teague, Lhe reliance is
misplaced. As noted by the United States Supreme Court itself, "'if o w post-AEDPA cases
suggest mything about AEDPAfsrelationship to Teugue, it is that the AEDPA and Teagut.
inquiries are distinct.'Wom v. Bunk, 536 U.S. 266 (2002).
Similarly, the State's su

ary rejection of the argument by Petitioner that Teague does

not apply because Ring es~blishesa new rule, if it is new, of srrbst~ntiveeri~ninallaw rather than
procedure is based on a faulty understanding of Teugue and Ring. Response at 12. What is
perhaps most misunderstood is what the rule of Ring is. Ring simply applies old procedural law
of the 5" and 6' Amendment Due Process right to Notice by information and jury findings
beyond a reasonable doubt to the new understanding of the substantive nature of the role that
statutory aggravating factors play in a capital case. The role has not changed, i.e., making a
person convicted of first degree murder eligible for the death penalty, but rather the Supreme
Court's understanding oftheir role was clarified in Ring, nor have tlie procedural protections
which arise by the clarification changed. Simply because the rights which attach as a result of
Ring's subtantive rule not previously acknowledged does not make the rule itself "procedural."
Since Petitioner's Brief in Opposition was filed in this case, the United States Supreme
Court has made much more clear the substantive nature of the rule of Ring. In Sutlazahn v.
Pennsylvania, -U.S.-,123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (Jan 14,2003), the United States Supreme
Court held that "neither the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause barred Pennsylvania from seeking the death penalty against
petitioner on retrial." Id., 123 S. Ct at 742. In reaching its conclusion, Justice Scalia, joined by
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Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thon~as,laid to rest any question regarding precise in~pactof

Ring v. -4rizonu when he wrote:
Just last Term we recognized the import of /lppren~liin the context of capitalsentencing proceedings. In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. -, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (20021,
we held that aggravating circumstances that make a defendmt eligible for the
death penalty "operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a greater
ofinse."' Id., at
(slip op., at 23) (emphasis added). That is to say, far puwosss
of the Sixth Amendment's j v - t r i a l guarantee, the underlying offense of "murder"
is a distinct, lesser included offense of "murder plus one or more aggravating
circustmces": Whereas the former exposes a defendant to a m a x i m m penalty
of life imprisoment, the latter increases the maximum permissible sentence to
death. Accordingly, we held that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury, and
not ajudge, find the existence of any aggravating circumstances, and that they be
found, not by a mere preponderance of the evidence, but beyond a reasonable
(slip op., at 22-23).
doubt. I d , at - -

Sattcrzcrhn v. Pennsylvania, supra, 133 S. Ct at 739. Justice Scalia, with a majority of the court
concurring in Ring, unambiguously establishes that "murder plus one or more aggravating
circumstances" is a separate offense from "murder simpliciler." Id.
Three points illustrated by Sattazahn are essential to the question before this Court. First,
that Petitioner here has been found guilty only of "murder simpliciter" [murder in the first
degree] and not "murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances" [capital murder] and thus,
death is not a statutorily permissible penalty. See Idaho Code 18-4004. In this case, instructions
specifying the elements of a murder simpliciter were given to the jury. The jury was not
instructed to find the element of any statutory aggravating circumstance, which raises the offense
to a capital murder. Because the instructions did not define the crime as a lesser included
offense of a capital murder, the jury was not asked to consider first whether the evidence was
sufficient to find the defendant guilty of the capital murder before it determined that Fields was
guilty of the lesser, murder offense. See I.C.

5 19-21321~). Accordingly, Fields should have
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been sentenced only for murder simpliciter and not "hurder plus aggravator." See Sfate v.
f i n e s , 133 ldaho 13,20,981 P. 2d 738,745 (19991, rehearing denied

'

Secondly, it is clear from Justice Sca1ia"sopinion that Ring, in its application of Appre~zdi
to the capital context, does not effect a "new rule of law" and thus, its application is not barred
by Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c). In Sirttuzahn, Justice Scalia expressly found that
Apprendi "'clur~>edwhat constitutes an "element" of an offense for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment's jury-trial guarantee." 123 S.Ct. at 739. To clarify simply does not create a new
rule but makes the rule clear or intelligible or frees it from ambiguity. See Webster's
Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary Random House, 1996 (2d Ed.) at 380. The statutory
aggravating circumstances were elements of the offense at the time of crime, conviction and
sentence and they remain elements. Petitioner was at all times entitled to notice and a jury trial
thereon. The conviction which now stands is nothing more than a conviction for first degree
murder," an offense for which death is not an available penalty
Thirdly, there can be little argument that the definition of a crime by its elements is
undoubtedly substantive and not procedural. Thus, Teague v. Lane does not apply and the
holding of Ring must be applied to Petitioner under Bousely v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,62021 (1995). Inherent in the State's arguments is a fundamental misapprehension of greater and
lesser included offenses and the application of that criminal law structure to Petitioner's
conviction. The State continues to argue that Petitioner was convicted of murder, a conviction
which is not subject to question in this proceeding, and the aggravating circumstances were mere

'

f i n e z also makes clear that a proceeding under ldaho Criminal Rule 35 is the
appropriate vehicle to correct the sentence. See id., 133 Idaho at 16,981 P.2d at 741.
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sentencing factors. Response at 16. We agree Petitioner was convicted of murder but the
conviction under scrutiny here is the conviction, or more imporlantly lack of conviction, for
capital murder, without tvhich Petitioner cannot legally be sentenced to death.

C.

Even If Teague Applies, Ring Should Be Applied Retroactively.

1.

Ring Satisfies the "Private Conduct Beyoud the Power to Proscribe"
Exception to the fingue Doctrine.

It is in understanding the substantive nature of the statutory aggravating circumstances
that the State's sgument dismissing the first exception of Teagzde under authority of Jones v.

Smirh, 231 F.3d 1227 (91hCir 2000) must be rejected as well. See Response at 15-16. Even if
Ring were a new rule of criminal procedure, it would be applied retroactively because "it places
'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe."' Teague, 489 U.S. at 3 1 1 (quoting Mackey v. United Slates, 401

U.S. 667,693 (1971)(Harlan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)). This exception arises
from Teague 's adoption of Justice Harlan's views on non-retroactivity in which he noted that
"[tlhere is little societal interest in permitting the criminal process to rest at a point where it
ought properly never to repose." Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692-93 (Harlan, J., conc~uringin part and
dissenting in part.) Thus, Justice Harlan concluded and the United States Supreme Court
ultimately accepted that "[nlew 'substantive due process' rules that . . . free[] individuals from
punishment for conduct that is constitutionally protected" ought to be retroactive. Mackey, 401
U.S. at 692-93; accord Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. at 620.
In Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 303,330 (1989) the Court recognized that the exception
extended to capital cases in a unique way, noting that a "new rule placing a certain class of
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individuals beyond the state's power to punish by death is analogous to a new rule placing certain
conduct beyond the State's power to punish at all." A constitutionai rule barring execution of the
revsded would fall outside Teague v. Lane 's ban on retroactive application of new constitutional
rules because it placed the ability to execute the retarded "beyond the State's power." Id.
(discussing Teugtie, 489 1J.S. at 30 1-02).
Unlike any other class of proscribed criminal conduct, before a goverment may sentence
a person to death, it must adhere to stringent jurispmdential requirements under the Eight11 and
Fourleenth Amendments. Ring 11. Arizona, 122 S. Ct at 2442 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
522-23 (Thomas, J., concurring)) ("[Iln the area of capital punishment, unlike any other area, we

have imposed special constraints on a legislature's ability to determine what facts shall lead to
what punishment--we have restricted the legislature's ability to define crimes."). The first Teugue
exception permits a rule to be raised collaterally if it prevents lawmaking authority from
criminalizing or punishing in a certain manner certain kinds of conduct. Teague, 489 U.S. at

31 1; Penry, 492 U.S. at 330. Ring like Nunez prohibits the state from imposing the death
penalty upon those who have been convicted by jury only of the lesser included offense of
murder and are not eligible for death absent additional jury fact finding which never took place.

Ring clearly comes within the ambit of the first Tiague exception compelling application of its
constitutional principles to Zme Fields

2.

Ring Satisfies The "Watershed" Exception to the Teague Doctrine.

Assuming arguendo that Ring announced a new rule of criminal procedure, the final step
in the Teague analysis, is to ascertain whether the constitutional principle announced in Jones,
applied in ilpprendi, affirmed and extended in Ring is a watershed rule of criminal procedure,
PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 8

implicating both the accuracy and fundmental fairness of criminal proceedings. Teugue, 489

U.S. at 312. Justice O'Connor bas certainly mswered that question in the affirmative when she
wrote in her dissent in Apprendi: 'Today, in what will surely be remembered as a watershed
change in constitutional law, the Court imposes as a constitutional rule the principle it first
identified in Jones." A~pprendiv. New Jersex 530 U.S. at 523 (O'Comor, J., dissenting). But

see Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2449-50 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (noting that claimants may be "barred
from taking advantage" of Ring "on federal collateral review"'). Ring v. Arizona, which
extended Apprendi to capital case sentencing proceedings, requires jury findings on, and pre-trial
notice of, aggravating circumstances -- concepts which are "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" under Teilgue's second exception. See Teilgue, 489 U.S. at 3 11.
A rule that qualifies under this exception "must not only improve accuracy [of the trial

and conviction],%but also alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to
the fairness of a proceeding." Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227,242 (1990) (internal quotation
marks and quoted cases omilted). Ring applies the principles of Jones v. United Stales and

Apprendi in the capital context and is a sweeping rule of criminal law. Ring applies to every
capital defendant in Idaho and in every other death penalty jurisdiction whose judge sentencing
scheme usurped the jury's fact-finding function and stripped the accused of his or her right to
notice, jury trial and due p r o c e ~ s . ~

As argued in our Response in Opposition to Request to Summarily Dismiss, the Teague
requirement of "accuracy-enhancing" does not appear to be applicable under Idaho law. hilatter
of Gilflord 127 Idaho 472,476,903 P. 2d 61, 65 (1995). See Petitioner's Response at p. 17-18.
3

See Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. at 2442 n.6 ('"[olther than Arizona [Ariz. Rev. Stat. $13501(C)] , only four States commit both capital sentencing factfinding and the ultimate sentencing
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Ring's requirement that a jury, not a judge, find beyond a reasonable doubt the factual
elernents necessary for a conviction of capital rnurder meets the second Teasue exception
qualifications. Applying ,lorzes and L4pprentfito the capital context, Ring raises the standard for
cletemining factors that may subjed a criminal defendant to a possible sentence of death from a
prepondermce of the evidence to beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby increasing accuracy.
Similarly, Ring" requirement, that every element of a crime - defined as every fact that increases
the statutov maximurn - be charged in the indictment and found by a jury by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt improves the accuracy of the fact-finding process because it reduces the risk
that an imocent person might be convicted of a more serious crime, or that a guilty person might
be punished more severely than the law allows. In Ring, the Court explicitly declined to accept
Arizona's asgunlent that judicial factfinding is superior in capital cases. The Court found that
argument '"far from evident," noting that "the great majority of States . . . entrust[] those
deteminations to the jury." Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2442.
In light of the hedarnental nature of the right to pre-trial notice of every element of the
offense and findings by a properly instructed jury beyond a reasonable doubt on every element of
the offense, the holding in Ring must meet the Tecrgue exception for a watershed rule affecting
bedrock procedural requirements implicit in ordered liberty and necessary to a fair trial. A

decision entirely to judges. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 5 16-11- 103 (2001) (three-judge panel); Idaho
Code Q' 19-2515 (Supp.2001); Mont. Code Ann. 5 46-1 8-301 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. 5 29-2520
(1995). . . Four States have hybrid systems, in which the jury renders an advisory verdict but the
judge makes the ultimate sentencing determinations. See Ala. Code $5 13A-5-46, 13A-5-47
(1994); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, 5 4209 (1995); Fla. Stat. Ann. 5 921.141 (West 2001); Ind.
Code Ann. 5 35-50-2-9 (Supp.2001)).
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cornparison to other rules, held to meet Teugue's watershed rule exception, forces the conclusion
that Ring necessarily falls within its purview.
[Clourts have applied the second exception of Teagut;. to a range of constitutional
rules of crin~inalprocedure. See, e.g., Ostrosky v. Afush, 9 13 F.2d 590,594-95
(9" hir. 1990) (mounting a new due process rule concerning mistjke of law
defenses and finding that the rule falls within the Tecrgzre exception for
"procedures implicit in the concept of ordered liberly" ); Hull v. Kelso, 892 F.2d
1541, 1543 n. 1 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (finding as a1 exception the rule announced in
Sandsfrom v. hfontunu regarding burden shifting instructions); Graham v. Hoke,
946 F.2d 982,994 (2d Cir. 1991) (iinding as an exception the rule amounced in
Cruz, that non testifying codefendant's confession may not be admitted); Williams
v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448,454-56 (4" Cir. 1992) (finding as an exception the _MiIIs
rule striking the unanimity requirement in jury findings of mitigating evidence);
Gaines (v. Kelly], 202 F.3d [598,] 604 [(2d Cir. 2000)l (finding as an exception
the Cage rule that describing reasonable doubt in terms of grave or substantial
uncertainty and requiring a "moral certainty" violates due process).
NofJLnan v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 547-48 (9thCir. 2001) (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
The State assures the Court that the accuracy of the conviction is not at risk. Response at
20. "The only issue is whether a jury should have been asked to find statutory aggravators
instead of the judge. That has nothing to do with the accuracy of the underlying conviction."
Response at 20. The State's inability to comprehend the concept at the heart of Ring v. Arizona the conviction in question is the conviction for capital murder, not simple murder - wholly
undermines the State's analysis regarding the affect that the lack of a jury properly instructed had
on the findings of aggravating circumstances and thus the accuracy of the verdict of "deatheligible."

D.

Prior Rulings That Apprendi Is Not Retroactive Do Not Preclude This Court From
Applying Ring Retroactively.
The State relies in part on the Ninth Circuit decisions of Jones v. Smith, 23 1 F. 3d 1227

(9thCir 2000) and United States v. Sanchez-Cbrvantes, 282 F.3d 664 (9thCir. 2002), which have
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declined to apply Apj~rendiretroactively. In Jones v. ,kith, an element of the crime was omitted
from the state court information, but the jury instructions were proper and argument to the jury
was made as to all the elements. 23 1 F. 3d at 1237. In analyzing whether Aj7prevziti uras
retroactive, the court held without disciplined analysis that -4pprendi was a new rule of criminal
procedure, thus satisfying the first step of the analysis. The Court went on to hold that the

Apprendi rule, "at least as applied to the omission ofcertain necessary elemenis@om the state
couri infirmution," did not fit into either Teugue exception and declined to apply ifpprendi
retroactively. Id., at 1238. Because Jones limited its analysis and holding regarding the Teague
exceptions to the facts of that case, it guides but does not control here. See United States v.

Sanchez-Cervunies, 282 F. 3d at 668. Indeed, in this case the jury was not properly instructed
nor were they asked to find the existence of any statutory aggravating circumstances.
In United Stutes v. Sanchez-Cervantes, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that

Apyrendi is not a watershed rule in the context of drug quantity determinations and does not
apply retroactively. 282 F. 3d at 671. The holding of Sanchez-Cervantes does not undermine the
retroactive application of Ring.
The Sanchez-Cervantes Court found that "requiring the jury to make drug quantity
determinations beyond a reasonable doubt will [not] greatly affect the accuracy of convictions."
282 F. 3d at 669. This observation has no application to the qualitatively different, and infinitely
more complex and important decision as to whether a defendant should be singled out as
deserving the possibility of facing the death penalty. "The penalty of death is qualitatively
different from a sentence of imprisonment." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305

(1976). Because of this qualitative difference, procedures which may be acceptable in the nonPETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 12

death arena cannot pass constitutional muster when death is involved. The bifurcated nature of
capital proceedings compels the conclusion that the retroactive application ofthe critical
constitutio~~al
principle of Ring is not bared. lfoffmun v. Aravt., 236 F. 3d at 539 (wherein the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached FiRh and Sixth Amendment conclusions in a capital case
that were different frorn a non-capital case (Buumann), by distinguishing the capital bifurcated
jury proceeding in Estelle frorn Baumunn's "noncapital," "routine" sentencing).
Just as the Baumnnn court limited its application to non-capital cases, so did ScmchezCervanres, 282 F. 3d at 67 1 n.45. The jurispntdential reasonableness of the distinction as noted
in HofJ";nun is compelling.
By distinguishing the procedures required in capital presentence stages from those
permitted in non-capital presentence interviews, Baz-lmannjoined a long line of
cases requiring heightened procedural safeguards in capital cases. See Lankford
v. Idaho,500U.S. 110, 125-27, 111 S.Ct. 1723, 114L.Ed.2d 173 (1991)
(weighing the "special importance of fair procedure in the capital sentencing
context" and holding that the lack of notice to the defendant of Idaho's intent to
seek the death penalty violated Due Process); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 1 1 1, 113-15, 102 S.Ct. 869,71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (discussing heightened
protections in capital cases and reversing death sentence because the jury was not
permitted to consider all of the capital defendant's mitigating character evidence);
Beck v. Alaharnir, 447 U.S. 625,637-38, 100 S.Ct. 2382,65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980)
(noting the Court's "often stated" principle that "there is a significant
constitutional difference between the death penalty and lesser punishments," and
overturning death sentence because the jury was not instructed on a lesser
included noncapital offense); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96
S.Ct. 2978,49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (finding that "the penalty of death is
qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment," and therefore holding
North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute unconstitutional).
Hofian, 236 F. 3d at 539-540. Therefore, under HoJYinan both Apprendi and Ring may be
applied retroactively in the capital context without running afoul of federal precedent. The State's
confidence "that, following these rulings, the Ninth Circuit would also find that the Ring decision
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flows from ,4pprerzdi and as such is a procedural change that does not affect the fundmental
fairness of the trial m d so is not retroactive, " [Response at 191, is pure speculation as the issue
has not been decided by the Ninth Circuit and no reliance thereon can be had.'

E.

Idaho's Case law Does Not Preclude Relief
Notwithstanding the position of the federal courts, this Court has the responsibility to

apply state law to the question as well. The State relies in part on the failure of the Idaho
Supreme CourtZsopinions in Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 41 7, 825 P.2d 1073 (1 99 1); Stuurt v.
State, 128 Idaho 436 ( 1 996) and Butler v. Stclte, 129 Idaho 899 (1 997) to apply particular rulings
reeoactively. None of these cases are dispositive of the question of retroactive application of
Ring v. Arizortcr to Petitioner's case.

"The federal constitution has no voice upon the subject [of retroactivity of a new rule of
state law]. A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself
between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward." Gt. A'orthern Ry. v.
Sunburst C'o.,(1 932) 287 U.S. 358,364. Accord, People v. Carrera, 777 P.2d 121, 142 (Cal.
1989). Idaho has used a three pronged test in both direct appeals and collateral attacks
established by the United States Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker, 38 1 U.S. 6 18 (1 965) to
determine the retroactive effect of cases. See e.g. State v. Whitman, 96 Idaho 489, 49 1, 53 1 P.2d
579,58 1 (1975) (a direct appeal where the Court cites Linkletter) and Starkey v. State, 9 1 Idaho
74, 76,4 15 P.2d 71 7, 71 9 (1 966) (a collateral attack where the Court cites Linklefter). The
question in Idaho of whether a case applied retroactively was determined by weighing, 1) the

4

Indeed, the issue is currently pending decision in the Ninth Circuit in a case nominated

SumnzerIin v. Stewart, No. 98-99002 (argued en bnnc Dec. 8,2002).
PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 14

pulFose of the new rule. 2) the reliance placed on the former rule and 3) the effect the retroactive
application of the new rule sould have on the administration of justice. 381 U.S. at 636, 85
S.Gt. at 174I . Two important principles of Id&o law on the question of retroactivity must be
kept in mind: (1) the usual rule is to give retroactive effect to judicial rulings, T@ton v. State, 99
Idaho 670,672, 587 P.2d 305, 307 (1978) ("The question of whether to follow the usual rule that
retroactive effect be given to judicial rulings or whether a particular case should be limited to
prospective effect only, using the criteria we outlined in State v. iCZihitnzan, 96 Idrtho 489,491,
53 1 P.2d 579, 581 (1975), arises when the rule announced in the more recent case overrules a
precedent upon which parties may have justifiably relied."); and (2) a state supreme court has
unfettered discretion to apply a particular ruling either purely prospectively, purely retroactively,
or partially retroactively, limited only 'by the juristic philosophy of the judges." Id.
"Consideration is given to applying a ruling prospectively 'whenever injustice or hardship will
thereby be averted.' " Wurtvick v. State ex rel. Clhunee, 548 P.2d 384,393 (Alaska 19761." Id.
It cannot be said that the reliance on Wulton v. Arizona was reasonable in light of the
clear language in Wirlton itself which misunderstood Arizona's statutory scheme and rejected
Walton's contention that the aggravating fictors in Arizona were elements. Wulton v. Arizona,
497 US at 648. Unlike the United States Supreme Court, the Idaho Supreme Court was well
aware of the role that the statutory aggravating circumstances played in determining death
eligibility, See State v. Churbuneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1 989) . Even if the reliance
on Wallon could be considered reasonable, prospective application only, is not necessary to avert

5

See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. at 610, 122 S.Ct. At 2444 (Scalia J. concurring).
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injustice or undue hardship. The need fbr finality in judgments must subrnit to the irrevocability
of the death sentence m d the absolute need for accurate and reliable findings regading the
verdict on the statutory aggravating circumstances. Courts can only be confident in the accuracy
and the reliability in a finding of death eligibility when the factfindil~gbody is able to debate and
diseowse and is free of any political pressure, i.e., when a jury of twelve not a single judge is
charged with the responsibility. Applying the third factor, there can be no reasonable tjnding
that applying the rule to fifteen defendanls who despite requests fbr the same were denied the
factfinding cannot be considered an adminislsative hardship worthy of depriving persons
sentenced to die of the retroactive effect of Ring v, Arizona

F.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(e) Does Not Preclude Relief.
As its final argument, the State contends "that Idaho Code 19-2719(5)(c) [J precludes the

retroactive application of a new rule in a successive petition." Response at 22.
1.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719 Does Not Apply Because Mr. Fields' Sentence Of
Death Was Outside The Range Of Permissible Sentences For His Offense Of
Conviction.

By its terms Idaho Code 19-2719 applies to death cases. Petitioner has been convicted
only of murder, not capital murder as it is now understood to include the elements of the
statutory aggravating circumstances. See generally, Petitioner's Response to State's Motion to
Summarily Dismiss Rule 35, pp. 7-8, State v. Fields, Case No. 16259.
2.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719's Time Limitation Jurisdictional Bar Violates The
Idaho Constitution's Separation Of Powers Requirement.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) plainly aims to limit the jurisdiction of district courts.
However, legislative efforts to restrict the district court's jurisdiction violate the Idaho
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Constitution. Idaho Const. Art. 11 # 1 (mandates that the powers of the three governmental
brancl~esremain separate); Art. V $13 (specifically prohibits legislative abrogation of judicial
jurisdiction); Art. V $ 20 (confers original jurisdiction on the district court to hear all cases). The
Idaho Supreme Court has consistently and long held that the legislature may not directly or
othewise restrict the district court's jusisdiction. See generally, Pdtioner" Response to State's
M o t i u ~to~Smmarily Dismiss Rule 35 Petition, State v. Fie/&, Ada County Case No. 16259
(filed herewith.) Consequently, even if Ring does mnounce some new rule of law which Mr.
Fields seeks to have applied to his case, Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) cannot stand as a bar.
3.

Idaho Law Prohibits Retroactively Applying Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5).

It is long settled "that an amendment to an existing statute will not, absent an express
legislative statement to the contrary, be held to be retroactive in application. Johnson v.
Stoddard, 96 Idaho 230,526 P.2d 835 (1974)[.I7Vebekerv. Piper Aircrafi Corporation, 113
Idaho 609,614,747 P.2d 18,23 (Idaho 1987)(citations omitted). See Idaho Code Section 73-101

('30
part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.")
Though the instant petition was filed after Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) was amended
to include subsection (c)~,applying that statutory provision in this case would constitute a
retroactive application. Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) raises an absolute bar to relief on any
claim based on the retroactive application of a new rule of law. Section 19-2719(5)(c) does not
create mere procedural requirements. It precludes an entire class of substantive claims, leaving
postconviction petitioners with no mechanism by which to assert those claims. Consequently,

6

Subsection (c) was amended into Section 19-2719(5) in 1995.
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applying Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) to Mr. Fields would constitute a retroactive
application. Though Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) expressly and absolutely bars
postconviction petitioners' claims dependent on retroactively applying a new rule of law, it
contains no express legislative statement that it st~oulditself be retroactively applied. It cannot,
then, be applied to the case at bar. See generally, Petitioner's Response to State's Motion to
Smmarily Dislniss Rule 35 Petition, State v, Fields, Ada County Case No. 16259 (i3ed
herewith).
4.

Idaho Code Section 19-2519(5) Violates Petitioner's Rights To Due Process And
Equal Protection Guaranteed Under The United States And Idaho Constitutions.

If Mr. Fields did not stand under sentence of death, Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)'s
time limitation jurisdictional bar would not

"I.C. fj19-2719 does not eliminate the

applicability of the UPCPA to capital cases, but it supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their
provisions conflict." hfcKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (Idaho 1999).
Because of this difference, applying that bar in the instant case would violate Mr. Fields' due
process and equal protection rights.
TOthe extent Idaho Code Section 19-2719's time limitation jurisdictional bar is construed
to preclude review of petitioner's claims, the statute is unconstitutional. It would violate Mr.
Fields' rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

'Under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), "post-conviction relief
is not burred where new evidence is discovered, or where luter case luw suggests a conviction is
unlaufil." Arugon v. State, 1 14 Idaho 758, 766 n. 12, 760 P.2d, 1174, 1182 n. 12 (Idaho 1988)
(citing 1.C.g 19-4901) (emphasis added). Also, under the UPCPA, I.C. Ij 19-4908, a claim can
only be waived fi the waiver is knowing, volunfury and intelligent. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho
695,700-01,922 P.2d 144, 149-50 (Idaho 1999). As noted in the text, to the extent that Idaho
Code Section 19-2719 conflicts with the UPCPA, the Section 19-2719 provision governs.
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States Constitution, m d Article 1, Sections 2 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution, in that there is no
rational basis, for the disparate treatment of non-capital prisoners who do not need to
denrollstrate the '"heightened burden" for postconviction relief which capital petitioners must
meet, e.g., Prrz v. State, 123 Idaho 758,760,852 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Idaho 19931, or meet the
limitations imposed by Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5), see, e.g., Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641,
648-49,8 P.3d 636, 643-44 (Idzrho 2000); Pizzuh v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 796-97, 10 P.3d 742,
745-46 (Idaho 1995). See generully, Petitioner's Response to State's Motion to Summarily
Disrniss Rule 35 Petition, Slate v. Flelair, Ada County Case No. 16259 (filed herewith).
Idaho's disparate treatment of capital as compared to non-capital postconviction
petitioners fails under a rational basis analysis. Necessarily, then, it fails under strict scrutiny
analysis, too. "A law which infringes on a fundamental right will be upheld only where the State
can demonstrate the law is necessary to promote a compelling state interest." Id. The state's
interest in expeditious handling of capital cases, the purpose of the offending provision, Idaho
Code Section 19-2719(5)(c), is not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify the violation of
petitioner's fhdarnental right to trial by jury.

CONCLUSION
For all these reasons and for all the reasons in Mr. Fields' previously filed pleadings in
the instant matter and in the Rule 35 Motion filed under Case no. 16259, the Court should deny
Respondent's motion to summarily dismiss the pending 19-2719 petition, vacate Petitioner's
sentence of death and set the matter for sentencing anew.
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Dated this

& day of April, 2003.

Attorney t'or Petitioner Zane Jack Fields
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U.S. Mail
Wand Delivery
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

)

v.

1
1
1

ZANE JACK FIELDS,
Defendant.

1
1

Case No. HCR 16259
FtESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
BSPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF
PETITIONER'S RULE 35 MOTION

Zane Jack Fields ("Defendant"), through counsel, files this opposition to Respondent's
Motion for Summary Dismissal of Mr. Fields' motion filed pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35.
Together with this Response, Mr. Fields is filing a supplemental response to respondent's motion
to summarily dismiss the August 2, 2002, Petition For Post Conviction Relief And/or Petition
For Writ Of Habeas Corpus. See Petitioner's Response In Opposition State's Reply Brief in
Support of Motion For Summary Dismissal of Petition For Post-Conviction Relief And/or Writ
Of Habeas Corpus. For the reasons set forth below Respondent's motion to summarily dismiss
Mr. Fields' Rule 35 motion should be denied.

PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S RULE 35 MOTION- I

,

\

1.

ARGUMENT
A.

BACICGROUND

Mr. Fields was convicted by a jury of first degree mrrrder. The infomation did not
chasge, the jury was not instructed on and did not find that the prosecution had proved beyond a
reasonable doubt the existence of my aggravating factor included in Idaho Code Section 1925 15. After the jury returned its verdict of guilt of Murder in the First Degree, the trial court
conducted sentencing proceedings and detemined beyond a reasonable doubt three aggravating
c i r c m s a c e s existed' and sentenced Mr. Fields to death.
Shortly before Mr. Fields filed the Rule 35 Motion, the United States Supreme Court
overruled its holding in Wulton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), that Arizona capital defendants
were not entitled to a jury decision on whether sentencing aggravating factors existed beyond a
reasonable doubt. Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428,2432 (2002). The court clarified that
"[clapital defendants, no less than non-capital defendants . . . are entitled to a jury determination
of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment." Id. at
2432. Before Ring, the Idaho Supreme Court consistently rejected the claim that the federal and
state constitutions require that Idaho capital sentencing involve a jury. See, e.g., State v.

'The trial judge found and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the three aggravating
circumstance found and weighed by the trial court, ( 1 ) "by the murder, or circumstances
surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life"; (2) the
"murder was committed in the perpetration of a robbery and/or burglary and was accompanied by
an intent to cause death"; (3) "the defendant, by prior conduct or conduct in the commission of
the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit murder, which will constitute a
continuing threat to society [§ 19-2515(g) (8)]. CR 167-170 (Findings of the Court in
Considering the Death Penalty, filed March 7, 1991).
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S RULE 35 MOTION- 2

C'huvboneau, 1 16 Idaho 129,774 P.2d 299, reh7gdenied (1 989). Ring compelled the Idaho
Supreme Court to reverse course, demonstrating that its earlier position was mistaken because it
was grounded in a misreading of United States Supreme Court precedent. Stute v. Fetterly, 137

Idaho 729,730,52 P.3d 874,875 (2002)(vacating death sentence and remanding for resentencing
on ground that Ring requires juries to ""make factual findings of the aggravating h t o r s necessary
to the imposition of a death sentence").
In Ring, the United States Supreme Court attributed its erroneous holding in Walton to its
misunderstanding that under Arizona state law, "the aggravating factors [were not] 'elements of
the offense' [but, rather, were] 'sentencing considerations' guiding the choice between life and
death. [Waiton,] 497 U.S. at 648 (internal quotation marks omitted)." Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2437.
This was mistaken because under Arizona law, absent a finding of an aggravating circumstance,
death and life imprisonment were not "the alternative verdicts." Walton at 648. Ten years later,
the Arizona Supreme Court clarified that under its state law capital defendants are not eligible for
a death sentence absent a finding of at least one aggravating circumstance. Stute v. Ring, 200
Ariz. 267,279,25 P.3d 1139, 1151 (Ariz. 2001)("ln Arizona, a defendant cannot be put to death
solely on the basis of a jury's [guilty] verdict[.] . . . [Tlhe death sentence becomes possible only
after the trial judge makes a factual finding that at least one aggravating factor is present."); see
Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2436.
With t h s corrected understanding, the United States Supreme Court necessarily reached a
different result than it had in Whlton. In particular, the court held that "we overrule Walton to the
extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating
circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty." Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2443. Put
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another way, King made clear that m y facts necessary to increase the maximum allowable
sentence are elemears of the offense. Ring, 122 S.Gt. at 2443 (because aggravating factors
necessary to the imposition o f a death sentence '"perate as 'the h e t i o n a l equivalent of an
element of a greater offense' the Sixth A m e n b e n t requires that they be found by a
jw'?j)citation omitted); see Harris v. UnifedSfates, 122 S.Ct. at 2409 (Kennedy, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., m d O'Connor & Scdia, JJ.)("Yhose facts setting the outer limits of a sentence,
and of the judicial power to impose it, are the elements of the crime for the p q o s e s of the
constitutional analysis") )and at 2323-24 (""[If the legislature, rather than creating grades of
crimes, has provided for setting the punishment of a crime based on some fact . . . that fact is also
an elementm)(Thomas,J., joined by Stevens, Souter & Ginsberg, JJ.). As Justices Scalia,
Rehnquist and Thomas very recently agreed:

Our decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),
clarified what constitutes an "element" of an offense for purposes
of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee. Put simply, if the
existence of any fact (other than a prior conviction) increases the
maximum punishment that may be imposed on a defendant, that
fact . . . constitutes an element, and must be found by a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id., at 482-484,490.

[Flor purposes of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee, the
underlying offense of "murder" is a distinct, lesser included
offense of "murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances":
Whereas the former exposes a defendant to a maximum penalty of
life imprisonment, the latter increases the maximum permissible
sentence to death. Accordingly, we held that the Sixth Amendment
requires that a jury, and not a judge, find the existence of any
aggravating circumstances, and that they be found, not by a mere
preponderance of the evidence, but beyond a reasonable doubt.
[Ring], at [2443] (slip op. at 22-23j.
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Suttuzahn v. Pennsyl~~aniu,
123 S.Gt. 732, 739 (2003)(Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., &
Thomas, J.).
Applied to the instant case, this means that Mr. Fields was convicted of non-capital ikst
degree muder, a lesser included offense of first degree murder "plus one or more aggravating

circmstances[,]'3.e.-capital murder. For this reason, Mr. Fields' death sentence was outside the
range of sentences lawfully available for his offense of conviction. Mr. Fields, then, must be
resentenced for non-capital first degree murder. See State v. Nzmez, 133 Idaho 13,20,981 P.2d
738, 745, reh'g denied (Idaho 1999)(where jury instructions omitted essential element of felony
but included elements of misdemeanor, conviction was for misdemeanor; "accordingly, Nunez
should have been sentenced only for misdemeanor convictions [and] [%]hecase will be remanded
for this purpose."); State v. Roll, 118 Idaho 936,801 P.2d 1287 (Ct.App. 199O)juudgment of
conviction reversed without any harmlessness analysis where essential element of offense
omitted from jury instructions).
Indeed, because the jury did not convict Mr. Fields of capital murder, the trial court was
without jurisdiction to impose a death sentence on him. It was without this jurisdiction for other
reasons, too: the charging document, a prosecutor's information, did not include the aggravating
factor elements relied on at trial; no preliminary hearing determination was made that there was
substantial evidence supporting the existence of the aggravating factor elements relied on at trial;
the jury did not determine that any aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating
circumstances; and the jury did not determine that the mitigating circumstances did not make the
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imposition of death unjust."aYs

v. State, 113 Idaho 736,739,747 P.2d 758,761 (Ct.App.

1%7)(""A jurisdictional defect exists when the alleged facts are not made criminal by statute, or
where there is a failure to state facts essential to establish the offense charged. L7iateV. Grady, 89
Idaho 204,404 P.2d 347 (1965); State v. CuZe, 31 Idaho 603, 174 P. 131 (1981); 1,G.R. 7(b)."),
afd, 115 Idaho 3 15,316 766 P.2d 785,786 (Idnho 1988)("we concur with the decision of the

Court of Appeals'". Since Mr. Fields was sentenced to a penalty greater than authorized for noncapital first degree murder, his sentence "is void as to the excess if the valid portion is severable
from that portion which is void." State V . Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71,76,57 P.3d 782,787 (Idaho
2002).3 In any event, where a jury charge omits an essential element of a greater crime, but fully
instructs on a lesser crime, a guilty verdict is a conviction for the lesser offense. State v. Nunez,
133 Idaho 13,20,98 1 P.2d 738,745, reh'g denied (Idaho 1999). The sentence must, therefore,
be within the range of penalties for that lesser offense. Id.

'Mr. Fields raised each of these claims in his August 2,2002 Motion to Correct Illegal
Sentence pursuant to Rule 35.
3Thisclaim is timely. "The issue of whether a court has exceeded its subject matter
jurisdiction is never waived and purported judgments entered by that court, acting without
subject matter jurisdiction, are void and subject to collateral attack. Sierra Life Insurance Co. v.
Granata, 99 Idaho 624,626,586 P.2d 1068, 1070 (1978); see Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455,
459, 680 P.2d 1355, 1359 (1984)Cvoid judgment is nullity and "can be collaterally attacked at any
time"]." State v. Heyrend, 129 Idaho 568, 571,929 P.2d 744,747 (Ct. App. 1996). Even where
the Uniform Post Conviction Act, Idaho Code Section 4901 -491 1, is generally unavailable as an
avenue to relief, "it is available to cure fundamental errors occurring at the trial which affect
either the jurisdiction of the court or the validity of the judgment, even though these errors could
have been raised on appeal." Smith v. Stute, 94 Idaho 469,474,491 P.2d 733,738 (Idaho 1971).
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
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B.

THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS FAIL.

Noting that Idaho Criminal Rule 35 allows a court to correct an illegal sentence at any
time, Respondent while not specifically arguing agaches to its brief Judge Culet's Decision and
Memorandum in WoHman v. Arave, in which Judge Culet finds that this provision is trumped by
Idaho Code Section 19-2719's time limitation. This argment fails because, as already noted, the
trial court was without jurisdiction to impose a death sentence, and jurisdictional claims rnay be
raised at any time. Supra, at 6 n.3 and accompanying text. Even if this Gaud disagrees, though,
the argument fails for several other reasons. First, Section 19-2719 does not apply because Mr.
Fields' sentence of death was outside the range of permissible sentences. Second, Section 1927 19's time limitation jurisdictional bar violates the Idaho Constitution's separation of powers
requirement. Third, Idaho law prohibits retroactively applying Section 19-2719 to Mr. Fields'
case. Finally, fourth, applying Section 19-2719's time limitation jurisdictional bar to Mr. Fields'
case would violate his rights to due process and equal protection as guaranteed by the United
States Constitution and Idaho Constitution.
1.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719 Does Not Apply Because Mr. Fields'
Sentence Of Death Was Outside The Range Of Permissible Sentences For
His Offense Of Conviction, Non-Capital First Degree Murder.

The Hofian decision relies on State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 828 P.2d 891 (1 992).
There, the Idaho Supreme Court held "that the forty-two (42) day time limitation of I.C. tj 19271 9(3) applies to claims of illegality of a sentence of death." Id. at 864, 893. The petitioner in
Beam asserted that his sentence was illegal because the trial judge failed to weigh each
aggravating circumstance against all mitigating circumstances as required by State v.
Charboneau, 1 16 Idaho 129,774 P.2d 299 (Idaho 1989). Thus, the petitioner complained that
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
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the trial judge employed an illegal process to detcmine the otherwise permissible sentence not
that death was an impermissible sentence. By contrmt, Mr. Fields contends here that his
sentence was outside the range of pemissible senteilces for his offense of conviction. Beam is
inapposite.

2.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719's Time 1,irniation Jurisdictional Bar Violates
The Idaho Constitution's Separation Of Powers Requirement.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) provides:

(5) If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this
section and within the time limits specified . . . [t]he courts of
Idaho shall have no power to consider any such claims[.]
(a) An allegation that a successive post-conviction petition rnay be
heard because of the applicability of the exception for issues that
were not known or could not reasonably have been known shall not
be considered unless the applicant [meets certain other enumerated
requirements].

(c) A successive post-conviction pleading asserting the exception
shall be deemed facially insufficient to the extent it seeks
retroactive application of new rules of law.

I.C. tj 19-2719(5). This provision plainly aims to limit the jurisdiction of district courts.
However, legislative efforts to restrict the district court's jurisdiction violate the Idaho
Constitution.
The Idaho Constitution, Article V, Section 20, confers original jurisdiction on the district
court to hear all cases. Idaho Constitution Article 11, Section 1, mandates that the powers of the
three governmental branches remain separate and, more particularly, Article V, Section 13,
specifically prohibits legislative abrogation of judicial jurisdiction:
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
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The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial
department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it
as a coordinate depmment of the goverment; but the legislature
shall provide a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law,
when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their
powers of all the courts below the Supreme Court, sofar as the
same may be done without conflict with the Constitution[.]
Id. (italics added). Of course, as the Supreme Court has long held, a postconviction petition "is a
proceeding entirely new and independent from the criminal action which led to the conviction."
Paradis v. State, 1 10 Idaho 534,636, 716 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1986). Thus, Article V, Section 13's
reservation of power to the legislature has no application to 9 19-2719 proceedings since they are
not appeals.
Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c)'s removing district court jurisdiction to consider
postconviction claims seeking retroactive application of new rules of law violates the Idaho
Constitution's separation of power mandate. In State v. Interest oflindsey, 78 Idaho 24 1,246,
300 P.2d 491,494 (1 956), the Idaho Supreme Court struck a statute purporting to transfom
previously criminal matters of juveniles into civil matters because "[tlhe legislature, by denoting
as a civil matter what the law has previously regarded as a felony, attempt[ed] to take away
jurisdiction vested in the district court by the constitution itself, and . . . attempted to render that
court powerless to do anything about the prosecution of such persons." Similarly, in Boise City
v. Better Homes, Inc., 72 Idaho 441,444-45,243 P.2d 303, 304 (1 952), the Supreme Court held

that "[tlhe original jurisdiction conferred upon the district court by the constitution, Art. 5, 920,
cannot be diminished by the legislature. Const. Art. 5, 91 3[.]" Again, in Clemons v. Kinsley, 72
Idaho 25 1,256-57,239 P.2d 266,269 (1 95 I), the Court held that "[tlhe broad jurisdiction
[created by Article 5, Section 131 is not subject to diminution by legislative act." The Court held
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
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the same thing in Robinson v. Robinson, 70 Idabo 122, 127,212 P.2d 1031, 1033-34 (1949).
Finally, in McIf~ightv. Grant, 13 Idaho 629,637,92 P. 989,990 (1907), the Court held that,
'"[wle think [Article 5, Section 131 was . . . intended to preserve to the judicial depastment of the
state government the right and power to finally detemine controversies between parties
involving their rights and upon whose claims some decision or judgment must be rendered or
detemination made." In short, the Idaho Svlpreme Court has consistently and long held that the
legislature may not directly or otherwise restrict the district court's jurisdiction. Consequently,
even if Ring does announce some new rule of law which Mr. Fields seeks to have applied to his
case, Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) cannot stand as a bar.
3.

Idaho Law Prohibits Retroactively Applying Idaho Code Section 1927 19(5).

It is long settled "that an amendment to an existing statute will not, absent an express
legislative statement to the contrary, be held to be retroactive in application. Johnson v.
Stoddard, 96 Idaho 230,526 P.2d 835 (1 974)[,]" Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 1 13
Idaho 609'6 14,747 P.2d 18,23 (Idaho 1987)(citations omitted). See Idaho Code Section 73-101
("No part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.")
Though the instant petition was filed after Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5) was amended
to include subsection (c), %applying that statutory provision in this case would constitute a
retroactive application. Puradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223,9 12 P.2d 110 (Idaho 1996), illustrates
why. There, the lower court applied a statute enacted after the trial and direct appeal were
concluded. The Supreme Court held that the statute's application was prospective, not

4Subsection(c) was amended into Section 19-27 19(5) in 1995.
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We agree with petitioner and those courts that having had cause to
consider the question in full, have concluded that the Supreme
court did not hold in Lindtz that courts are necessarily to apply the
new provisions of chapter 153 to all habeas petitions filed after
April 24, 1996 [i.e.- AEDPA7senactment date]. More particulaly,
we hold that Lindh did not foreclose-and indeed contemplatedcontinuing resort to L~mdgraf [i.e.-retroactivity of statutes]
analysis in order to ensure that application of chapter 153's new
provisions is not impemissibly retroactive in such cases.
bfueller v. Angelone, 18 1 F.3d 557,567 (4' Cir. 1999)(citing to t - o ~re Wansurd, 123 F.3d 922,
933 n.22 (tjthCir. 19971, and citing to In re Mnarik, 166 F.3d 591 (3"' Gir. 1999), and Brown v.
Angelone, 150 F.3d 370 (4" Cir. 1998)). See Scott v. Boos, 21 5 F.3d 940, 949 (9" Cir.
2000)(federal prohibition against retroactive application of statute absent clear Congressional
statement of intent looks to "parties' actions, not the date of filing").
Though Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) expressly purports to absolutely bar
postconviction petitioners' claims dependent on retroactively applying a new rule of law, it
contains no express legislative statement that it should itself be retroactively applied. It cannot,
then, be applied to the case at bar.
4.

Idaho Code Section 19-2519(5) Violates Petitioner's Rights To Due
Process and Equal Protection Guaranteed Under The United States And
Idaho Constitutions.

If Mr. Fields did not stand under sentence of death, Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)'s
time limitation jurisdictional bar would not apply.5 "I.C. $19-2719 does not eliminate the

'Under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), "post-conviction relief
is not barred where new evidence is discovered, or where later case law suggests a conviction is
unlawful." Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,766 n.12,760 P.2d7 1174, 1182 n.12 (Idaho 1988)
(citing I.C.9 19-4901) (emphasis added). Also, under the UPCPA, I.C. $ 19-4908, a claim can
only be waived ifthe waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho
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applicability of the TJPGPA to capital cases, but it supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their
provisions conflict." hfckrinney v. Slate, 133 ldaho 695,700,992 P.2d 144, I49 (Idaho 1999).
Because of this difference, applying that bar in the instant case would violate Mr. Fields' due
process and equal protection rights.
To the extent Idaho Code Section 19-2719"s time limitation jurisdictional bar is construed
to preclude review of petitioner's claims, the statute is unconstitutional. It would violate Mr.
Fields' rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, and Article 1, Sections 2 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution, in that there is no
rational basis, for the disparate treatment of non-capital prisoners who do not need to
demonstrate the "heightened burden" for postconviction relief which capital petitioners must
meet, e.g., Paz v. State, 123 Idaho 758,760,852 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Idaho 1993), or meet the
limitations imposed by Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5), see, e.g., Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 64 1,
648-49,s P.3d 636,643-44 (Idaho 2000); Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793,796-97, 10 P.3d 742,
745-46 (Idaho 1995). Romer v. Evans, 5 17 U.S. 620, 63 1-36 (1995); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,446-51 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55,61-63
(1982); U.S.D.A. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,535 (1973); Sterling H. Nelson & Sons, Inc. v.
Bender, 95 Idaho 813,815-16,520 P.2d 860,861-62 (Idaho 1974).
Moreover, because Idaho's statutory postconviction scheme makes available different
mechanisms for enforcing fundamental rights-here, the right to a jury trial-depending on whether
the petitioner stands sentenced to death, that discriminatory scheme must be assessed with strict

695,700-01,922 P.2d 144, 149-50 (Idaho 1999). As noted in the text, to the extent that Idaho
Code Section 19-2719 conflicts with the UPCPA, the Section 19-2719 provision governs.
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S RULE 35 MOTION- 13

scrutiny. See Van Vulkenburgh v. C'ifisensfor Term Limii,~,135 Idaho 121, 126, 15 P.3d 1129,
1 134 ( I d d o 2000) (if a h d a e n t a l right is at issue, appropriate standard of review of law
infringing on that right is strict scrutiny); iVewEan v. Sfate, 96 Idaho 7 11, 7 14, 535 P.2d 1348,
1351 (Idaho 1975) (strict scrutiny when statute's classification infringes upon a fundamental
right); Siute v. Breed 111 Idaho 497,500,735 P.2d 202,205 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (strict
scrainy of statutory schemes that infkinge upon a "'fundmental rightbuch as voting,
procreation, or constitutional safeguards for persons accused of crimes7'). See generally Ronald

D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise On Constitutional Law 5; 18.41 at 800-01(3"' ed. 1999)
("When the g o v e m e n t takes actions that burden the rights of a classification of persons in terms
of their treatment in a criminal justice. system it is proper to review these laws under the strict
scrutiny standard for equal protection.")
Idaho's disparate treatment of capital as compared to non-capital postconviction
petitioners fails under a rational basis analysis. Necessarily, then, it fails under strict scrutiny
analysis, too. "A law which infringes on a hndarnental right will be upheld only where the State
can demonstrate the law is necessary to promote a compelling state interest." Id. The state's
interest in expeditious handling of capital cases, the purpose of the offending provision, Idaho
Code Section 19-2719(5)(c), is not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify the violation of
petitioner's fundamental right to trial by jury.

CONCLUSION
For all these reasons and for all the reasons in Mr. Fields' previously filed pleadings in
the instant matter, the Court should deny Respondent's motion to summarily dismiss the pending
Rule 35 petition, vacate Petitioner's sentence of death and set the matter for sentencing anew.
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
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Dated this d:ay

of April, 2003.

Attorney for Zane Jack Fields

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
/iL

I hereby certify that on the / 3 day of April, 2003,I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, postage prepaid where
applicable, addressed to:
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Roger Bourne
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office
200 W. Front St., Room 3 191
Boise ID 83702
Facsimile: 208-287-7709

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile
Overnight Mail

PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S RULE 35 MOTION- 15

&&3

**

4

I

R E G E U\k7 E @

a

APR 2 4 2C03

@%-z?-__--&QYY
raEB-------

MZ-'-=

GREG H, B O W R
Ada C o w Prosecuting Attomeprosecut~ngABornsy s Office

**i-

ApB 2 3 2003

Ada County

4.

Roger % m e
DepuQ Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar a 1 2 7
200 W . Front Street, Room 3 191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephorte: (208) 287-7700

-

---

Clark

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL, DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ZANE FIELDS,
Petitioner,
vs .

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. SPOT020071lD

STATE'S RESPONSE TO
PETITIONER3 S W P L E m m A L
AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF

1

COMES NOW, Roger Bourne, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and makes a State's Response to the Supplemental
Authority provided by the Petitioner in Support of Petition for Post Conviction Relief.
This supplemental authority is the memorandum decision by District Judge Bradbury in
the George Porter v. State of Idaho case from the Second Judicial District.
The State does not attempt an exhaustive analysis of Judge Bradbury's opinion in
this response because of time constraints. However, the State's research indicates that
every court that has considered the question of whether or not the

decision is

retroactive has decided that it is not retroactive. The following federal courts have found
STATE'S S P O N S E TO PETITIONER'S SUPPLEME3TAL AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR POST CONMCTION RELKEF (FIELDS), Page 1

that the

decision is not retroactive: Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 98 (10' Cir. 2002);

Trueblood v. Davis, 301 F.3d 784, 788 (7" Cir. 2002);

,2003 WL

261799 (8' Cir. 2003); Sibley v. Culliver, 2003 WL 256907 (M.D. Ala. 2003); U.S. v.
n o m a , 2002 VlL 31545772 (D. Del. 2002); Gav v. U.S., 2003 WL 168416 (S.D. New
York 2003); United State v. Johnson, 2003 WC 1193257 P . D . 111.2003); Ben-Yisravi v.
Davis 2003 WL 402829 (N.D. Ind. 2003).

-9

The folIowing state courts have found that the Ring decision is not retroactive:
State v. Towery, 64 P3.d 828 (Ariz. 2003); Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463 (Nevada 2002).
In addition to the cases cited above, five Idaho district court opinions have denied
post conviction relief based upon the Ring decision, including: McKinnev v. State,
Leavitt v. State, Rhoades v. State, Hoffman v. State, and Wood v. State. This Porter
decision is the only one that the State is aware of that has found the

decision to be

retroactive.
Additionally, regardless of whether or not Teawe v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989),
applies to Idaho Code $19-2719, every state and federal opinion that the State has been
able to find that considers the Ring case and A~prendiv. New Jersey, has held that Ring
and Arsprendi are not substantive, but are procedural. The most recent cases include
United States v. Davis, 2003 WL 1837701 (E.D. La. 2003); State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828
(Ariz. 2003); Sibley v. Culliver, 2003 VVL 256907 (M.C. Ala. 2003); United State v.
Sampson, 2003 7JVt 352416 (D. Mass. 2003).
Judge Bradbury held that Fetterlv v. State, 121 Idaho 4 17 (199 1) may not apply
because Fetterly was decided before Teape. However, subsequent cases have applied
the Fetterly analysis after Teague was decided. Stewart v. State, 128 Idaho 436 (1996);
Butler v. State, 129 Idaho 899 (1997); State v. Townsend, 124 Idaho 881 (1993).
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Finally, as discussed in

'64 P.3d at 834-35, the Supreme Court declined to

make Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), retroactive. DeStefano v. Woods, 392

U.S. 63 1,633 (1968). Duncan held that the basic Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. In DeStefano at page 634-635, the
court explained, "we would not assert, however, that every criminal trial - or any
pmicular trial - held before a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may never be as
fairly treated by a judge as he would be by a jury." In Towery, supra, the Arizona
Supreme Court found this argument to be particularly persuasive in holding that Ring was
a procedural change only.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, it appears that the better weight of authority is that the Rinp;
decision and the A~prendidecision are procedural changes and that they are not
retroactive.

RESPECTFULLY SUB-D

t h i s 2 day of April 2003.

GREG H. B O W R
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

By:

Roger Bourne
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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CERTmCAm OF SERWCE
that on this

& day of April, 2003, 1 served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing State's Response to Supplemental Authority in Support of
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief to Joan M. Fisher, Capital habeas Unit, Federal
Defenders of Eastern Waswgton and Idaho, 201 N. Main, Moscow ID 83843, by
depsithg in the U. S. Mail, postage prepaid.
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Deputy Prosecutkg Attorney
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ZANE JACK FIELDS,

VS.

)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

PetitionerlDefendant,

RespondentlPlaintiff.

Case Ma. SPOT0200"7lD/WCRl6259
STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL
RESPONSE IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

)
)
)

COMES NOW, Roger Bourne, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and makes a supplemental response to the State's earlier
memorandum provided in support of its motion to dismiss. The supplemental information
being provided by the State is the Memorandum Decision and Order in the Creech case
and the Sivak case written by Fourth District Judge Ronald J. Wilper. The decisions are
attached to this response. Judge Wilper granted the State's motion for summary judgment
in those cases on the same issues that are before this Court.
STATE'S S W P L E m N T a RESPONSE IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS
(SIVAI(/SPOT020071lD/HCR16259),
Page 1

001.96

The State understwds that these decisions are not binding on this Court, but
supplies them for the Court's information. The State has earlier supplied Judge Culet's
decision in the Mawell Hoffman case, which also granted the State's motion for
s u m a r y judment on similar issues.
The State is aware of a decision in State v. Porter, written by Second Judicial
District Judge John Bradbury, which denies the State's motion to dismiss. A copy of that
decision is also attached.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This

2day of

,2003.

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

S m S C m E D AND SWORN to be me this

1day o

,2003.

i

STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE IN SUPPORT OF STATEX MOTION TO DISMISS
(SrvAWSPOT0200711D~CRl6259),
Page 2
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that on this

3day of

2003, 1 served

a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Supplemental Response in Support of
State's Motion to Dismiss to Joan M. Fisfrer, Capital Habeas Unit, Federal Defender's,

201 N. Main St., Moscow ID 83843, the following person(s) by depositing in the U.S.

STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE IN SUPPORT OF STATIE'S MOTION TO DISMISS
(SNMSPOT0200711DM:GR16259), Page 3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WE FOURTH JUDICIAL

r/

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN

OF ADA

WOMAS EUGENE CREECH,
Petitioner,

Case No. SPOT 0200712D
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

VS.

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

I

Respondent.

1"'

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. HCR10252

14

VS

.

15

THOMAS EUGENE CREECH,
16

Defendant.

17

3.9

1

This case came before the Court on the State's Motion to Dismiss Thomas
Creech's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief andlor Writ of Habeas Corpus, and

20

Petitioner's Motions to Correct or Vacate his sentence of death. Because the new rule
21

22

25

i

announced by the United States Supreme Court in Rina v. ~ r i z o n a 'does not apply

Rina v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
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a

retroactively to the Petitioner's case, the State's Motion to Dismiss the Petition is
1
2

GMNTED and Petitioner's Motions are DENIED.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

3
4

On August 2, 2002, the PetitionerIDefendant,Thomas Eugene Creech (hereinafter

5

Petitloner), filed a second successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief andlor Writ of

I(

Habeas Corpus (Case No. SPOT-02-00712D), together with a Motion to Correct Illegal

/I
11
/I
11
11

sentence of Death and for New Sentencing Trial (Case No. HCR10252).

The

RespondentfPlaintiff. State of ldaho (hereinafter the State), filed a Response and a Motion

to Dismiss the Petition on September 3, 2002.

O'

l1
lZ

/I

Oral argument was heard on March 7, 2003. The Petitioner submitted additional

post-hearing authority in support of his argument on April 11, 2003. The State filed a
Reply on April 21, 2003.

FACTUAL AND

17

1a
19
20

A3

24

25

26

11

On August 28, 1981, the Petitioner pled guilty to Murder in the First Degree for

1
I/
11

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

killing a fellow inmate while the Petitioner was a prisoner in the custody of the ldaho
Department of Corrections.' Petitioner was sentenced to death on January 5, 1982. He
appealed and his case was eventually remanded to the district court for re~entencing.~
On April 17, 1995, the district court entered its findings and imposed the death penalty

1) under ldaho Code 8 19-2515.'
The facts regarding the offense are contained in the ldaho Supreme Court's 1983 decision, State v.
Creech, 607 P.2d 463, 105 ldaho 362.
"rocedural
history of the remand is contained in the ldaho Supreme Court's 1998 decision, State v.
Creech, 966 P.2d 1, 132 ldaho I(hereinafter Creech 11).
a Petition Exhibit 2A.

/I11
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1

The Petitioner filed his first petition for post-conviction relief on May 9, 1995. The

2

district court denied relief and the ldaho Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of

3

conviction, the imposition of the death sentence and the denial of his petition for post-

4

conviction relief on August 19, l%18.~

5

The Petitioner filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief on June 1, 2000.

6

The district court dismissed the successive petition. On June 6, 2002, the ldaho Supreme

7

Court dismissed the Petitioner's appeal of the district court's d e c i ~ i o n . ~
ANALYSIS

10

The instant petition and motions are based on the United State Supreme Court's

11

2002 decision in Rinq v. Arizona, supra, which overruled their 1990 decision in Walton v.

12

~ r i z o n a . ~In overruling Walton, the Supreme Court relied on their 2000 decision in

33

A~prendiv. New Jersey.8
In Walton, the Supreme Court said Arizona's death sentence statute was

14
l5

compatible with the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which guarantees

16

criminal defendants the right to a trial by a jury. Specifically, the Arizona statute assigned
to the judge, not the jury, the duty to decide whether or not certain aggravating factors
were present in capital cases, and if so, to weigh those factors against any mitigating
fa~tors,and in this way to decide whether or not to impose the death penalty. The Court
in Walton said the statute did not deprive defendants of their Sixth Amendment right to

21

trial by jury because aggravating factors are sentencing considerations, not elements of

22

the crime.

Creech ii, infra.
Creech v. State, 51 ~ . 3 387,
d 137 Idaho 573 (2002).
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
Amrendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

24
25

26

!I
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In 2000, the United States Supreme Couri issued its decision in the case of

L

, a "hate crime" case. In

2

, the Supreme Court held that

3

other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

4

beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a

5

reasonable doubt. The New Jersey statute provided that once a defendant was convicted
of a certain crime, it was the duty of the sentencing judge to decide whether or not the
facts of the case made it a "hate crime." If so, the maximum penalty was greater than it
would be if the judge determined it was not a hate crime. The Court said those factors
-

operate as 'Yhe hnctional equivalent of an element of a greater offense."
,.dI at 494, n.19.
That being the case, the defendant had a right to have a jury decide whether those facts

I
The Supreme Court ~ o u l dnot reconcile the Walton decision with the Ag~rendi

were present.

decision. As a result, a divided court overruled Walton and announced a different rule in

m. The rule announced in Rinq is that aggravating factors in capital cases operate as
the functional equivalent of elements of a greater offense.

Therefore, the Sixth

Amendment gives the defendant the right to have those facts determined by a jury,
Idaho's death penalty statute, as it existed at the time the Petitioner was ultimately

I sentenced to death in 1995, was essentially identical to the Arizona statute declared to be
unconstitutional in

fin^.

The Idaho Supreme Court recognized this in State v. Fetterly, 52

P.3d 874, 137 ldaho 729, (2002). "...Rim v. Arizona ...appears to invalidate the death
penalty scheme in Idaho ..." Id.at 875. The Court vacated the death sentence in Fetterlv

2.2

26

I

and remanded the case for sentencing.

m M O . m U MDECISION
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1

A "new rule" applies retroactively to state cases pending on direct review, or not yet

2

final? The appeal in Fetterly was pending before the ldaho Supreme Court when the

3

United States Supreme Court decided

4

5
6

1)
/I

1

on June 24, 2002. Therefore, the new rule

applies to Fetterly's case and presumably to all ldaho death penalty cases pending on
June 24, 2002. However, Creech's case was not pending on direct appeal on that date.
Petitioneis conviction and sentence became 'Yinai" in 1998. Creech II, supra. A state
conviction becomes final for the purposes of retroactivity analysis when the availability of

8

9

1.0

/Idirect appeal to the state courts has been exhausted and the time for filing for writ of

1
/I1
1

certiorari (with the United States Supreme Court) has elap~ed.'~

11.

Petitioner suggests the & decision is not a "newn rule of law, but the argument is

not persuasive. A new rule is one not dictated by precedent existing at the time a

judgment became final."

l2

Walton was the precedent existing at the time Creech's

judgment became final.

I4

I/

Under most circumstances, a new law does not apply to cases that are already final

when the new law is declared. This is because the State, no less than a criminal
defendant, has a reasonable right to rely on the law as it existed at the time the case is

17

"finally" decided. In the instant case, the Petitioner pled guilty to First Degree Murder in

le

1982. He was sentenced to death following Appeal in 1995. The case became '%nalnin

1998. The doctrine of finality is not a novel concept. As the United States Supreme Court
20

// said in a 1989 decision,
In many ways, the application of new rules to cases on collateral review
may be more intrusive than enjoining of criminal prosecutions for it
continually forces the states to marshal resources in order to keep in prison

'Grfffithv. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,107 S. Ct. 708 (1987).

l d ~ e a a u v.
e Lang,489 U.S. 288, 109 S, Ct. 1060 (1989); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227 (2000); Fetterlv v.
State, 121 ldaho 417 (1992); Stuart v. State, 128 ldaho 436 (I996);Butler v. State, 129 ldaho 899 (1997).
%tier
v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1890).
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I
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I

I

I

defendants whose trials and appeals conform to then existing Constitutional
standards. Furthemore, as we recognized in
, "state courts
are understandably frustrated when they faithfully apply existilng
Constitutional law only to have a federal court discover.. .new Constitutional
demands." Teague supra.

A new law may even apply to 'Yinal" cases in limited circumstances. The United

l11

Slates Supreme Court may specifically hold that the new law announced in a decision

must be applied retroactively to other "finalncases. The Supreme Court is the only entity

Ilthat can make a new rule retroactive in this manner, such that all other United States
8

Ilcourts must apply the rule retroactively."

1

The Supreme Court did not state that the

holding in f?&~ would be applied retroactively to final cases.

.

10

I
I
I1

.

The next step in determining whether a new law should be applied retroactively to a
11

final case is to determine whether the rule announced is a new "substantive" law, or a

12

retroactive^^.'^

13

"procedural" law. If the new law is substantive, then it is applies

,,

law is procedural, then the Court must go through what is commonly known as the Teaaue

1s

analysis. supra.

16
l7

18

20

21

if the new

Petitioner argues that the new law created by Ring is a substantive law because

1

Rin~
refines the definition of an element of a capital offense. However, the Ninth and

l/Tenth Circuits have recently held that Ap~rendiannounced a new rule of criminal

/I

procedure, not substantive law.I4 This Court is persuaded that s i ~ c eRinq is clearly an
extension of Apprendi, and since the law created in A ~ ~ r e n is
d iprocedural, the new law
createdJby
.&?F

is a procedural law.

22

24

TvIer v. Cain, 533 U.S.656 (2001).
Bouslevv. United States, 532 U.S. 614, 620 (1998).
Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227 (9' Cir. 2000): Cannon v. Mullin. 297 F.3d 989 (10" Cir. 2002); and United
States v. Mora. 293 F.3d 1213 (10Ih~ i r2002).
.
l2
j3

25
26

''
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a
in Rinq is not a procedure that is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Therefore,
1

I/

the new law created in Rinw shall not apply retroactively to Petitioner's case.

3

II

HABEAS CORPUS

I/
II11
1

8

11

The Writ of Habeas Corpus remedy is not availabfe. The Uniform Post-Conviction

Procedure Act has replaced the writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of challenging the

validity of a con~iction.'~The proper use of a petition for post-conviction relief "avoids
repetaious and successive applications; eliminates confusion and yet protects the
applicant's constitutional ric~hts."'~

9

RULE 35 MOTION
3.0

The sentence of death was not illegal when it was imposed in 1995, nor when it
11

became final in 1998. The new law announced in Rinq does not apply retroactively to

12

l3

I1
I/

Petitioner's case. Therefore, the Petitioner's Rule 35 ~ o t i o n "for correction of an

"illegal" sentence is denied.

l4
l5
l6

l7

11
11

CONCLUSION

Because the new rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in R i n ~

/Idoes not apply retroactively to the Petitioner's case, the Siate's Motion to Dismiss the
Petition is GRANTED and Petitioner's Motions are DENIED.

24

McKinnev v. State, 992 P.2d 144, 133 ldaho 695 (1999).

l6

25

26

Dionne v. State, 459 P.2d 1017, 93 ldaho 235 (1969).
ldaho Criminal Rule 35.

l7

la

1I ~
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
T-t,

Dated this

2s day of April, 2003.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
11

1, J. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
mailed, by United States Mail, on this ZF day of April, 2003, one copy of the
MEMOWNDUM DECISION AND ORDER as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to
each of the a8orneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows:
FEDEWL DEFENDERS OF EASTERN WASHINGTON & IDAHO
JOAN M. FISHER
CAPITAL HABEAS UNIT
201 N. MAIN
MOSCOW, ID 83843
HAMPTON & ELLIOT
TERESA A. HAMPTON
P.O. BOX 1352
BOISE, ID 83702
ADA COUNTY PROSECU.TOR

VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL

J, DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIS

1

LACEY M. SIVAK,
Petitioner,

Case No. SPOT 020071OD
MEMOWNDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

lo

I2

11 THE STATE OF IDAHO,

I1Respondent
STATE OF IDAHO,

13

Plaintiff,

Case No. HCRI 0183A

14

VS .

15

LACEY M. SIVAK,
16
17

'

Defendant.

1

18

This case came before the Court on the State's Motion to Dismiss Lacey Sivak's
19

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief andlor Writ of Habeas Corpus, and Petitioner's Motions
20

to Correct or Vacate his sentence of death. Because the new rule announced by the
21

22

United States Supreme Court in Rinq v. ~ r i z o n a ' does not apply retroactively to the

23
24

25

26

Rinp v. Arizona. 122 S. Cf.2428 (2002).

MEM0RAM)UM DECXSXON
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1

Pe"tiioner"scase, the State's Motion to Dismiss the PeGtion is GFIPINTED and Petitionets
Motions are DENIED,

2

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

5

/
//Petitioner),Ried his fifth state Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and/or Writ of Habeas 1

11

On August 2 , 2002, the PetitionertDefendant, Lacey M. Sivak (hereinafter

//Corpus (Case No. SPOT-02-00710D),together with a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence

I/
)/
1

of

8

Death

and

for New Sentencing Trial

(Case No. HCR10183A).

The

RespondentiPlaintiff. State of ldaho (hereinafter the Slate), flied a Response and a Motion

to Dismiss the Petition on September 3, 2002.

lo
11

//

Oral argument was heard on March 7, 2003. The Petitioner submitted additional

1

1

I

post-hearing authority in support of his argument on April 1I , 2003. The State filed a

22

Reply on April 21, 2003.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDUWL BACKGROUND

l5

16

(1

Petitioner was arrested for the April 1981 robbery and murder of Dixie Wilson.
Petitioner's trial took place in September 1981.2 The jury found Petitioner guilty of robbery

17

and felony murder. On December 16, 1981, the district court imposed a fixed life
18

sentence for the robbery conviction and the death sentence for the first-degree felony
19

20

murder conviction.

21
22

23
24
25

26

The facts regarding the offense are contained in the Idaho Supreme Court's 1983 decision. State v. Sivak,
674 P.2d 396.105 ldaho 900 (hereinafter Sivak I).

mMORANDUM DECISION
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Z

2

(1

The ldaho Supreme Court vacated Petitionerfs death s e n t e n c e three times for
procedural defects.3 After Petitioneis death sentence w a s vacated for t h e third time, t h e

11 district court entered findings of fact, entered a new judgment of conviction, and re-

I111

imposed the death penalty under ldaho Coder 5 19-2515 on September 29,1992.~On

&

s

August 18, 1995, the Supreme Court affimed the district court's d e c i ~ i o n . ~
Foilowing re-imposition of the death sentence, Petitioner flled a second petition for
,

7

postconviction relief. On May 5, 1993, t h e district court dismissed the second petition. On
a

August 18, 1995, the ldaho Supreme Court dismissed the Petitioner's appeal of t h e district

ANALYSIS
12
13
14

///I

T h e instant petition and motions a r e based on t h e United State Supreme Court's
2002 decision in Rinq v. Arizona, supra, which overruled their 1990 decision in Walton v.

~ r i z o n a . ~In overruling Walton, t h e Supreme Court relied on their 2000 decision in

15

Apprendi v. New Jersey. 8
16

.

In Walton, the Supreme Court said Arizona's death s e n t e n c e statute w a s
17

compatible with the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which guarantees
18

l9

is
26

I

criminal defendants the right to a trial by a jury. Specifically, t h e Arizona statute assigned

Sivak I (delivery of sentencing findings of fact and conclusions of law without an open court hearing); Sivak
v. State, 'l12 ldaho 197,203 (1986) (Sivak I! ) (failure to consider all of Sivak's mitigating evidence at
sentencing hearing); State v. Sivak, 119 ldaho 320, 322 (1990) (Sivak Ill ) (improper weighing of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances and improper consideration of victim impact testimony).
4
The procedural history of the remand is contained in the ldaho Supreme Court's 2000 decision, Sivak v;
State, 8 P.3d 636, 134 ldaho 641.
S t e - v . Sivak, 901 P.2d 494. 127 Idaho 387 (1995) (Sivak IV).
-- Sivak IV.
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U S . 639 (1 990).
A ~ ~ r e nv.d iNew Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

I1

NlEMORAJYDUNI DECISION
AND ORDER - Page 3

to the judge, not the jury, the duty to decide whether or not certain aggravating factors
were present in capital cases, and if so, to weigh those factors against anyi'mitigating
factors, and in this way to decide whether or not to impose the death penafty. The Court
in Walton said the statute did not deprive defendan& of their Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury because aggravating factors are sentencing considerations, not elements of
the crimeIn 2000, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in the case of
Ap~rendiv. New Jersey, a "hate crime" case. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that
other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. The New Jersey statute provided that once a defendant was convicted
of a certain crime, it was the duty of the sentencing judge to decide whether or not the
facts of the case made it a "hate crime." If so, the maximum penalty was greater than it
would be if the judge determined it was not a hate crime. The Court said those factors
operate as "the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense."

k,
at 494, n.19.

That being the case, the defendant had a right to have a jury decide whether those facts
were present.
The Supreme Court could not reconcile the Walton decision with the A~orendi
decision. As a result, a divided court overruled Walton and announced a different rule in

m. The rule announced in Rinq is that aggravating factors in capital cases operate as
the functional equivalent of elements of a greater offense.

Therefore, the Sixth

Amendment gives the defendant the right to have those facts determined by a jury.
,

. .

Idaho's death penalty statute, as it existed at the time the Petitioner was ultimately
sentenced to death in 1992, was essentially identical to the Arizona statute declared to be
unconstitutional in Rinq. The Idaho Supreme Court recognized this in State,v. Fetterly, 52

/I
8

I

mMORANDUM DECISION
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-

P.3d 874, 137 Idaho 729, (2002). ". ..

...appears to invalidate the

death

penalty scheme in Idaho ..."g.at 875. T h e Court vacated t h e death sentence in Fetterjv

I/ and remanded the case for sentencing.

A 'hew rule" applies retroactively to state cases pending on direct review, or not yet

final.' The appeal in Fenerlv was pending before the ldaho S u p r e m e Court when the
United States Supreme Court decided

on J u n e 24, 2002. Therefore, t h e new rule

applies to Fetterly's c a s e and presurnably to all ldaho death penalty cases pending on
June 24, 2002. However, Sivak's case w a s not pending o n direct appeal o n that date.
-

Petitioner's conviction a n d sentence became "final" in 1995. Sivak IV, supra. A state
conviction becomes final for the purposes of retroactivity analysis when the availability of
direct. appeal to the state courts h a s been exhausted and t h e time for filing for writ of
certiorari (with the United States Supreme Court) h a s elapsed.10
Petitioner suggests the

decision is not a "new" rule of law, but t h e argument is

not persuasive. A new rule is o n e not dictated by precedent existing a t the time a
judgment became final." Walton w a s the precedent existing a t t h e time SivaL's judgment
became final.
Under most circumstances, a new law d o e s not apply to cases that a r e already final
when the new law is declared. This is because t h e State, no less than a criminal
defendant, h a s a reasonable right to rely on the law as it existed a t the time the c a s e is
"finally" decided.

In t h e instant case, the Petitioner w a s found guilty of First Degree

Murder in 1981. He w a s sentenced to death following Appeal in 1992. T h e case became

Griffith v. Kentucky,479 U.S. 314, 107 S. Ct. 708 (1987).
Teaaue v Lane, 489 U S . 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227 (2000): Fetterlv v.State, 121 ldaho 417 ('1992); Stuart v. State, 7 28 ldaho 436 (1996); Butler v. State. 129 ldaho 899 (1997).
ld

%tier
25

V. McKellar, 494

U.S. 407 (1990).
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/("final1'in 1495. The doctrine of finality is not a novel concept. As the United States
Supreme Court said in a 'i 989 decision,

11

In many ways, the application of new rules to cases on collateral review
may be more intrusive than enjoining of criminal prosecutions for it
continually forces the states to marshal resources in order to keep in prison
defendants whose trials and appeals conform to then existing Constitutional
standards. Furthermore, as we recognized in Ensle v. fssac, "state courts
are understandably frustrated when they faithfully apply existing
C;onstitutional law only to have a federal court discover.. .new Constitutional
demands." Teaaue supra.
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A new law may even apply to "final" cases in limited circumstances. The United

I/

States Supreme Court may speciiically hold that the new law announced in a decision
must be applied retroactively to other @f'inal7' cases. The Supreme Court is the only entity

I
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that can make a new rule retroactive in this manner, such that all other United States
12
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courts must apply the rule retroa~tively.'~The Supreme Court did not state that the
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holding in R i n would
~
be applied retroactively to final cases.
The next step in determining whether a new law should be applied retroactively to a

I

final case is to determine whether the rule announced is a new "substantive" law, or a
"procedural" law. If the new law is substantive, then it is applies r e t r o a ~ t i v e l ~ .If' ~the new
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law is procedural, then the Court must go through what is commonly known as the Teaaue
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Petitioner argues that the new law created by Rinq is a substantive law because
refines the definition of an element of a capital offense. However, the Ninth and
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Tenth Circuits have recently held :hat Ap~rendiannounced a new rule of criminal
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Tyler

v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001).
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'' Bouslev v. United States, 532 U.S. 614, 620 (1998).

26
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procedure, not substantive lavv.I4 This Court is penuaded that since
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,
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extension of
created by

1
,

is clearly an

'

, and since the law created in

is procedural, the new law

is a procedural law.

A new procedural law is not applied retroactively to cases that have become final

prior to t h e new rule being announced, unless the case fafls within one of two

11 exceptions. Teague, 484 U.S. at 305-306.

I/

decision. Therefore, the

to the

It is clear that Petitioner's case was final priar

decision can only be applied retroactively if the

// new procedural law falls within one of the two exceptions.
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The first exception is that a new law shall be applied retroactively if it places

10

"certain kinds of primary private individual conducf beyond the power of the criminal law11
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making authority to proscribe." Id. at 311, The second exception applies to "those

l2

procedures that ...are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."

The first exception is

not applicable to Petitioner's case because the holding in Rinq does not place "private

l4

individual conductl'7n this case murder, beyond the power of the criminal law to

"6
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proscribe.
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The United States Supreme Court has held that the second exception involves

YWatershed rules of criminal procedure.^^ which means "bedrock procedural elements that

19

must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction."

u. The procedural rule at

20

issue "must implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial," and be an accuracy21

enhancing pro~eduralrule.
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Id. at

312-313. The Ninth Circuit has held that the new

procedural rule create in Apprendi is not so fundamental as to fit within Teaque's second

Jones v. Smith. 231 F.3d 1227 (9" Cir. 2000);Cannon V. Mullin. 297 F.3d 989 (10" Cir. 2002);and .United
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ex~eption.'~
Again, this Court finds the reasoning of the courts in those Federal cases to
1

I1
I1

be persuasive. Since Ring is an extension of A~prendi,the

in

n e w procedural rule created

is not a procedure that is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Therefore,

the new law created in Rina shall not apply retroactively to Petitioner's case.
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HABEAS CORPUS

6

The Writ of Habeas Corpus remedy is not available. The Uniform Post-Conviction

)I
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Procedure Act has replacedthe writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of challenging the

I

validity of a ~onviction.'~The proper use of a petition for post-conviction relief "avoids

9

repetitious and successive applications; eliminates confusion and yet protects the
10

applicant's constitutional rights."17
11

RULE 35 MOTION

1 became final

The sentence of death was not illegal when it was imposed in 1992, nor when it

l3
l4
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in 1995. The new law announced in Rino does not apply retroactively to

I

Petitioner's case. Therefore,the Petitioner's Rule 35 blotion" for correction of an

1s

l1illegajl1
sentence is denied.
CONCLUSION
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Because the new rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in Rinq
does not apply retroactively to the Petitioner's case, the State's Motion to Dismiss the
Petition is GRANTED and Petitioner's Motions are DENIED.
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States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213 (10'" Cir.2002).
United States v. Juan SanChel-Ce~antes,
282 F.3d 664. 670 (9" Cir. 2001):Jones, 231 F.3d at 1238.
'13 McKinnev v. State, 992 P.2d 144, 133 Idaho 695 (1999).
j7 Dionne v. State, 459 P.2d 1017, 93 Idaho 235 (1 969).

7s

'' Idaho Criminal Rule 35.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this

26

ar '7.- of April, 2003.
day
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I, J. David Navarro, the undersig

uthority, do hereby certify that I have
mailed, by United States Mail, on this
day of April, 2003, one copy of the
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